Emergent Form of Existential Consciousness Through a Dialectical Process of Act and Agency by O'connor, Daniel F.
AN EMERGENT FORM OF EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
THROUGH A DIALECTICAL PROCESS OF 
ACT AND AGENCY 
By 
DANIEL F. 0 'CONNOR 
1\ 
Bachelor of Science in Education 
Northern State College 
Aberdeen, South Dakota 
1966 




Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 






AN EMERGENT FORM OF EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
THROUGH A DIALECTICAL PROCESS OF 
ACT AND AGENCY 
Thesis Approved: 







MAY I I 1976 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
.:IIJ;radually it has become clear to me what every philosophy so far 
has been; the personal confession of its author and a kind of involun-
tary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) inten-
tions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which 
the whole plant has grown" (Nietzsche, 1968:203). 
This inquiry essentially represents an attempt to understand 
myself in relation to others and the environment. I have focused on the 
development of consciousness, for without understanding how people may 
become conscious and how they may construct reality, I would have little 
understanding for topics concerning social change and radical movements. 
I would like to acknowledge and express my appreciation to several 
people. I have enjoyed the friendly atmosphere and expert assistance 
that Jill Holmes and other members of the fourth floor of the library 
have shown me throughout my stay at Oklahoma State University. I would 
like to thank Oklahoma State University and Antioch College for their 
cooperation in this inquiry. To members of my committee: Dr. Richard 
Dodder, Dr. Larry Perkins, Dr. George Arquitt. and Dr. Gene Post; I 
greatly appreciated your assistance in advising me with this study. I 
have greatly appreciated the advice and excellent reading material 
which Dr. Perkins has suggested for me. I consider myself fortunate to 
work with two scholars and gentlemen of the calibre of Dr. Dodder and 
Dr. Perkins. 
I would like to express my appreciation to the members of my 
iii 
family. MaryJane and James showed a tremendous amount of patience and 
understanding during the course of this inquiry. I would like to ex-
press my deepest gratification to my wife, Pat, for her invaluable 
assistance in taking a collection of rough drafts and putting them into 
a polished professional final copy. Pat has acted as typist, editor, 
proofreader and companion throughout this inquiry. I am fortunate to 
have such a wonderful wife and children. I would also like to express 
my appreciation to Pat's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Vitale, and my parents, 
Dr. and Mrs. O'Connor, for their understanding and assistance. 
A special word of thanks to my good friend, Richard "Kodak" 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
FOCUS OF THE INQUIRY 
Overview of the Inquiry, , , , , 
Significance of the Problem, ••••• , • 
CONSCIOUSNESS:. A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION. 
Introductien . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
Consciousness: Prior to the Phenomenology 
of Mind • • • ---Hegel , , • • • 
The Phenomenology of Consciousness • 
Geist ••• , , .. . .. •. . . . 
Marx 
The Proletariat: The Vehicle of 
Transformation , . , • . 
Praxis: The Method of Transformation 
Nietz~che •••••••••• 
. . ;
Nihilism: The Inability to Experience Self 
Re-evaluation of Morals: The Master and 
Slave Morality •••••• 
Summary ••••• 
III, AGENCY: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Introduction 
Alternatives to a Rational Paradigm ••••• 
Weber: Characteristics, of a Bureaucracy • • • • 
A Critique of Domination: Rationalization. 
Increased Centralization: The Drive for 
Specialization ••• 
Hegel, Marx and Weber: Critique of 
Domination • • • • • 
IV. ACT: 1A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FROM A DIALECTICAL 
PERSPECTIVE .••••••••• 
Introduction .•••• 
The Dialectical Perspective: A Process of 
Mediation •• 
Praxis Via Acts: View of Consciousness 
A Dialectical Psychology: The Self and 
































Assumptions of the Dialectic • • • • • • • • 63 
The Logic of the Dialectic: The Fringe 64 
Dialectical Logic: A Non-Linear Field 
of Relationships. • • • • • • . • • • • 67 
A Dialectical Sociology: Act as a 
Dialectical Concept of Praxis 74 
Summary: Act as a Dialectical Concept of Praxis 76 
V. CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACT 
AND AGENCY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ) • • 
Introduction 
The Variables of the Model 
Consciousness 
Act . . . . . . . 
Agency • • • • • • . • • 
The Mechanism of the Model 










VI. THE TESTING MODEL AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN WITHIN 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION ••••• 
Introduction 
The Testing Model. 
Assumptions 
Propositions. • ••• 
Definition of Variables • 
The Sample •••• 
Data Collection. • ••• 
High Agency ••••••• 
Low Agency ••••• 
Purpose in Life as a Measure of Existential 
Consciousness •••••••.•••••• 
Developing a Measure of Existential Consciousndss • 
Sartre's Conception of the Human Conditidt'l. · 
The Construction of the Questionnaire •• 
Pre-Test of the Questionnaire •••• 
Item An~lysis of the Questionnaire. 
Remaining Scales •••• 
Socialization ••.• 







































VII. CONSIDERA'J;'ION OF THE VARIABLES AND PROPOSITIONS 
Introduction ••••••••••• 
A Consideration of the Variables of Act and 
Agency • • • • • • • • • 
Criteria for Low Act • • • • • • • • • • • • •. 
Criteria for Low Agency 
Criteria for High Act 
Criteria for High Agency. 
Consideratien of the Propositiens. 
Limitations ef the Study •• 
• ! • • 
• • ' Ill • 
Consideration of the Propositions • •' •••• 
Student Characterization of Self 
VIII. CONSIDERATION OF THE MAJOR THESIS AND POSSIBLE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE INQUIRY .•••••• ; •• 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • 
Consideration of the Major Thesis. 
Existential Consciousness Questionnaire. 



















LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
I. Characteristics of the Sample. 
II. PIL Scale by Items 
III. Existential Consciousness Scale by Items 
IV. Pre-College Socialization. . . . 
V. Student Body Profile 
VI. Relationship of Act and Existential Consciousness • 
VII. Relationship of Agency and Existential Consciousness 
. . 
VIII. Relationship o~ Act and Agenc~ to Existential 
Consciousness. • • • • • • ••••• 
IX. Relationship of ·Act, Agency and Class Rank to 
Existential Consciousness ••••••• 













LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 
1. Diagram of the Model: Consciousness, Act and Agency. 
2. Representation of the Variables of Agency and Act and 







FOCUS OF THE INQUIRY 
Overview of. the Inquiry 
This study is an inquiry into the structural condition which may 
give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. A theoretical model 
is constructed in an attempt to accaunt for sueh a formation. · The 
variables of the model are consciousness, act and agency. The format 
of this inquiry will be to develop first the theoretical foundation for 
each of these concepts. Chapter II is a consideration of consciousness 
from a perspective of Hegel and Marx. The latter part of the chapter 
develops the foundation of an existential mode of consciousness as it 
is interpreted from Nietzsche's writings. Chapter III focuses on the 
theoretical foundation from which the variable of agency is developed. 
The major focus in this chapter centers on Weber's either/or evaluation 
which basically presents the alternative of an increased ability to 
meet human needs which would be accompanied by an increase of bureauc-
racy and, hence, domination or,a decrease in bureaucracy or domination, 
hence the ability to meet human neecds. This either/or appraisal is 
evaluated and other alternatives are suggested. Chapter IV is a 
-theoretical consideration af·the variable of act. The primar:y focus is 
directed toward a dialectical perspective which enhances·ene's real-
ization and power of transformation. After these variables of 
1 
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consciousness, agency and act have been considered, the theore~ical 
madel will be presented. 
The model · in its · general form pres en ts · ·three levels· of conscious-
ness which are sensual consciousness, self-conscio'usness, and u~i;,ersal 
self-consciausness. Fer purposes·of this study only the first two 
levels of consciousness shall be considered. At each of ·these levels 
there exists four types of int,raconsciousness. In the general model 
there will be a total·af eight ideal types of consciousness. 
As a test of the general model, a particular model is devised to 
be tested in two·educational institutions. In this testing model the 
variables, act and ·agency, were dichotomized into a high and a low form. 
The first concern of the research project was to operationalize the 
variabies of a low act so that it could be represented by an educational 
institution which-:,was open and flexible in meeting the interests of its 
students. A high., agency was to r.epresent an institution which modeled 
itself after a tightly structured bureaucratic form, After these 
desi__gnations are made, the variable of act is operationalized into 
' 
majors. Within each institution there will be a high and _a low act • 
. · Without ge,ing into further detail, this sheuld give the general impres-
sion of the structural character of the research design. 
To measure the variable of an existential consciousness a 
questionnaire was written which focused on the major existential 
cancepts of freedom, choice and the will to power. This questionnaire, 
~1ang With the PIL and ether newly devised scales, was administered to 
various groups of students within the low and high agencies. Additional 
infsrmation was gained through interviews and researching the written 
rules and regulati~ns of the vari~us agencies. ~he format of Chapter V 
3 , 
will present the theoretical model and discuss the eight 111,odes of 
emerging consciousness, while Chapter VI will present the testing model 
and the research inethodology. In Chapter VII the data will be presented 
in the form of a consideration of the criteria used in selecting the 
variable.of act and agency. Chapter VII will also invelve,a consider-
ation of the propositions. The final chapter will focus en the central 
thesis of the model which states that for those wµo are e~gaged within 
a situation characterized by a low act and low agency will on the 
average exhibit the greatest amount of existential consciousness. 
Significance of the Problem 
At present a major school of influence in organizational life in 
general and Sociology in particular is the belief that the individual 
is not capable of making decisions for himself. This assertion is 
argued froni on basically.two levels~ First, it is believed-that most 
individuals are not capable of making the propet decision. Arid 
secondly, that even if individuals are capable of making the proper 
decision, they will not be able to know the decisions'of ethers, and 
thus could possibly, in the act of choosing, embark upon courses of 
duplication and not make the most efficient choice. The central 
concern within a perspective of this type evaluates "ptoper" and 
"efficient" as to how well it serves the ideal of a secure state~ 
Security and safety for one class is often based upon the struggle of 
anather class. This study is intended to inquire into the types of 
consciousness that may emerge from various combinations of acts and 
agencies. The primary form of consciousness studied is existential 
consciousness. Existentialism tends to place tbe act~r in themiddle 
of the stage where he is held responsible for his decisions. Contrary 
to this belief is the perspective that regards individuals to '!)e 
appendages of a larger e:itternal order that.must be manipulated'and 
managed into position. 
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Througheut society today; institutional structures seem threatened 
at their very core. We are confronted with this basic premise: Insti-
tutions are in the process of transformation. Tijrough various 
structural combinations .qf acts,and agencies, wha.t type of transfor-
mation can we envision? If .we are to actively support situations where 
individuals become the central focus of concern, then situations 
leading to a developing existential consciousness will be a primary 
consideration. 
CHAPTER II 
CONSCIOUSNESS: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss·the theoretical basics 
from which the variable of consciousness shall be defined in this study. 
Consciousness shall be interpreted in a transcendental sense with a 
major emphasis on purposeful, self-directed action. When consciousness 
is considered from this perspective, two prominent theorists quickly 
come to mind. They are Hegel and Marx. In regard to Hegel, particular 
attention will be devoted to the path of consciousness as it evolves 
through its stages of sensual-consciousness, self-consciousness and a 
universal self-consciousness. The particular format which will be 
followed in.the section on Hegel will be to consider his analysis of 
consciousness as it was developed in the Phenomenology of Mind and 
then to consider the means to obtain this mode of consciousness as he 
expressed it in Geist. 
Marx shall be considered for his analysis of the means through 
which o~e becomes-conscious. In many ways·Marx may be thought of as. 
reacting in a dialectical manner to the system Hegel had developed. 
In Marx1s analysis Hegel's concept of the Universal was applied to a 
cla;ss forma~ion, and Hegel's concept of Geist was brought into a 
materialistic perspective through his concept of praxis. 
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A third aspect of consciousness will be considered from the 
theoretical foundation devel_§)ped by Nietzsche. It is his conception 
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of consciousness and the means Nietzsche expressed to obtain a self-
mastery or to experience a will to power that will act in this study as 
the theoretical foundation for the meaning of an existential mode of 
consciousness. The first concern will be to state the core me~ning of 
consciousness as it will be used in this study and then to consider how 
it was interpreted by Hegel's predecessors and contemporaries. Par-
ticular attention will be given to Descartes and Kant concerning their 
analyses of consciousness. 
Consciousness: Prior to the 
Phenomenology of Mind 
To be conscious is to be conscious of something. If this some-
thing is of the same element or condition, then the process of 
consciousness will not change. That something is assumed to be some-
thing different. The question af how one becomes conscious has been a 
central point of concern throughout history. Consciousness throughout 
this study will be defined as the mediation process which occurs 
between the in-itself and the for-itself or the representation of the 
thing and the concept of the things or a mediation of what Kant referred 
to as the phenoumena and the noumena. The fbcal point of this inquiry 
has been well expressed by Hegel: "Consciousness, we find distin-
guishes from itself ·something, to which at the same time it re1ates 
itself; or, to use the cui;-rent expression, there is something for 
consciousness ..• " (1967:139). 
For Descartes consciousness was.a process where the objects 
7 
impressed their forms upon the mental process. This aspect of philos-
ophy.developed into various forms of empiricism of which a most notable. 
strand was developed by.Berkely. From this perspective man was viewed 
as a unit who received impressions from external objects. 
Kant, in partial reaction to Descartes, quickly set out to correct 
the belief that objeets impress forms upon the conscieusness in 
Critique of Pure Reason. From the preface to the second edition Kant 
states: 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all of our knowledge must 
conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our know-
ledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them 
!!_ priori, by means of concepts; have, on this assumption, 
ended in failure. We must therefore, make trial whether 
we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, 
if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge 
(1958:16). 
The mode of analysis or path of mediation by which objects become 
known falls upon the path of experience which undergoes a process of 
understanding. This process of understanding, for Kant, followed a set 
form of~ priori rules. 
For experience is itself a species of knowl'~dge which in-
volves understanding; and understanding has rules which I 
must presuppose as being in me prior tq bpjects being given 
to me, and therefore as being~ priori (1958:16-17). 
Kant's mode of analysis allowed him to reformul.ate Descartes I 
question. For Kant everyone knew the real world a$ a unity for them ... 
selves. The phenomenon was a co11-struction of reality as it was for 
that person through a field of experiences. What was left unkriown to 
the subject,and which one had no control over the ~aterial of the out-
side world was expressed as 17-oumena. Kant had thus placed mah in the 
pesition of knowing the werld in its phenomena form but not being 
capable of knowing the world in its noumena form. What Kant had 
8 
achieved in philosophy was basically to bring man, the subject, back 
into a mediating relationship with the environment. From this develop-
ment, Hegel was particularly aware of· this reflective ac·t ef a 
transcendental position. 
Two other contemporaries which Hegel carefully studied were .Fichte 
and Schelling. Fichte posited the absolute Ego as the starting point 
of all knowledge. In oppesition to this absolute Ego, he contracted a 
non-ego which, through the opposition, knowledge was possible.· 
Schelling tried to improve en the subjectivism of Fichte by pesitin~ 
institution as the unifier of knowledge. 
In so doing, he suppressed the opposition between subject and 
object and asserted their unity beforehand, witheut tracing 
back in a reductive thinking process the cognitional ·exper-
iences of consciousness to their original ground (Novickas, 
1968:91). 
Hegel 
The environment and influences which Hegel was participating in 
during his life were centered upon the issues which Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling and other.s considered to be a worthy endeavor. Their mode of 
analysis·was directed to the act of consciousness and the relationships 
man engaged in to become aware of himself and his world. 
Hegel quickly goes to his contemporaries in the preface to the 
Phenemenologyof Mind to state that their contentions, however popular, 
are misdirected •. Those who have used an absolute in the determination 
of the thing in-itself as being incapable of being understood or as 
forms·of the absolute ego or a purely subjective basics are fer Hegel 
shart qf the task of sc;i.ence. What these views share are a fear of the 
truth. 
It starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a 
medium and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this . 
knowledge. More especially it takes fer granted that the 
Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the ether 
side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute is still some-
thing real; in other words, that knowledge, .which, by being 
outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is 
nevertheless true-a position, which, while calling itself 
fear of error, makes .itself known rather as fear of the 
truth (1967:133). 
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The task which Hegel hl;l.s set before him to "bring philosophy nearer 
to the forms of.science-that goal where it can lay aside the name of 
love of knowledge and actual knowledge" (1967:139). 
The Phenomenology of Consciousness 
The central thesis of·this section states.that for Hegel the mode 
of domination develops from the process of work from which objectif-
ications and reifications emerge with·the resulting observation that an. 
elimination of this domination cannot·be.overcome, Aufheben, in other 
acts of works but can only be transcended through.the process of Geist. 
Consciousness then is a process which evolves through this process 
first realizing itself in its· immediate farms·and then. enters into a 
struggle· of desires wh'ich culminate in a struggle af dominatian which 
is most commonly referred to as the master-slave relationship and can 
only find its fulfillm~nt in the.unification af·subject and abject .in 
the mode of a universal self~cansciousness. 
The Phenomenology, of.Mind did much i~ bringing philosophy closer 
to the state of being transformed. It acted as a unifier or rational 
thought as it attempted to ;s,yri.thesize all previous philosaphies. It 
had noted the essential character 0£ science and philosophy to be a 
self-transcendental act. In this precess Hegel noted the following: 
Man app~opriates knowledge and understanding and beco~es conscious. 
through th~ un:J-fying act of his own direction and in this act of 
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mediation the object of contemplation or experience enters intp this 
mediation with .self as the.whole process takes on a different meaning. 
For consciousness is, · on :the one· hand,. consc.ioµsness ef the 
object, .~.n · the other, consciousness of its elf; . consciousness 
of what to it· is true, .. and consciousness of its knowledge · of 
· that truth · (196 7: 141) • · 
•· - . . . . 
The fi:rst stage of consciousness Hegel referred ta as sensual · 
. . . . . . . 
consciousness.which consiSted of sense certainty, perception and under-
standing. All three of these modes,of consciousness were only partial 
truths. They :were found in their immediate state which is to say they 
lacked a unification of subject and object. 
The s~cond stage of consciousness notes the distinction of self and 
in this stage of self-consciousness, Hegel developed the theme of a 
master-slave r~latienship. Thi.s · section is probably one of the most 
. ' 
often. quoted ap.d has served as a source of revolutienary understanding 
(Mar~, 1972; Sartre, 1971; Memi, 1965; Fannon, 1968). At the begin-
ning levels of this consciousness the self conceives of itself as a 
mere object and treats others as mere objects. As it becomes aware of 
itself, it.must also realize that there are other selves. In,. this 
recognition there is an ensuing struggle for domination. "Self-con-
sciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and ]>y the fact 
that it exists for another self-cansciousness'-that is to say, it is 
only being acknowledged er 'recognized'" (1967:229). 
·Hi~tory· fti)r Hegel moved in' a dialectical.process which remains in 
an engoing movement through 111an's desires. Desire is not a singular 
universal theme but is composed of several cempeting components which 
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bring out the total engagement of man. Desire brings to the front what 
it is that man is willing to engage in; and through this process man 
becomes aware of what type of en,gagement he will become a part of. 
From this desire action is .the expression of man's negati0n. "The 
individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized 
as a Person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as 
an independent self-consciousness" (1967:233), 
The master engages in this fight to be recognized by others 
(slaves) as being superior. This recognition is illustrated through 
the slave's work which is performed for the master. Within this 
cont.ext the master attempts to be recognized by slaves and have others 
work for him which becomes the restricting and d.enying relationship for 
further growth. The master is encased within his own tomb. If the 
master is to.be recognized by slaves, then one must determine the 
nature of the relationship. It must be clear by now that the master 
has corttempt for his slaves and surely thinks less of them for their 
inability to enter into the fight. Thus, the recognition that the 
master receives is the very recognition he demands but ca.nnat consider 
worthy of his status because it comes from slaves. If the master 
wduld be recognized by other masters, then it would not be a master 
recogt1izing another master, which woulGl call for one performing the 
othet's wor;k because this relatienship is found ortly betweep masters 
and slaves and not between master and master. Th, master would prefer 
death rather thq.n recognize another superiority. ]for Kojeve, "mastery 
is an e:xistenti41 irqpa:sse'' (f968:46). 
The slave is one who preferred work for another rather than death. 
lhe slave is placed in at1 inferior position wher.e he supresses his 
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his desires .for another al).d, in so doing, cemes to a point of nothing-
ness. From this realization of·. nothingness, the slave begins to live 
for himself. What seems ta be the tomb for the slave becames the 
expression of .life. Work is the motion whereby man engages in the act 
of expressing himself through a beceming precess which will bring ta 
his own an understanding. (self=cansciousness) .~d ... freedom. 
Labour, ___ en .. the .. other _hand,._ .is .. deaire rest.rained and . checked, 
evanescence delayed.and,postpon.ed; in other words, labour 
.. sq.apes .and. fashions the thing ••.•. The cons.ciausriess that toils 
and serves accordingly attains, by this means the direct 
apprehension. of .. that. independent be:i.ng_. as its .. self (Hegel, 
· '196i; 23'8) • 
From·this relationship of the master.,.slave scenerio the foundation 
of Hegel's conception of work as an obj_e.ctification process _which he 
considered as a process of alienation is developed and the dialectical 
process of transformation is outlined. The stages of this process are 
developed first through a struggle af desire which occµrs in the realm 
. . . . 
of the i$e4iat:e and is.followed by the struggle of daminatian. Dom-
·ination, as it is expr.essed· here, is perf<l>rming work for another. The 
dialectic4tl prqcess is developed as the slave firs·t bec9mes an object 
or :thing external from self and through this objectific:$'tian a con-
I • 
comitant process of reificat:lion occurs. The paint at which Hegel 
leaves us:withip the stage ef self-consciousness is that the means of 
transformiltion are present for the slave to overcome his ce,ndition of a 
thinghood. The actual overco-.i-i;a.g proces's for Hegel dees not occur in 
the wo;rk.ing ;p;ro¢.ess but through tpe further development of an inward 
Jelf·~conseioilsn~ss·~ 
The third stage of conscieusness as Hegel described it wa,s the 
stage of a universal self-censciausness which was obtained through the 
13 •. 
mediation of dependent and independe.nt relationships. This process was 
generally referred to by Hegel as Geist. It is the unification of 
subject and object without a process of domination. For Hegel this wa.s 
achieved through the unification of spirit and reason. 
Geist 
Solomon (1972) has succinctly focused his attention on the develop-
ment of this concept. He argues that Hegel's development of Geist was 
directly concerned with replacing Kant's conception of the individual 
ego. Solomon attempts to support this contention by peinting out the 
use of a technique referred to as methodological solipsism, which 
Descartes, Kant and Hegel all used as a starting point of their philos-
ophies. 
Fo.r Reg.el .• , the transcendental ego. as Geist, .is a literally 
general or universal consciousness, aa; ,i:t ought to have been 
for Kant. Heg~l's Geist is .Kant's ego without the unwar-
ranted, cl,aim that there is one ego per .Person •. Geist is 
simply the underlying unifying prinei,ple of consciousness 
and, a.t the same time, the underlying rational will 'behind' 
all practical reason and action (Solomon, 1972:148). 
For further clarification of this concept one should understand 
the meaning which Hege.l assigned to reason. Baille (1Q67), in his 
introduction, outlines tp.e meaning as consisting of a ;reflective and 
intuitive process consisting along side of each other. Reason involves 
a cognitive process of full awareness but only in the general sense,; 
~eason is inseparable from the person. 
It ('rep.son) can be reflective when 1we consider the aspect of 
distinguishing and relating elements involved; and intuition 
when we consider the aspect of unit'ihg the~e d.if.ferences 
.into a single whole. But there are, after a,ll,. aspects; the 
function. is one and individual. Reaso11- .is· therefere 'mediate' 
and immediate in its operation and wherever it ope:rates this 
holds true. This means, however, that as a function it is 
self complete; directing itself and de.tennining .itself 
(1967:42). 
As :Bernstein (1971) has so clearly pointed out, we must not blur 
Hegel's conception of reasen wit.h the Humean terminelagy that· has 
. . I . . . . . 
managed so well to permeate our understanding of tine term. •For the' 
meaning Hume g~ye t;o reason, "separates it from experience and the 
passions, and. conc.eives of reasen as a faculty of individual men that 
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h~s no inner contaus or dynamic force.of its own" (Bernstein, 1971:15). 
For Bernstein Geist is a process of development which people gain 
through experience and acdcm. 
For the develepment ef Geist. ta reach absolute truth, it·. W<:>uld 
' ' ' 
. -· 
have ta encounter self-negatien which emerges from objectifica:tien and 
whi;ch is considered by Hegel in turn ta cause alienation. Through this 
process otf ',the dialectic, 'Geiijt is a negative. power of self-activ'ity. 
The unity.of reason and spirit gives rise to a universal sel,.f--censcious-: 
ness. And, · in achievi11g this movemen, t, one ha•s come full circle, which 
:iJs to say, consciousness· fully understands itself. 
Marx 
In the master-slave relationship the·critique of domination for 
Hegel occqrred.through.the working process~ This section will develop 
the thesis that Marx cohsidered the process of de~ina.tion occurring 
~htough,an,~lien~ted working environment that was purposefully created 
'by a minc{rity, the boutgepis class, in an effort to appl!'opriate surpl\!S 
va,l1.1e. Worki f~r''Mlirx was· not an .alienating process in-its~lf but a 
t:i;-ansforming process that d.~veloped one's censcieusness. The vehicle 
of transformation was not 'ta be found in a Geist. of an inward movement 
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put.through an outward movement of revolutionary change. Tpis was to be 
achieved, as Mane understood it, through the process of a praxis. 'The,· 
first concern of this section will be to explore how Marx c~me to view,;. 
the proletariat as the universal class and then to consider the process 
of praxis. 
The Proletarb.t: The Vehicle of Transformation 
Marx's early development may be generally referred to as a period 
of intense study through which he came to a point where he was able to 
critique Hegel and, as he thought, go beyond him. To do this Marx 
would have to transform philosophy from a speculative task to a mode of 
action. While he completed his degree at ~he University of Berlin, 
Mari continued tol study philosophy ~np maintain his associations with 
the Young He.ge_liains. Through this association he ca.me into centact 
with groups«within the Young Hegelians who wanted to take the study of 
phildsophy out of the J?ast, or what had occurred, and proj.ect it into 
the futu:i:-e. Cieszkowski, a member of the Young Hegelians, f:i,:rmly 
spearheaded this attempt of applied philosophy. To do this.he had to 
. • I 
1:eint:erpret Hegel's conception of matter. "In Cieslzkowsid's system 
matter can no longer remain, as in Hegel, the opaque expression ef 
spirit in self-alienation, its opposite.negatio1}" (Avineri, 1968:128)~ 
Ctl..e.szkowski' s vision of an applied .philosop:p.y clearly was in tune to 
what Feuerbach and Marx would.later develop·in their :concept of praxis. . . . . ; 
At this time,.however, the Young Hegeli.aris lacked a vehicle to express 
the realizat:it0,n_ of thE! fo:i:-thconili..n$ transforinatiot1. For the moment this 
group was at an·impasse. While the Young Hegelians practiced their 
critique, Marx attempted to complete his understanding of philosophy. 
When.philosophy reached the point of realizing itself, it in turn 
abolished itself in the expression of reality. This is achieved when 
philosophy is able to represent reality for it is based upon the 
assumption that in recegnizing reality a dialectical process involves a 
change in reality and also a change. for those who tdtness it. "This 
philosophy is, according to Marx, the Hegelian system, and therefore 
before Marx could move into praxis, he had te perfect philosophy only 
in order to transcend it" (Avineri, 1968:,.37). 
To achieve this end Marx strove to attain an adequate knowledge of 
reality in order to change it. The vehicle that would emit this change 
was developed in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. ·rn this 
critique Marx testified to the insights of Hegel in describing the rise 
of the modern state. 
The criticism of the< German philosophyef right and of the 
state, which was given its most logical, profound and complete 
expression by Hegel, is at once the critical analysis of the 
modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the 
definitive negation of all the past fo~s of consciousness in 
·Getman jurisprudence and politics, whose most distinguished 
an4 most general expression, raised to the level of a science, 
is precisely the speculative philosophy of right (O'Malley, 
1970:xxviii). 
In this Critique Marx analyzed Hegel's work using three techniques. 
The one that probably gave him the mo~t !nsight into this analysis was 
the transformational method that w~s so ·well utilized by Feuerbach in 
"Provisional-Theses for the ·Reform of Philosophy". Feuerbc1,ch simply 
describes the method of criticism of Hegel's speculative philosophy as 
the need "to make tihe p·redicate into the subject ••• in order to have the 
· und:t.sguised, pure and clear truth" (1970:xxix). This could be easily 
illustrated in speculative philQsOphy where the st&tement might be made 
that God made man in the likeness of himself. When the transformative 
' 
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method is applied, the st:atement would read: Man makes Gad in the 
likeness of hims.elf. Anether technique Marx used .· in the . Critique was a 
textual analysis where he would.cite paragraphs from Hegel's workand 
then analyze them. This precess, in part, acceunts fer the rather 
lengthy critique. The third technique was the use of a histerical 
approach which essentially analyzed what was ·being sa.id ta the actual 
record of history (Avineri, 1968). 
With the publication of the Gritigue, many o:f Marx's cencepts and 
outlines. of his later works wer~ already present in ,their essential 
forms. By this time he had out;:J,.ined hi~ concepts of the proletariat as 
representing the universal class and had called for the abolition of 
private property. This is to $uggest that.Marx's concept of socialism 
' ' ' 
and conununism were not developll!,en ts of his later writings. In response 
to Hegel's treatment of bureaucracy as the representative of the 
universal class, Marx adopted the concept of .a universal class and 
associated it;not with a b~~~ucrijcy but with thos.e who sought to work 
towards.the:universal interests of society. In dialectical fashion the 
particular class is a ~roup w-ho attempts to gain satisfaction not for 
universal needs and obj'ectives but for particular needs and objectives. 
Speaking of the univetsal class, Marx·saw that their: 
••• aim~ and interests must genuinely.be the aims and interests 
of·soi:iety itself, of which it becomes in reality the social 
head and heart. Itis 01;1.l.y in the nam~ of general interests· 
that a particular class can claim general supremacy (Avineri, · 
1972:8). I 
Marx's analysis of the develop:ment of classes points out tha:t, up until 
that time, classes existed ~s particular classes and that it was not 
'i·, 
until that time a universal class appeared. He associates the attri-
butes of the general intereSltQf all, the universal, with the 
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proletariat. Avineri's (1972) discussion of this point·is extremely 
enlightening as he points out that Marx's original contemtion of class 
did not emerge from an economic consideration but emerged from a con-
frontation with Hegel's use of the concept of universal class. In 
regard to property Marx simply called for the abolishment·of private 
property, or for the particular class to come to realize what was 
already a reality for the universal class. 
The ·ca:11 for an overcoming of·the state. may be found as early as 
1844 in the Economic~ Philosophic Manuscripts. Engels did call for 
a "withering away," but Marx acted from his own conceptions and 
Hegelian influences and called for an aufheben of the State. While 
Hegel viewed the state as an outgrowth from .the Spirit, Marx viewed 
the state as an organizational structure that came into being to 
appropriate surplus value. The State acted ta protect the interests 
and privileges of a particular class who owned the means of production 
and who controlled private prqperty. For Marx the social division of 
labor and inequality through seciety sprang from the need for this 
particular class to pretect its interests. In re~ard to the term 
aufheben, it is a primary concept utilized by Hegel. "This Hegelian 
term is, of course; the crux of the dialectical system: it implies not 
only abolition but also transcendence and preservation" (Avineri, 1972: 
13). Avineri sees this response by Marx as a direct aufheben of 
Hegel's,position. 
Only by abolishing ·the state as a particular. insitu,.tion can 
the· ultimate· aim of the Hegelian state, .i.e .• ,· universality 
be truly realized. Marx's abolition·of the' form. of the state 
is. aimed .at· preserving the universa,1.istic cont.ent of Hegel's 
idea of the state, and Marx's socialism is :not;hing else than 
Hegel's political theory ultimately aufgehoben-abolished and 
preserved (Avineri, 1972:13). 
•,.,: 
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With the publication of the Critique the germinal seeds for Marx's 
future thought and course of scholarship became firmly grounded. No 
longer could there be any doubt that Marx had radically broken.from the 
Hegelian paradigm. By this time the annomalities that Marx had person-
ally experienced and observed could no longer be accounted for within 
the system as Hegel had written it. As editor of several journals and 
newspapers, he personally experienced censorship and closure. He 
witnessed that the state fined peasants for using dead wood from the 
forests to burn during the winter months. His personal life and 
encounters kept him abreast of social strife and the concerns of daily 
life. He was cognizant of the conflicts within society. While the 
Young.Hegelians'had brought their critique as far as it would go, they 
stood at an impasse trying to fit Hegel's method into an active en-
counter of ongoing events. Feuerbach, using the transformation method, 
masterfully critiqued the state of existing speculative philosophy. At 
this time Marx set himself the task of analytically noting those points 
of agreement and disagreement with Hegel. This scholarly exercise has 
'been the point of many recent accounts on the relationship and contri-
bution Hegel had on Marx (Hook, 1936; MarC:tise, 1969; Lichtheim, 1971; 
Dupre~ 1966; Hyppolite, 1969; Avineri, 1968, 1972; Schroyer, 1973). 
Marx understood the need to first embark on a study of philesophy and 
then realized the.need to implement it. By 1844 he had the essentials 
of his philosophical basis, the vehicle for transformation, an outline 
of social change and now preceeded to critique the existing conditions. 
Marx was firmly engaged in the pursuit of a praxis. "We have begun to 
see how Marx's concept of praxis is a dialectical transformation of 
Hegel's Geist; it would be. impossible to make sense of praxis without 
. ii:.! '; : -
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the Hegelian background" (Bernstein, 1971:50), 
Praxis: The Method of Transformation 
Through the development of praxis, Marx had created a revolutionary 
concept. Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," especially the last three, 
testify to this revolutionary insight. For Marx the major obstacle, 
confronted by both idealistic and materialist.ic philosophies, was the 
inability to bridge the gap between subject and object. 
Marx argues that all epistemological theories hitherto pro-
pounded either held that ultimate reality is impenetrable to 
human cognition, or suggested that consciousness is a mere 
reflection of reality (Avineri, 1968:148). 
Through the development of praxis Marx believed that man became both a 
subject and an object. The process in which this was brought about, or 
the aufheben, is not through the development of self-consciousness as 
it is realized in the formation of a Geist but is brought about through 
the human endeavors of man through his labors. Praxis for Marx centered 
in human activity. The distinction between Geist and praxis also 
explains, the different conceptions each man developed toward the 
process of alienation. Briefly stated, Hegel saw the development of 
alienation as a process occurring from labor. He regarded labor as 
being alienated because man was always out-pacing the available 
economic resources by his ever-expanding needs. More essential to his 
conception of alienation was the process of externalization which 
implied that man became separated from his products. For Hegel, if 
alienation was to be overcome, it would not be in the forms of work or 
the resulting social relations but through the process of attaining 
self-consciousness which has been expressed in Geist. 
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Marx regarded the inability of philosophy to understand or over-
come alienation because it had, up to that time, regarded alienation in 
some form or another as a theoretical problem. In so doing, the only 
recourse left open for them was to resolve alienation through a mental 
process which ended in the development of consciousness. The impli-
cation clearly was that one should change one's censciousness. The 
casual factor in the development of alienation for Hegel was the 
objectification process. Marx regarded this as a necessary process but 
not the casual factor. The focal difference between Hegel and Marx 
resulted in the development of estrangement which was ·for Marx the 
casual factor producing alienation. Estrangement was firmly placed in 
the social-historical arena of man's environment. Aitnough alienation 
sprang from the economic conditions, its manifestations were vibrated 
through the social· and psychological eomposition of man. The concept 
of praxis is central to understanding what Marx considered to be 
alienation. It was not merely objectification that caused alienation 
but rather a breach in the ability of man to express himself • 
. It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself 
inhumanly in opposition to himself, but the fact that he 
objectifies himself in distinctio:n from and in opposition to 
abstract thinking, that is the pq'sited essence of th~ 
estrangement and the thing to be superseded (Marx., 1972: 8) • 
Marx ·acknowledges his debt to Reg.el for understanding labor as an 
essential aspect of man and is appreciative ef his development of the 
master-slave relationship but simply sees Hegel as staying within the 
realm of modern political economy. Through this shortcoming, Hegel 
only focused on pesitive aspects of labor. The mystique that ties the 
essential composition of a commodity and the resulting transitions that 
ensue in a capitalistic economy fs the central point of concern in 
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Marx's analysis of political economy. At various times the charge has 
been made that Marx can be.divided into early and late Marx, usually 
indicating that he drastically changes from a philosopher to an 
economist. This does not seem justified, as it has been indicated, 
Marx first felt it necessary to bring philosophy to a close so that it 
would transform itself. This mode of development or praxis is further 
based upon the intention of understanding the ongoing transaction of 
society which, for Marx, .centered in the division of labor as he 
sought to determine who acquires the surplus value of the labor process. 
The task of Capital was to demystify the realm of political economy. 
The earlier themes were germinated in The Critique and Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts and the German Ideology and were also present 
in Capital. Another work that actually served as a preparation for 
Capital, and. which took approximately 13 years of research, was 
Grundrisse.· This work, which was approximately 1000 pages, was not 
discovered until the outbreak. of the Second World War. 
The unmasking of this mystique of commodities was thoroughly 
undertaken in Capital and may be seen as a further development and 
articulization· of Marx's radical scholarship. In this unmasking Marx 
develops the concept of fetish;i.sm, which suggests that the value of the 
commodity does not originate in its use value but in the psychological 
conception of the work to be performed, the amount' of time spent on 
the production of the product a.nd the resu,lti1.1g s9cial forms and 
interactions that take place. The mystique originates when the social 
relationships of work are reP,laced by the relatio,nships of men via 
their products. 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because 
in it the social character of men's labour appears to them 
as an objective character stamped upon the product of that 
labour; because.the relation of the producers· ti;> the,sum 
total· of their own labor is presented ta them as a secial 
relatian, existing net between themselves, but between the 
products of their labour. This is the reason why the 
products of labeur become commodities, social things whose 
qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible 
bx the·senses ••• There is a definite social relation between, 
an'd that assumes, in .. their eyes, the fantastic form of 
relation between things. In order, therefore,,te find an 
analogy, we must have receurse to the enveloped regions of 
the religious world. In that world the products ef the 
human brain appear as independent beings endewed with life, 
and entering into relation both with·one. another and.l:he 
human race. So it is in the world of commedities with the 
products of men's hands. This,! call the Fetishism which 
attaches itself to the produc~~ qf l~bour, so soon as they 
are produced as commodities, ahd which is therefore insep-
arable from the production of cemmodities (Ma,rx, 1967:72). 
Labor for Marx was nat an alienated activity in itself as it was 
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fer Hegel but rather an essential expressien ef the species in which a 
transformation process occurred. "By this activity on the external 
' world and changing'it, he at the same time changes his own riature. He 
develops his slumbering,pewers and cempels them ta act in ebedience to 
his way" (Marx, 1967:177). When. this process is divo~eed from the 
worker, estrangement occurs in which man becomes diverced from the 
products he produces, from other men he works with.and frem himself. 
• I: 
This is achi~ved through the appropri~tion of laber through the 
installment of wages' when the °taborer sells his labor for a qeter-
mined period of time atld; by so'doing, reiinquishes his control ove;r 
. . : . ' 
the product. Also, influencing the nature ef the working process is 
the accompanying state of technology. Marx'saw alienatieil arising from 
the social conditieris of. the work,ing process where those who owned the 
means of production directed tqe·various organizations of the society 
to appropriate the surplus value of the commodittes for themselves. 
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To aleviate this condition, Marx advocated a restructuring, a revolution 
of the existing structures, of society. Marx's conception of history 
was different from Hegel's conception of Spirit. 
It has not, like the idealistic view of history in every 
period to look for a category, but remains constantly in the 
real ground of history; it does not explain practice from the 
idea but explains the formation of ideas from material prac-
tice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all 
forms and products of consciousness cannot be.dissolved by 
mental criticisms, by resolution into 'self-consciousness' 
or transformation into 'apparitions', 'spectres', 'fancies', 
etc., but only by the practical overthrow of the actual 
social relations which give rise to this idealistic humbug, 
that:not criticism but revolution is the driving force of 
history, also of religion, of philosophy, and all other 
types of theory (Tucker, 1972:128). 
The mode of expression one utilizes is of primary importance in 
forming one's consciousness. For Marx one of the most vital modes of 
expression was the working or labor process. It was through this 
mediation that one changed nature and, in turn, changed oneself. Marx 
believed it'was not the consciousness of men that determine their being, 
bu~ on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. 
Social being constituted those modes of expression which occurred in 
human interaction. Alienatien was that process which interfered with 
the full unfolding and active creative processes that man undertook in 
his ongoing projects. The point of concern Marx focused on was to 
understand those conditions in which labor manifested itself. From 
this view he saw the inequality in society being perpetuated through 
the alienating labor process that was constructed to benefit the 
particular interests of the few. 
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Nietzsche 
To conclude the chapter on consciousness, Nietzsche will be con-
sidered for his insightful analysis of 20th century man and the means 
he prescribed to become conscious of self. Nietzsche diagnosed the 
forthcoming age as one of nihilism. While for Hegel the means,of 
realizing a universal self-consciousness was threugh Geist and for Marx 
it was developed through a praxis, Nietzsche proposed another means of 
transformation. He expressed the vehicle for aufheben as occurring 
through the process of a re-evaluation of morals. The means through 
which this would be achieved, as declared by Nietzsche, was through the 
will to power. The format af this section will be to censider the 
prognosis of nihilism, the corresponding psychological traits of 
dependency and independency as Nietzsche described them in his re-
evaluation of morals and finally the means to self-mastery which he 
described as the will to power. 
Nihilism: The Inability to Experience Self 
Nietzsche diagnosed his age as losing the ability to experience 
self. He saw this process eroding away through the inability ef man to 
mediate his own experiences. Directly related from this loss was the 
growing fragmentization of life, which for Nietzsche, stood at the 
brink of nihilism. Through this realization he believed that men 
shrank from the task of self-responsibility and slid into the herd for 
comfort where they would be cuddled by blinders. 
Previous forms of mediation were guarded in other historical times 
with a guiding ideology to which Nietzsche referred. In the 17th 
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century m~n searched for universal laws to account tor his own being and 
purpose. The 18th century witnessed self-expression where man was held 
to Qave dignity in himself and where he would construct social settings 
for the betterment of man. At the.close,of this century Condorcet's 
statement of a continual chain of progress announced a well integrated 
ideology of progress. Hegel developed his system of rational thought 
in the early part of the 19th century and Marx spoke of scientific 
socialism. Nietzsche observed this as the state of nihilism where what 
had once stood as a various foundation for belief and justification of 
action was. swept out from underneath man. It is as though man was 
supporting himself with the aid of crutches. These crutches can be 
labeled a belief in universal laws, the idea of man as having a purpose 
or mission, the theme of special progress and evolution ascending to 
greater heights, and the last crutch which.man was r~sting Qn in hopes 
of maintaining his posture was based .on the faith of various religions. 
The,se crutches were removed ~rom man and this is one way of viewing 
nihilism. 
The illusion of continual progress was challenged by Nietzsche's 
principal of eternal recurrence, Rational systems were challenged as 
he directed his analysis to the unconscious, Socialism was viewed as 
a mass movement of the herd. The final support which man rested upon 
was religion and Nietzsche described this as the death of God. When 
man believes he lacks the means of self-expression, he is at the heart 
of nihilism°' This principle of nihilism is .the counterpart of Hegel's 
as well as Marx's alienation. 
Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached, 
first, when we have sought 'a meaning' in all events-that is 
not there: so the seeker ev~ntually becomes discourage~. 
Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of 
strength, the aging in vain, insecurity, the lack of any 
opportunity to recover and to :regain composure-being ashamed 
in fr0nt 0f oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too 
long ••• What all these motions have in common is that some-
thing is to be achieved through the process-and now one 
realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing 
(Nietzsche,1968:12). 
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Nihilism asserts itself in three manifestations. The first is the 
realization that the universe can go on existing without man's direction, 
which is at the heart of the transition of what has been described as 
the shift from the Ptolemaic world, where man stood at the center of 
the world and the sun revolved around the earth to a perspective of the 
Copernican world where man and the earth took their place in relation 
to a larger Universe. This realization has been further expanded by 
Einstein's world of relativity. Formerly };leld aims'and purposes which 
man had elevated qS guiding laws collapsed with the realization that 
"man (is) no longer the collaborator, let alone the center of becoming" 
(Nietzsche, 1968:12). A second principle is the shattering of a 
formerly'unified constructed belief system. For such attempts to 
build a system upon certain basic assumptions is subjected to close 
scrutiny where "the well being of the universal demands the devotion of 
the individual-but behold, there is no such universal 11 (Nietzsche, 1968: 
12). A third manifestation of nihilism comes to be displayed as a 
"disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in 
a true world" (1968:13). Nihilism is characterized by a state of 
nothingness where once held belief systems and constructions of reality 
are shattered. Morgan describes .a nihilist as: 
••. man who judges of the world as it is, that_it ought not to 
be, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not 
exist. Accordingly, existing (acting, suffering, willing, 
feeling) has no sense: the passion of 'in vain' is the 
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nihilists' passien ... (Morgan, 1943:53}. 
Nihilism·as a psychological state is brough.t about when the ideals 
which man has can no longer be practiced. It is a void between the 
attainment of a praxis. This is but another illustration of the concept 
of alienation. It is a form of separation between the concept and the 
experience; and for Nietzsche man could begin to bridge this gap by 
calling for a re-evaluation of morals. 
Re-Evaluation of Morals: The Master and 
Slave Morality 
The history of morals as Nietzsche saw them consisted of three 
stages. The first or premoral stage was primarily characterized by the 
consequences of an act which is to say it relied upon the consequences 
of the act. In this stage men generally live in close knit groups 
where the survival and social organizations centered around dependency. 
Thus, the consequences of the act as to its beneficial or harmful 
effects was the primary criteria of its morality. 
It was rather .the way a distinction or disgrace still 
reaches back today from a child to his parents, in China 
it was the retroactive forces of success or failure that 
led men to think well or ill of an action" (Nietzsche,. 
1968:234}. 
This stage of moral engagement was referred to as the "merality of 
mores'' where customs and tradition served as the guiding conc·erns. 
The succeeding period was characterized by the intention of the act 
which marked an early attempt at self-knowledge. 
Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal 
ef perspective! •.. The intention as the whole origin and 
prehistory of an action almost to the present day this pre-
judice dominated moral praise, blame, judgement, and 
philosophy on earth (Neitzsche, 1968:234). 
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From this perspective of intention the focus was centered on the con-
scious realization of the act. This is the period which man has been 
engaged in since the beginning of history. To break this hold of the 
ongoing morality, Nietzsche called for an extra moral perspective which 
would again call for a reinterpretation of value • 
• • • tve innnoralists have the suspicion that the decisiv.e value 
of an action lies precisely in,what is unintentional 'in it, 
while everything about it that is intentional, everything 
about it· that can be seen, ·known, 'conscious, ' still belangs 
to its·~urface and skin-which, like every skin, betrays 
something but conceals even more. In short, we belieye that 
the· intention,.is merely a sign and symptom that still re-
qu~res interpretation-moreover a sign that means too much 
and the.refore, taken by itself alone, almost nothing. We 
believe that morality in the traditional sense,. the moral-
ity of intentions, was a prejudice,. precipitable and perhaps 
provisional-something on the order of astrology and alchemy 
but in any case something that must be overcome. The 
o;vercoming of morality, in a certain sense even the self-
overcoming of morality-let this be the name for that long 
secret work which has been ~aved up for the finest and most 
honest, also the most malicious conscience of today, a 
living touch-stone of the soul (1968:234-235). 
The ques'l!ion becomes: What is the origin of the characteristics of a 
good and bad morality? 
From the pre-moral peried various acts which were considered to be 
effective and' '':gGed for the groupr• came. to be established. And when 
violations occurred, one was treated with misgivings and revenge. From 
this.encounter violations were treated as outcasts who were·expected to 
repent; and in so doing, a sense of guilt was said to exist. As Morgan 
has connnented "menmistook the sequence of guilt and punishment for 
those of cause and effect" (1943:147) In organized religion inter-
preters or -guardians of these moral principles acted as overseers and 
inflicted guilt on their members. Nietzsche inquired into the source 
of these· moral characteris·tics. His first peint was that "there are no 
moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these 
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phenomena" (1968:149). Those who outlined the characteristics of good 
morality depend upon the position and occupation one held in society. 
The two major divisions he noticed in society were a morality existing 
for the masters and a different one for the slaves. 
The master morality sets itself apart from the others and elevates 
the principles which ensure their position as being "good" and those 
which conflict as being "bad". It should be noted immediately that in 
the first type of morality the.opposition of " ... 'good' and 'bad' means 
approximately the same as noble and contemptible'' (Nietzsche, 1968: 394). 
Those primary characteristics of master morality involve an external-
ization and an assertive force from which the master projected himself 
over othe-rs. Those principles that cause one to be feared and respec-
ted, such as a striving for power, control or self-directiveness, are 
those which· .are morally good. 
The other type of morality is one built around the herd where 
"good" moral characteristics are those which support the existence of 
the masses or herd. These virtues, which for the most part are absent 
such as a striving fer power and other characteristics which support 
the impotent herd, as Nietzsche saw them, are submission and an inward 
drive to control and submit to others. 
Those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which 
serve to ease existence for those who suffer: have pity, 
the compaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, 
industry, humility, and friendliness are honored-for here 
these are the most useful qualities and almost the only 
means for enduring the pressure of existence slave morality 
is essentially a morality of utility (1968:397). 
Obedience, ability to complete tasks assigned, willingness to work 
with others, following directions, punctuality, not disturbing other, 
and expressing patience and putting in a hard days work are 
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ch~racteristics of the good morality of the herd. A single word to 
describe this class of morality would be mediocrity. Nietzsche was 
careful to point out these two types of morality are seldom, if ever, 
found in their pure types. He used this scheme to illustrate his con-
. tention that those who were to experience themselves as the composer of 
their own reality were of one type while others lacked the force to 
experience self. This driving force was referred to as the will to 
power. Hegel saw the creative force coming out of a relationship 
between the master and slave as residing in the power of the slave. 
Hegel's justification was that in learning to control one's creative 
forces in the act of working for another, one also learns how to dir~ct 
oneself and to realize the act of transformation which is involved in 
the act of work, Both Hegel and Kojeve noted that a basic character-
istic of the slave was the willingness not to enter into a dangerous 
struggle but to submit to another. Nietzsche, on the other hand, saw 
i 
the process of transformation residing within the Master, for it was 
he who had the initiative to experience self through his outward move-
ment. What both perspectives share is the recognition that one has to 
be the organizer and director of their own creations. This is what 
Marx called for as a basic criteria in overcoming alienation and the 
commodity form of fetishism in work and social relations. To exper-
ience self comes through a will to power. 
Nietzsche's question, "What is Life?" is answered in his formula, 
"Life is the will to power" (1968:148). A major assumption of this 
concept is that within each person there are a host of competing 
desires, instincts, wills, interests, and experiences, and it is for 
the individual person to give orders to these competing forms which 
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entails assignment of a rank order. "The world viewed from inside, the 
'1'~ , 
work defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character'-
it would be 'will to power' and nothing else" (1968:238). To be able 
to experience oneself, one would have to exercise the will to power. A 
mastery of the self is a necessary pre-requisite. 
One has to test oneself to see that one is destined for inde-
pendence and command-and do it at the right time. One should 
not dodge one's tests, though they may be the most dangerous 
game one could play and are tests that are taken in the end 
before no witness or judge but ourselves (1968:241-242). 
A predominant trait of existentialism and one which Nietzsche out-
lines as necessary to achieve the will to power is a process of praxis 
where one experiences and practices what one believes. Nietzsche's 
method of experimentation called for a testing or a living and exper-
iencing of what one thought life should be. The testing is a process 
of one acting out one's ideals in order to realize them. Nietzsche's 
life exemplifies this commitment. ~ Spoke Zarathustra is, in many 
ways, an amplification of Nietzsche's solitude and contemplation as he 
attempts to diagnosis the conditions of society. "Lo! I am weciry of 
my wisdom, like the bee that hath gathered too much honey; I need hands 
outstretched to take it" (Nietzsche, 1971:3). There were few hands 
while Nietzsche was still in possession of all his faculties to receive 
his analysis. He had few close relationships for he thought that in 
order to achieve self-mastery he needed time for serious study, iso-
lation and the ability to experience what he was writing. 
In himself he has to suffer to the end the after effects of 
the social organisms, he has to do penance for the unsuit-
ableness of existence condition, judgements and experience 
that were fitted for a whole, and finally he gets so far as 
to create in himself the possibility of his existence as an 
individual, by reorganization and assimiliation, and by 
excretion of urges (Morgan, 1943:202). 
./ 
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This form of self-mastery that would emerge from this struggle in. 
this ex.;tra-moral stage of valuation would be 'the ove.rman or superman, 
one who would exhibit the will to power in order to experience self. 
Kaufmann has noted this in Nietzsche's writing as the "ultimate power ••• 
in controlling, sublimating, and employing one's impulses-not in con-
sidering them evil and fighting them" (1967:235). Frustrated attempts 
in the struggle to .gain self-mastery can be seen by those who attempt 
to master others and also by those who submit to others. The will to 
power was illustrated in Nietzsche's writings in the confrontation 
between Dionysus and Apollo. One does not completely control the 
other but rather assists the other in an every-expanding relationship. 
Nietzsche realized the ongoing dialectic of social change and 
valuation for the process of nihilism was eminent and yet there was 
ongoing attempts to camouflage nihilism which he recognized in the 
development of a different kind of philosopher clothed in the guise of 
science. In several instances Nietzsche classified philosophers into 
horizontal and vertical. Such philosophers who espoused adaptation, 
equilibrium and regarded man as a passive vehicle as expressed in a 
Darwinian-Spencerian manner were referred to as horizontal in their 
perspective. Another classification he sometimes used was to distin-
guish between philosophers and laborers. Laborers were those who 
worked· from the past as exemplified in Kant and Hegel. These laborers 
were also similar to the horizontal philosophers in that both sought 
to confo:m:n to an established principle. Vertical philosophers were 
those who attempted to lift man from the herd into an exploration of 
oneself. Nietzsche clearly regarded himself as a vertical philosopher. 
Hegel stood.at the end of a.paradigm and, in so doing, he acted as 
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the synthesizer of previous philosophies. His most fundamental assump-
tion throughout his writing is that each philosophy had aspects of 
validity in themselves and it was for Hegel to bring all these partial 
immediate propositions into a well-integrated system of rational th~ught. 
If Hegel can be a representative of the god Apollo, the counterpart 
may be found in Nietzsche as he represented the god Dionysus. Nietzsche 
observed the paradigm of Hegel and strove to counteract it. Hegel saw 
the development of his system in the rising up of the Spirit. Nietzsche 
formalized his efforts as the will to power. Hegel represented his 
force of change in his system in the word of aufheben which has caused 
much consideration and various interpretations. There are, however, 
three components that are most often associated with this concept 
which are: (1) the process of preserving, (2) the process of cancel-
ling,· and (3) the process of lifting up. 
Nietzsche, in writing on the will to power, observed the process 
of change to occur when self-mastery was achieved. This process 
emerged as one could sublimate other competing wills and, in so doing, 
achieve an ordered rank. Through the process of sublimation other wills 
were not destroyed or omitted but were yet part of the composition of 
the will to power. The similarity.between Hegel's aufheben and 
Nietzsche's sublimation has been noted by Kaufmann. 
Nietzsche's 'sublimation' has imposed no similar hardship on 
his translators, who could use the English 'sublimating' 
which goes back to the same'Latin root. The Latin root in 
question, 'sublimare' however, means in German-aufheben, 
and Nietzsche's sublimation actually involves, no less than 
does Hegel's aufheben, a simultaneous perserving, cancelling, 
and lifting up (1967:236). 
Kosok also notes the relationship and use of aufheben in Hegel's 
writings and sees it as an essential component in non-linear logic. 
However, unlike a simple identity logic, the mediation or 
negation of a term as a second term must have reference to 
the immediacy of which it is a mediation negation or result. 
Otherwise it would merely be another immediacy and not a 
mediation (1970:124). 
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The relationship of Nietzsche to existentialism for this paper may 
be briefly summarized. He was an individual who engaged himself in a 
process which he thought was necessary to achieve self-mastery. His 
life was a praxis characterized by a will to power which demanded a new 
re-evaluation of the existing moral conditions of society. 
Through the process of re-evaluation of morals, Nietzsche withdrew 
from the mainstream of society and analytically stripped himself of the 
cultural symbols. In this stripping process, he came to question the 
obvious and the sacred for he believed it was necessary for the person 
to go through this in_order to experience self. This process of re-
evaluation of morals and the will to power is the underlying theme of 
what this study considers to be an existential consciousness. 
Summary 
For Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche consciousness was a process through 
which one could come to realize self as an independent and dependent 
being who is in the process of becoming. In the act of becoming there 
are various forms of domination which obstruct this process of con-
sciousness. There are, however, means to go beyond this obstruction 
to gain a full consciousness. Hegel saw the development of conscious-
ness residing in a universal self-consciousness and the means to go 
beyond the mode of domination which occurred from the working process, 
or objectification process, via Geist. For Marx the development of 
consciousness called for a recognition and enactment of all man's 
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species powers and the means to overcome the mode of domination, or the 
fetish of commodities, was through a praxis. Nietzsche expressed his 
path of consciousness to be realized when one could experience self and 
gain self-mastery. Consciousness for all three men involved: (1) the 
recognition that consciousness was an active process that must be 
directed by the individual person, (2) a mediatien between the immediate 
and determinate, and (3) the unifier of these mediations was the active 
subject. 
CHAPTER III 
AGENCY: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Introduction 
As the 19th century came to a close, there developed many 
challenges to the rational paradigm that was so well constructed by 
Hegel and Marx. Nietzsche may be viewed as a transition from the 
rational to the irrational perspective that developed in the early part 
of the 20th century. A few of the alternatives that were developed in 
response to the rational paradigm centered around (1) an existential 
perspective which focused on the individual rather than a system, (2) 
an environmental perspective which focused on the biological aspects of 
man and the environment; and (3) a perspective that•concentrated on the 
i!rational aspects of man. These three perspectives have been analyzed 
by Hughes and it will be his discussion with which this chapter will 
begin. 
This chapter will essentially attempt to develop the theoretical 
perspective from which the variable of agency will be drawn. Agency 
will be drawn from Weber's analysis of bureaucracy. Once this has been 
developed, Weber's analysis will be treated as a critique of domination. 
Weber basically saw the increase of rationalization in an either/or 
aspect; i.e., either rathionalization will increase with its ability to 
provide for greater human needs and, thus, domination will also increase 
Qr rationalization and the ability to meet increasing human needs will 
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decrease along with its domination. This either/or analysis will be 
examined in view of the developments occurring in Russia and a sugges-
tion will be made that there are other alternatives to Weber's analysis. 
Alternatives to a Rational Paradigm 
The portrayal of consciousness which had emerged from Germany 
during the first half of the 19th century was firmly rooted in a 
rational perspective. The ability of man to consciously direct his 
actions and evaluate his experiences was fundamental to the general 
environment of the time. Hegel and Marx were supportive of the idea 
that man could rationally direct his own transformation. 
In partial response to this engagement, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
who were contemporaries of that era, challenged the belief in the 
rational process. Sartre, in another way, challenged the ability of-
man to bridge the gap between the in-itself and for-its~lf. On the 
eve of the 20th century there had developed another challenge to the 
rational paradigm, as exemplified in the writings of Hegel and Marx. 
At this historical moment nation states were experimenting with 
holistic ventures of imperialism as they rushed to stake their claims 
on foreign soil. The rising forms of consciousness that were expected 
to occur among the proletariat, as Marx had written about it, did not 
occur. While the revolution did not materialize, there was a strong 
realization that Marx's critique could no longer be ignored. 
The ability of man to direct his rational process was being 
questioned by another group who stressed environmental factors as a 
major casual factor in man's development. Various mutations of 
Darwin's theories emerged. For example, Spencer's "survival of the 
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fittest" meant that man must be left unregulated so that a natural 
process of selection would ensure the survival of the most valuable 
qualities for society. 
Within all this their arose a notable and very influential group 
of thinkers who, on.the one hand attempted to redirect Marx's analysis 
into a more conservative means and who on the other hand attempted to 
jar man loose from the confining and pre-determining confinements of 
his environment. Such is the interpretation of Hughes (1961) who has, 
in his portrayal of this epoch, constructed a valuable account of how 
this group of thinkers attempted to analyze their own epoch. It is a 
work concerned with how these analysts viewed human nature and how the 
process of reality formation occurs. Hughes viewed these thinkers as 
being concerned with the irrational not so much as to support this 
conception of man but mor.e with the intention to control them. 
Unquestionably the major intellectual innovators of the 1890's 
were·profoundly interested in the problems of irrational 
motivation in human conduct. They were obsessed, almost 
intoxicated, with a rediscovery of the nonlogical, the 
uncivilized, the inexplicable ••• The social thinkers of the 
1890's·were concerned with the irrational only to exorcise 
it. By probing into it, they sought ways to tame it, to 
analyze it for constructive human purposes (1961:35-36). 
Hughes considers this epoch from 1890-1930 as a major movement in 
intellectual thought. The major concerns of this epoch for these 
thinkers were·in the area of inquiring into what the relationship 
between the conscious and unconscious might be, the relationship be-
tween consciousness and time, which w~re ultimate concerns in the area 
of epistemological inquiry.and which were very much concerned with 
unmasking the ideological fibers of their time. These areas of inter-
est are ·certainly evident in the individual interest of these men. 
To'come to terms with Marxism, then, was the first and most 
obvious task confronting the intellectual innovators of the 
1890's. Some, like Freud dealt with Marx only by implication 
by extending social thought to new areas undreamed of in the 
socialist ideologies. Others, like Pareto, offered highly 
skeptical refutations of the central arguments of dialec-
tical materialism. Still others, like Croce and Sorel, 
while maintaining the Marxist terminology, were to transmute 
it into something so different from the original intention 
as to leave little standing but a hollow framework-within 
which the earlier categories of thought had ceased to be 
actualities and had become mere symbols and methodological 
conveniences. Finally, a decade later than the rest, Max 
Weber was to propose a view of society that brought Marx's 
to the deepest spiritual values of mankind (1961:42). 
The primary concern will be to understand Weber's position in 
regard to the formal organization of institutions and the effects it 
has on participating actors. 
Weber: Ch~racteristics of a Bureaucracy 
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Weber described the characteristics of a bureaucracy as a routine 
administration of duties based on a written body of rules that are 
carried out by .::,ff icials. These 'officials are appointed to their 
office on the basis of their preparation and certification. These 
officers are regarded as experts of a specialized task and are placed 
in a hierarchial structl:lre which is monocratically organized. As the 
position of the office 11).atures, the person holding the office must 
change his activities from a. part-time endeavor (avocation) to a full-
time working capacity (vocation). 
Weber saw the development of a bureaucratic structure dependent 
upon several contributing factors. The need for a consistent source 
of revenue was extremely important. The development of a money economy 
and the use of wages as a source of buying power helped to prepare the 
way for taxation and a continued Source of funds. The idea of demos ••• 
i 
••• in the sense of a shapeless mass, never governs larger 
associations, but rather is governed ••• Bureaucracy in-
evitably accompanies modern mass democracy, in contrast 
to the democratic self-government of small homogenous 
units (1968:983-985). 
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Weber referred to this as a "leveling of the gaverned". Also important 
in the movement towards a bureaucracy is removing the means of produc-
tion away from the workers, thus impeding individual action and making 
them more dependent upon the bureaucracy. 
The person who enters the bureaucracy does not enter into a 
relationship as he may have done in past history. It is not a rela-
tionship of a noble·and a king where personal charisma or a flexible 
schedule may be agreed upon. The person no longer enters and performs 
work as a part-time, non-encompassing environment. The bureaucracy 
calls the person to his office not on a part-time basis but on a full-
time basis. One enters an.office that has prescribed duties, 
responsibilities and expectations. The power of this position due to 
rank and status comes not from the person but from the office. And to 
relieve the office from the concerns of the masses, one should be 
! appointed by a superior. From his posit:l:on in the bureaucracy of the 
office, one is to serve it as a vocation. 
For the bureaucracy to maintain its power, discipline was needed. 
Weber saw this in the form of money used as a salary, a position of 
rank and status, and tenure which clearly would outline one's career. 
Taut discipline and control which at the same time have 
considerations for the officials sense of honor, and the 
development of prestige sentiments of the status group as 
well as the possibility of public criticism ••• With all this, 
the bureaucratic apparatus functions more assuredly than 
does legal enslavement of the functionaries (1968:968). 
From this structure the bureaucracy was thought to be an efficient 
means of performing tasks assigned. For Weber it was the "means of 
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transforming social action into rationally organized action" (1968:987). 
Further benefits from bureaucracy would, in essence, be "technical 
superiority". 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, re-
duction of friction and of material personal cost-these are 
raised to the optimum point in the strict bureaucratic ad-
ministration, and especially in its monocratic form (1968: 
974). 
To achieve these benefits, Weber stated that it must purge itself of 
human factors. 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectably, the more it is 
'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in elimin-
ating from official business, love, hatred, and all purely 
personal irrational and emotional elements which escape 
calculation (1968:975). 
Fully recognizing the bureaucratic structure and its potential 
benefits for a modern state, one must also consider the relationship 
this type of structure has on individual social action. Weber was 
clearly cognizant of both and chose the form "efficiency" and bureau-
cratic order. 
Under otherwise eqq.al conditions, rationally.organized and 
directed cllction (Gesel~scha.ftshandeln) :is -sup.erior to every 
kind Qf collective behavior (Marsenhandlen) and, also social 
action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposihg'.it (1962:987). 
A Critique of Domination: .. Rationalization 
In many ways this is a typical presentation of Weber's account of 
the bureaucratic structure. Its focus is on the ~ver-increasing demand 
for farther ratienalization of the social and ecen~mic order. In such 
a. view what is implicitly assumed is that Weber was responding to the 
Marxian analysis; and further analysis generally supports an inter-
pretation that develops their point of disagreement. There would be 
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little argument with the statement that Marx was concerned with a 
critique.of domination. In this discussion of Weber, the assumption 
from which this presentation will begin is that Weber was concerned 
also with a critique of domination. From this initial assumption both 
Marx and Weber will be analyzed at their points of agreement which 
should add to our understanding of domination in the economic.and 
political spheres. Cohen views Weber's development of rationality as 
fundamental to his central thesis. 
That social relations of domination can no longer be 
adequately expressed through the categories of political 
economy and socio-economic class, but rather through 
analysis of political forms of domination and the state. 
(1972:65). 
The major difference that separated these two men were their basic 
assumptions from which they proceeded to construct their critique. For 
Marx, alienation could be overcome through the revolutionary universal 
class struggle leading to a socialist system. Weber based his critique 
on the assumption that labor was an objectification of self; and at the 
point of objectification, labor becomes alienated. To Weber labor was 
not a means of liberation but was actually a mode of alienation. In 
addition, Weber stated that further rationalization was inevitable. 
Whereas socialism would aleviate the oppressed conditions of society 
for Marx, it would, for Weber, only achieve greater domination. Weber 
understood the essence of socialism to be built on the even greater 
need for centralized planning and coordination. The vehicle that 
would accomplish this weuld be the bureaucratic mode of organization. 
To_ both Hegel and Marx the concept of mediation and _the dialectic 
of transformation was of fundamental importance. The dialectical 
movement will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but for 
44 
the present analysis the process of becoming is, the movement from the 
immediate to the mediate. This is to suggest that the immediate state 
of the given is not the total process and has been often referred to by 
Marx as the second nature of things. His critique in Capital is an 
attempt to go beyond the given state of appearances where commodities 
are only a partial aspect of the total working process. Marx developed 
his critique on the premise that labor was a dialectical process which 
entailed both a subjective and objective transformation. Through the 
mode of capitalism Marx saw the development of commodities take on the 
aspect of the total process. This process of commodity fetishism came 
to represent the whole or total process. For Weber the dialectical 
process of transformation was not accepted and this is partially why he 
could not envision any alternative other than a continued and increased 
growth of the bureaucratic mode. He saw this process being achieved 
through an increase of rationalization. Without a mediation between 
the immediate and mediate, Weber followed a one-way directive. These 
are major points from which both men conceived their overall critique. 
Weber's critique of domination centered on the development of the 
bureaucratic mode of organization which came to view p'eople as an 
aspect of a larger whole. People came to be viewed as role players 
performing specified tasks to which they had no involvement or oppor-
tunity to direct their own activities. "Weber considered bureaucracy 
the most striking problem of modern social reality" (Cohen, 1972:71), 
Through hi~·:nalysis he pointed out that a bureaucratic order was ,, 
dependent upon a mode of calculatien of quantifiable things which could 
be accounted for in various forms of rational beekkeeping. Furthermore, 
he believed an available surplus of social labor was needed and that it 
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was essential to divest the person of their means of production, which 
is to say, to have them working not for themselves but for the organ-
ization. To accomplish this, the use of the wage or salary was a 
necessary technique of domination. Weber interpreted this process as 
the leveling of the governed where the bureaucratic mode eventually 
came to dominate all facets of life. In an attempt to become objective; 
formal rationality is extended througho_ut the social structure of 
society. This critique certainly corresponds quite favorably with 
Marx's development of capitalism. His analysis of the rise of capital-
ism focused on a calculatable form of accounting, the army of the 
unemployed, separation of the means of production, wage labor and loss 
of control over one's creations. 
Weber's critique of domination underscored the increasing amount 
of rationalization which manifested itself in the attitude that any-
thing could be rationally accounted for in a given calculable system. 
Weber saw this process being brought on through a continual form of 
formal rationality which acted as a "principle of orientation of action 
to abstract, formal rules and norms to an imperscmal order such that 
calculations can be made 'without regard for persons'" (Cohen, 1972:66). 
Through formal rationality Weber saw the displacement of means over 
ends. Thus, what started out as an effort to carry on transactions in 
the market place for connnodities became a struggle to carry on trans-
actions not for connnodities but for profit. With further calculations 
of abstract forms, the drive for profit became an end itself. Marx's 
corresponding analysis was C-M-C' and M-C-M'. Further continuation of 
the means-over-ends displacement was noticed by Weber in the stress of 
efficiency over other aspects and the constant drive to quantify things. 
46 
Weber basically saw the social-cultural values of other historical eras· 
being displaced by the· drive for rationality. His disagreement with 
Marx on the clas~ struggle and socialism as a means for transformation 
brought him to the conceyt of ethical responsibility for individual 
action. Weber acted from the given position that an increased amount 
of domination would follow through the auspices of the bureaucratic 
mode of organization. Weber dichotomized his analysis into trying to 
account for increased human needs through greater production and 
distribution techniques which in turn would have an increase in the 
amount of domination or a decrease in the ability to meet increased 
human needs and a concomitant decrease in domination. 
According to Weber's analysis, however, the satisfaction of 
human needs would entail increased industralization and 
centralized planning and this would have the unintended 
consequence of tremendously increasing bureaucratic dom-
ination (Cohen, 1972:78). 
Increased Centralization: The Drive 
For Sp~cializ.ation 
The.critique of domination which Weber has offered could serve to 
sharpen the analysis of domination.and its relationships to social 
organizations. Certainly in the 20th century we can see evidence.of 
Weber's· insightful analysis. Russia stands before us as a case in 
point. She.attempted to adopt the technological means of production as 
they were being developed in the United States in an attempt to direct 
them to their own ends. 
Consider the Bolshevik Revolution and its abortive attempt to 
transform the state from an organ of bureaucratic central to an organ-
izational structure representing the needs .of the people .• - Lenin's 
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program of "revolution", as outlined in the State and Revolution, called 
for a program that would debureaucratize its institutions. His plan 
called for bringing the decision-making precess down to lower levels 
:· 
which could be partially achieved by elections and the power of recall. 
Lenin attempted to decrease the distance between the workers and the 
bureaucrats by instituting equal wages for beth. Lenin theught this 
might level the distance between them "so that all may become 'bureau-
crats' for a time and that, therefore, nobody may be 'able ta become a 
bureaucrat" (Fleron and Fleran, 1972:72). 
, 
The organizational efferts·to achieve the withering away ef the 
· state has fer the U.S.S.R. yet ta be achieved. The premise ef trans-
formation as dire~ted by L~riin attempted to se.ize power away from one 
form af external auth(l)rity and replace it. with another mod.e of authority. 
Alth~ugh the Bolshevik R~yoiutiort attempted to transform. the state, it 
in fact supported anothe.r repressive bureaucratic structure. Fl~ron 
and Fleron have attrib,uteq thi~ to three caus~s: 
2. 
The conspirational, hierarchial na~ire 0£ the party in 
pre-revol't.).tit>ri,ary led, it to ta~e on therar1tts~ t,ch-
niques, 1:ihd ment~lity, ·ef the secret-pold.ce ~uteauci::atic 
system which : it sought to. ever throw ••• 
The proce~s of role reversal during the dic;tatership 
of the proletariat~ ac~ording to which th!e.proletariat 
would seize the reins of the bourgeois capitalist 
state appartus ih order to exploit their former e~-
ploiters, led to increased bureaucratizatiati.:of the 
party • 
••• the central core of, the cultural revolution.would 
be full ... scale ind\istralization and eJq)aP,sion of 
machine techn.9logy of a capitalist model (1972=76-77). 
Other programs which were initiated by Stalin and his successors 
still cantinue to act from the assumption that through the adoption of 
a technological means they can redirect it to their st.a ted goals. 
From the Stalin era there was an increased am.aunt of centralization 
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which was accompanied by further developments in the bureaucratic mode 
of social organization. The Russian government continues to implement 
a policy of bureaucratic growth and supports a policy of competition to 
increase its productivity. 
The Soviet response to competition with Western Capitalism is 
:two-pronged; it involves not only competition to produce, but 
also competition to consume (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:85). 
Weber's critique of domination cited the ever-increasing repressive 
form of the bureaucratic organization. The alternatives, as he saw 
them, certainly pointed to the indication that Russia chose to attempt 
to meet her needs through the adoption of a bureaucratic mode of social 
organization. This is not to suggest that Weber.'s alternatives are the 
only ones to choose from. Before analyzing this confinement of Weber's 
analysis, attention will first be turned to the mode of technology 
called Taylorism as it developed in the United States and how it was 
supported in Russia. This is to serve as another illustration. of the 
compatibility of organizational restraints and how they easily dis-
regard national boundaries. Paul Piccone has commented on the 
similarity between Russia and the United States. 
With respect to their attitude toward social change, although 
for different reasons, there is no difference between the two 
systems: both the Soviets and the Americans are under the 
ideological illusion of self-perfection. Even their accounts 
of each other are strikingly similar. While (enlightened) 
techno.cratic Wes tern thought analyzes the repressive political 
system of the U.S.S.R. as essentially a function of economic 
and technological backwardness-a temporary state of affairs 
that will gradually disappear in proportion to the techno-
logical-and industrial advancement of the country-in terms 
of the Stalinist logic the West also is to be left alone, 
for only then will the capitalist economy necessarily reach 
its unavoidable self-destruction in virtue of the working 
out of the internal contradictions of the system (19·70: 39). 
In the United States the time-motion studies of F. W. Taylor were 
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refinements of task specialization which were originated by the manage-
ment and then used to direct the activities of the laborer. In his 
principles of Scientific Management (1947) the essential foundation of 
his system began with the distinction between management and labor. 
Decisions related to planning the work activity were the responsibil-
ities of the management and the laborer was expected to follow the 
routines prescribed by the manager. Taylor considered the enactment of 
the task idea the most important single element in modern scientific 
management. 
The work of every workman is fully planned out by the manage-
ment at least one day in advance, and each man receives in 
most cases complete written instructions, describing in 
detail the task which he is to accomplish, as well as the 
means to be used in doing the work (1947:39). 
As an illustration of the principles of scientific management in 
action, Taylor describes the innovations which were applied in the 
Bethlehem Steel Company. When he entered the plant, the average amount 
of pig iron being moved by one man per day was twelve and one-half tons. 
Taylor studied the situation and through minute calculation believed he 
could have men loading approximately four times that amount per day. 
His first concern was to find the ideal man, train him and, for in-
centive to work harder, increase his salary and have him serve as an 
example for the other men. After watching the pig iron crew of 75 men, 
they chose one man who "had been observed to trot back home for a mile 
or so after his work in the evening, about as fresh as he was when he 
came trotting down to work in the morning" (19-47: 43-44)v-:s:~,s.~·man they 
referred to as Schmidt. It was also known that he was building his own 
home and was an exceptionally "close man", which is to say, he saved 
his money. To entice Schmidt to accept the offer of being a first-rate 
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man, which meant he would attempt to meet their requirements, was their 
first concern. After some persuasion, Schmidt accepted and indeed 
moved 47 tons of pig iron per day. In the course of persuading and 
instructing Schmidt the scientist used rather blunt and rough language. 
Taylor, however, explains his reasons. 
This seems to be rather rough talk. And indeed it would be 
if applied to an educated mechanic, or even an intelligent 
laborer. With a man of the mentally sluggish type of 
Schmidt it is appropriate and not unkind, since it is 
effective in fixing his attention on the high wages which 
he wants and away from what, if it were called to his 
attention, he probably would consider impossibly hard 
work (1947:46). 
Taylor viewed his system as one that would combine the interests 
of the laborer to that of the management. Under the auspices of the 
task assignment and piece rate for incentive pay, he thought that all 
would strive to achieve higher rates of production. An additional 
incentive, as he understood it, was that it would lessen any potential 
conflict between management and labor and thus be a means of social 
control. 
The means of a bureaucratic mode of organization for the purposes 
of obtaining increased production was not rejected by Lenin. His 
concern was with increased production with the implicit assumption that 
as long as the workers shared in the increased products, it would be 
rewarding in itself. 
The task that the Soviet government must set the people in 
all its scope is-learn to work. The Taylor system, the last 
word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist 
progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of 
bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scien-
tific achievement in the field of analyzing mechanical 
notions during work, the elimination of superfluous and 
awkward motions, the elaboration of correct methods of 
work, the introduction of the best systems of accounting 
and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must at all costs 
adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of 
capitalism. We must organize in Russia the study and 
teaching of the. Taylor system and systematically try it out 
and adopt it.!=.£. our~ ends (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:81). 
Hegel, Marx and Weber: Critique of Domination 
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Domination occurs in many forms and effects men in different ways. 
To be dominated by one mode rather than another is still domination. 
If these three modes of analysis of dominati0n are viewed as critiques 
of a form of obstruction to man's process of becoming, then perhaps a 
more penetrating analysis toward liberation may be forthcoming. 
Hegel's analysis of the master-slave relationship points to the 
premise that domination occurs when another attempts to treat one as 
an object devoid of a subjectivity in an attempt to subjugate the others 
to a predetermined pattern or order. This is an effort to freeze·an 
aspect of the total process into a rigid form. When this happens there 
is little attention directed to becoming which involves a mediation, 
which is to say, a transformation. Hegel's mediation occurred through 
a Geist. As we have noticed, this was an unacceptable tenant for Marx. 
At this point it would be helpful to review a primary concern of 
the Marxian analysis and to evaluate its effectiveness for a critique 
of domination. A focal point of this analysis asks the question: Who 
owns the means of production? This has been a primary criteria used 
in helping to define class division and is assumed by some that''if the 
"people" own the means of production, it will eliminate class division 
and will ultimately eliminate alienation. It seems that a principle 
o'f Marxian analysis states that the contradictions which arise between 
the productive force and the social relations of production will bring 
on the downfall of the capitalist system. Marx referred to this as a 
basic contradiction within the capitalist system. 
At a certain stage of their development the material forces 
of production in society come into conflict with the existing 
relations of production, or-what is but a legal expression 
for the same thing-with the property relations within which 
they'had been at work before. From forms of development of 
the forces·of production these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution 
(McLellan, 1971:196). 
In view of Weber's analys.is and the compatibility of the U.S.S.R. 
and U.S.A. in adoptiµ.g a bureaucratic mode of organization, Marx's 
analysis in this regard should be reconsidered. 
Nor can we any longer assume that the autonomy of pro'."" 
ductive forces is sufficient for them to enter spontaneously 
into cont:cadition wi'th the capitalist 'relations of production. 
On the contrary, developments during the la:st two decades 
ra.ther lead to the conclusion that the productiye forces 
~ shaped by the capitalist relations of production and 
that the imprint of the latter upon the first is so deep 
that any attempt to change the relations of production 
will be doomed unless a radical change is made in the 
very nature of the productive forces, and not only in the 
way in which and in the purpose for which they are used 
(Gorz, 1972: 27) • 
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The awareness of this critique has caused much attention since the 
time of Weber. A former student of Weber's, G. Lukacs, noticed this 
develop~ent and drew from Marx's concept of comm()dity fetishism and 
Weber's concept of. rationalh:ation to develop his central thesis of 
. . . 
reification (1968). Reification was a process .in which society comes 
to view all its needs in tertns of a commodity exchange •. Through this 
calculated procedure social relations are subsumecJ into a rational 
·bureaucratic mode of organization. Rationalization as a ,process of 
vielfii.ng the world and social relations has been a; majo.r concern of the 
Critical School. 
Probably one af the most well-known members of this scheol in the 
U.S. is Marcuse. Recently there has been an historical study o.µ.·the 
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Critical School or Frankfurt School from its origin·in 1923 to 1950. 
This study is quite-helpful in explaining the organizational structure 
and major concerns of this institute. Schroyer's account (1973) is an 
informative_analys;is of the various modes af dominatian as they are 
viewed from a Critical Schaol perspective. His particular analysis is 
interesting as he points out that critical theary has reached an 
impasse that must now turn upon itself to regain its link with a 
political practice. Schroyer sees J, Habermas's analysis of cognitive 
interest and meta-communication as a vital ingredient in regaining its 
praxis. 
Another alternative Weber failed to consider to this process of 
rationalization was the possibility that a made of production could be 
utilized that would meet human needs and not be oppressive. For 
further consideration af this alternative ane may gain a different 
perspective in studying the path the Chinese have embarked upon. Their 
attempt to debureaucratize social institutions and bring the produc-
tive forces into harmony with the needs of their people may be viewed 
as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Through the experiences 
of the Great Leap Forward the following four points were attempted. 
1, The Stalinist mode of 'one man management' was rejected. 
2. A development of the 'two-participation' was enacted to 
bring the worker and the administrator into a closer 
relationship where both elements participated in and 
with the other in decision-making situations. 
3. The mode of 'triple combination' consisting of workers, 
technicians, and administrators was further developed 
to bring these factors of production into closer re-
lationship. From this team aspect, they were respon-
sible for making decisions.in regard to technical and 
,innovative matters. 
4. The incentive system was rearranged to decrease material 
incentives and the accompanying competition and antag-
onism among workers (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:87-88). 
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When Weber is regarded in the light of a critique of domination, 
many of his insights help to develop an analysis of social organization. 
Although Weber presented his alternative in an either/or structure, it 
is hoped that.through this discussion it is evident that we have a 
multiple of choices for our consideration. A vehicle that may serve to 
broaden our consideration from a linear mode of either/or though may 
be advanced through a dialectical analysis. The process of the.act 
through a dialectical mediation will be the focus for the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
ACT: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FROM 
A DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
In this chapter the dialectic will be discussed in relation to 
three aspects: (1) consciousness, (2) the relationship a dialectic 
establishes between self and the world, and (3) the basic assumptions 
on which a dialectic rests, which is to say, the logic of the dialectic. 
The dialectic is being studied in this paper for primarily two reasons: 
(1) to attempt to make the case that the dialectic is an integral part 
of a praxis through which one gives meaning to self and the world and 
(2) to state a few of the principles of the dialectic on which the 
rationale of the model ultimately rests. The discussion of the logic 
of the dialeCtic is presented in a wide scope to suggest the possible 
application and relationships a dialectical perspective may,!tave on 
• the various disciplines of logic, physics and psychology. The section 
will end with a statement on what it means for an act to be considered 




The Dialecti6al Perspecti:ve: 
A Process of Mediation 
As Hughes (1961) pointed out, the decade of the 1890 1 s and the 
intellectual theorists of that time could no longer ignore Marx. 
Although the influence of Weber has been great and realizing that the 
functionalist school exerted a great deal of influence in the academic 
areas, the Marxian challenge again threatens the consensus paradigms of 
American mainstream sociology. 
A particular aspect of this challenge is emerging from those who 
believe that the process of consciousness occurs along a dialectical 
movement where people are at the center of their own reality construe-
tion. This active, ongoing process occurs within a social environment 
involving others and .is located within a particular historical epoch 
with its concomitant modes of production. Particular emphasis has been 
placed on the dialectic and the revolutionary concepts, of becoming • 
. 
This dialogue has been sharply developed in the Eastern Communist 
countries, especially Czechoslovakia. Telos, under the editorship of 
Paul Piccone who has also written several articles on the dialectic 
(1970), Marxism (1971), and Phenomenology (1972), is also an active 
transmitter of eastern European thought. In a recent article which was 
translated for the Journal, Karel Kosik (1970) clearly and succinctly 
outlines the function of philosophy based upon a commitment to Marx 
and the dialectic. 
Praxis Via Acts: View of Consciousness 
The premise that Kosik starts with is the realization that there is 
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a separation between the phenomena and the essence. He refers to this 
as the representation and the concept. The assumption is that the 
thing-in-itself does not stand by itself or do we comprehend it as a 
thing-in-itself in its immediate form. What is needed is a critical 
analysis that studies the internal structure of the thing and how it 
relates and interacts with other components. He is insistent on not 
becoming a victim to misplaced concreteness or to view the world through 
a fetishized process. He develops his analysis along similar lines that 
Marx used in Capital. Reality construction for Kosik is not a one-way 
directive where people work to obtain goals that are independent of 
their crea,tions and praxis. He believes that one comes to mediate one's 
reality through the modes of personal expression. 
In the practical-utilitarian relationship with things-where 
reality reveals itself as the world of means, ends, tools, 
exigencies, and efforts to satisfy them-the individual creates 
for himself, in concrete contents, his own representation 
of things and elaborates a whole correlative system of 
notions which catch and fix phenomenal aspects of reality 
(1970:21). 
The foundation of the dialectic attempts to understand how man 
transforms nature, the environment, himself and others and how in this 
process he comes to change himself. To understand this.process, 
realizing Kosik's basic assumption that the given state of appearances 
are representations and not things-in-themselves, a detour must be made 
in order to go beyond their immediate state. It is through this detour 
that man often mistakes the representation for the thing-in-itself and 
comes to live·in a world of "pseudo-concreteness". This is a realm that 
some people operate in and which Kosik refers to as a "world of 
chiarosuro of truth and fraud" (1970:22). 
The dialectic brings the p~ocess of reality construction into a 
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personal encounter where the destruction of the pseudo-concrete reality 
becomes,an actuality. This is achieved through the realization of a 
human praxis where reified representations are dissolved as each person 
comes to realize his own truth. "Each individual must-personally and 
without the possibility of someone else substituting for him-give-him-
self an education and live his life" (1970:28). 
Within this realm transactions and manipulations occur through 
which they are portrayed through ideological filters and where "the 
world of fixed objects that give the impression of being natural con-
ditions and are not immediately recognizable as the result of man's 
social activity" (1970:22). In realizing the importance of man's 
social activity, this human praxis becomes a vehicle of transformation 
in which- there are no predefined givens which man attempts to initiate. 
The process of reality construction is a mediated activity arrived at 
through social relations. 
The dialectic does not consider the·fixed products, the 
configurations and the objects, _and the whole of the 
reified material world as something original and inde-
pend~nt. Similarly, it does not consider the world of 
representations and common sense to be so. It does not 
accept them in their immediate aspect. Instead, it 
submits t_hem to an analysis in which the reified forms 
of the objective and ideal world are dissolved. Thus 
they lose their fixity, their natural character and 
pretended originality in order to show themselves as 
divorced and mediated phenomena, as sedementations and 
products of the social praxis of humanity (1970:26). 
Kosik is attempting to understand how humans acquire knowledge of 
the external world and themselves. He is in agreement with Marx for he, 
believes we appropriate the world through praxis. Kosik's praxis 
involves the creation of an idea or form at which time the person acts 
upon that form and observes the resulting changes. He refers to this 
process as an "overcoming of naturalism". 
The_dialectic of.the activity and passivity in human know-
ledge manifests itself first of.a.11 in the fact that man, 
in order, to know things in themselves,.rnust first of all 
transform them into things for himself, In order to know 
things as they are independently of himself, he must first 
submit them to his own praxis. Man knows reality only to 
the extent that he creates human reality and behaves pri-
marily as a practical being (1970:30), 
When the dialectic is recognized as the focal point of man's 
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activity, predefined structures and givens begin to lose the aura of a 
misplaced concreteness and enter into a relationship of personal en-
counter. Being is no longer a state of conformity but becomes a 
process of becoming. 
A Dialectical Psychology: 
The Self and the World 
For Carl Ratner (1971) a dialectical psychology refers to a process 
of human activity that is based upon the world and in which "social 
orders are formed by people in coping with material conditions, and the 
individual born into this order rely on it for the basis of thei activ-
ities" (1971:109), He regards this as a process of mediation occurring 
through material and social conditions. A dialectical examination of 
reality construction would consider the individual acting from a con-
tent of being-in-the-world within a particular historical epoch. The 
individual and the world environment are viewed as two co-determinate 
agents, i.e., to speak of one is to imply the other. Both are a part 
of a personal active, ongoing process of perception and reflection. 
Ratner basically believes the universe is generally portrayed through 
three conceptualizations: a mechanistic, an individualistic and a 
dialectic conception. His consideration of these perspectives are 
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interesting fer it illuminates how a dialectical psychelegy may per-
ceive its subject-abject field of relations. 
Considering the mechanical orientatien Ratner sees this as a one-
way directive usually consisting of a m~jor casual factor which directs 
the outcome of the interaction. "If the latter owes its entire exis-
tence to the former it isn't anything in its own right; it has na 
substance or individuality, it is purely an extension af the cause" 
(1971:81). In the case of behaviorism the resulting reificatian centers 
on the world or. the existing environment as the causative factor in 
producing man's consciousness or, as behaviorists might prefer, pro-
ducing one's orientation. 
The element of time within this perspective regards the present as 
the point of reference. What presently exists is regarded as that point 
of order with which other activities should be directed to comply. The 
historical development of such a reference point is often regarded as 
that point which has evolved from a long and tedious spiral of ever-
increasing refinement. 
The form of interaction emitting from this process becomes a one-
way directive from the environment to the person. 
One view-that of mechanical determinism-is that one aspect 
predominates over all others which are merely adjuncts af it. 
This aspect is said to determine the nature of the others 
which are subsumed in it (Ratner, 1971:83). 
"Whatever we do, and hence however we perceive it, the fact remains 
that it is the environment which acts upon the perceiving person, not 
the perceiving person who acts upon the environment" (Skinner, 1972: 
179). With this as his basis of behaviorism, Skinner illuminates the 
caurse of this one-way directive. 
As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics and 
biology, the autonomus agent to which behavior has tradi-
tionally been attributed is replaced by the environment-the 
environment in which the species evolved and in which the 
behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained (Skinner, 
1972:175). 
A mechanistic perspective attempts to establish a set of pre-
defined directives from which individual actors are regarded as 
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receivers and imitators of a previously defined reality. The individual 
is not considered as an organizer or as an interpretor of the environ-
ment. Even less is he considered to be capable of redefining his 
reality through an interchange with his world and others. 
As is often the case in trying to combat forms of a mechanistic 
perspective, a variant of iµdividualism is used to express the freedom 
and aloftness of the person from the environment. Ratner considers this 
occurrence as an unacceptable attempt to understand the process of con-
sciousness. As the individual becomes the·predominant agent, Ratner 
sees the focus on individual interaction and formation of self as a 
projection of self over others and the existing environment. Essence 
and phenomenon are considered to emerge from personal interaction with-
out recognizing the base or the world from which it rested. This point 
is oftentimes stressed to where the cultural vehicles of one's milieu 
is neglected in an attempt to highlight the freedom of the individual. 
Ratner points out that while mechanism ties the person to only the 
objects and stimulii of the environment, individualism does not con-
sider the ties which bind man to his historical, materialistic world. 
The weakness is that no basis is provided for the subject's 
activity which is considered to be a purely personal choice. 
This activity is wholly determined by the individual alone 
and is not influenced by any factor beyond himself (1971:94). 
Ratner considers the individualist view of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre 
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to be representative of this perspective. For Merleau-Ponty there are 
no c.auses which can impress themselves upen a conscieusness. Sartre 
states that the given conditions of society c~nnot restrict one's 
freedom. 
While the mechanistic perspective takes these given coµditions as 
the transmitter of consciousness, the individual perspective has a 
tendency to consider very lightly the existing historical framework and 
its developing precess. This pentiits members of this perspective to 
construct their,observation as if it would be the same irregardless of 
time and space. In so doing, a hazardous tendency might be to assume 
these conditions are ever present in all situations; and for some this 
may be interpreted as a component of human nature. If this becomes the 
case, attempts to eliminate these 3!_ priori forms would seem t~ be .beyond 
the aQil:Lty of man. To ill'ustrate this 'point, Ratner cites from R. D. 
. ' . . . 
Laing's, The Divided Self, the technique of clinJcal biegraphy. 
We·put the larger sociological issues in parenthesis as not 
of direct and i~ed'iate relevance to the understand:(.ng ,of 
how this girl came tQ be psychotic. Thus, I think the 
clinical biography that' I shall present cauld'be a working 
class girl from Zurich, ef a middle class girl:frem Lincoln 
or a millic:ma.ire.'s daughter frem Te~as (R~tner~· 1971:98), · 
For the· individualist the given immediatewerld pravides the 
' 
pre-existing conditians fram which a host of cam.panents and relation-
ships are formed. It is the.individual that rearranges the cemponents 
and gives meaning and particular r~levance to one~s own reality. The 
underlying question becomes: How is the decision-making process 
enacted? Ratner recegniz~s this as defining, in general, the limits of 
a phenomenelogical and existential perspective •• 
For individual, then personal freedom always presupposes and 
relies upon a forei&n impersenal settiµ& which set the bound-
aries of action but does p.ot intrude ori. the details. This 
leaves the general quality of our acts fixed but also un-
explained, unexamined,_and vague, and it leaves the details 
of our acts capricious and inexplicable (1971:96-97). 
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Ratner sees this as the reason why existentialism and phenomenology 
"study how consciousness is organized but never what it is dealing with 
or why" (1971:97). In this way the forms of censcieusness are studied 
but not their contents. 
From a dialectical perspective where the individual and the world 
are co-determinates, the individual mediates his world through an active 
process that is able to transcend the world and himself, The person, 
through mediating the world, himself and others, changes himself and 
gives meaning to his life. A fundamental cencept for dialectical 
psychology is praxis. In such a perspective the given conditions are 
ones to be negated in order to express vital life-flowing structures 
that correspond to growth and individual praxis. Ratner believes it 
is necessary to overcotn~ the given structures, situations and confining 
orientation to achieve a praxis. Working in or conforming tli> the given 
puts constant pressure on the person ri.ot to explare or "to expand him-
self and see himself in new circumstartc.es ••• " (197HlQ6). 
Assumptions of the Dialectic 
A brief overviewing of the dialectic is in order. Kosik centered 
his attention on the active acquiring powers of subjective mediations 
and the relationship it has to a dialectical process of praxis. Ratner 
illustrated what can happen when .the initial discussion praceeds from a 
pasition holding that the individual and the warld eccupy two distinct 
pesitions external to each other. At this time the power of the 
dialectic may be brought into sharper focus through a discussion of its 
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logic. The first topic will be to analyze a distinguishing feature that 
separates classical from dialectical logic. To further illustrate this 
distinction, the writing of a notable living dialectical scholar and 
the implications a dialectical logic may have for the sciences of logic, 
physics and psychology will be considered. Writing primarily'·in an 
Hegelian fashion, Michael Kosok masterfully analyzes the explosiveness 
of the dialectic in a non~linear perspective. i ' 
The Logic of the Dialectic: The Fringe 
Lenin has said the unity of opposites was the most important prin-
ciple of the dialectical process. This principle basically affirms 
that the element is determined through its internal opposition. This 
has generally been regarded as a process of becoming. McGill and Parry 
believe the major distinguishing factor between classical and dialec-
tical logic is the ability of dialectical• logic to allow for the·fringe 
which is that space in which opposites occur such that the two overlap. 
For the purpose of their exposition McGill and Parry clarify their 
meaning of opposites. "In this paper A and -A always stand for strict 
opposites, i.e., properties which cannot both be true of the same event 
E (except where E lies in a borderline or transitional range)" (1948: 
420). This exception is precisely one of tlie principle differences 
distinguishing dialectical from classical legic. The'implication of 
re-organizing this fringe area (borderline or transitional) calls into 
question two fundamental laws of formal l';)gic: the law of the excluded 
middle and the law of nan-contradiction. The concept of contradiction 
as the authors are concerned with it, implies a conflict which cannot 
be resolved or an engagement of two opposing forces which in a logical 
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sense generally implies that an impasse has been reached in which one 
position must give way to the other. McGill and Parry are interested in 
the latter meaning, 
Two interpretations of the Unity of Oppasites principle which 
cause classical lagic .some difficulties are: 
1. In any concrete continuum, whether temporal er non-
temporal, there is a middle ground between twa contig-
uous opposite properties A and -A, i.e., a stretch of 
the continuum where it is not true that everything is 
either A or -A. 
2. In any concrete continuum,.there is a stretch where 
something is both A and -A (1948:421). 
To illustrate this fringe area they use an analogy similar to the 
mathematical expressions developed by Black (1948). Let us imagine 
"we have a series of colors which can be divided into 10 segments which 
can be numbered successively from 1-10" (1948:429). The area 1-4 can be 
designated as red and the area 7-10 would be not-red. At what point 
does this transition occur. The area between 5-6 is generally thought 
of as overlap or fringe area. It is clear on this line that sections 
1-4 excludes not-red and that 7-10 excludes red but the overlap repre-
sents an area of vague boundary lines and distinction. Attempts have 
been made to attribute this area of vagueness to the inadequate state 
of our measuring devices or, as Russell attempted to attribute other 
similar areas of vagueness, to an inadequate use of clear conceptual 
language symbols. Black has pointed out however that this vagueness 
may not be due to an inadequate state of scientific precision but is 
endemic to the process itself. McGill and Parry quote from Black's 
findings. 
A symbol's vagueness ..• in the existence of objects con-
cerning which it is intrinsically impossible to say if the 
symbol in question does, or does not, apply. The set of all 
objects about which a decision as to the symbol's application 
in intrinsically impossible is defined as the 'fringe' of 
the symbol's field of application (McGill and Parry, 1948: 
433). . 
Black seems to highlight the aspect of subjective vagueness 
through the use of vague symbols. However, various experiments con-
ducted with animals to distinguish between an illuminated circle and 
an ellipse shared an area of vagueness or an area that could not be 
clearly distinguished. To a direct.application of scientific instru~ 
ments McGill and Parry point out that "even the best instrument would 
fail to discriminate a mathematical line dividing A from -A, since 
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mathematical lines cannot be disorientated, and by all accounts, do not 
exist in nature" (1948:435). Another way of looking at this phenomenon 
is to imagine trying to reach the next highest number to the left of 
the decimal point by adding nines to the right of the decimal. 
McGill and Parry ask what are the options available.for us·if we 
recognize the dialectical implication of the principle of the unity of 
opposition. As they see it, there are four available options: retain 
formal logic for all applications with the exception of the fringe 
areas, develop quantitative techniques similar to those used by Black, 
impliment a three-stage logic of truth values, 1, ~' or to adopt some 
form of the Heyting logic. 
The point at which McGill and Parry leave us is with the 
recognition of the fringe area and how formal logic tends to regard 
this as an exception. The unity of opposites as it is approached in 
dialectical logic recognizes that this interaction of opposites has an 
influence on the future becoming a state of the element. Furthermore, 
what has been implied and which will be explicit by Kosok is that the 
ensuing interaction commences from aspects' essential to each other and 
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are not viewed as external separate entities as sometimes is the case 
in formal logic. Kosok amplifies this implica tien as he moves.· toward 
. a. non-:-linear logic •. 
Dialectical Logic: A Non-Linear 
Field of Relationships 
Kosok was introduced to the intricacies ef dialectical logic and 
its implications for a dialectic of nature by his father, the late 
Dr. Paul Kosek. With this introduction he has continued to consider 
the possibility of formulating a unified field theory of the sciences 
from a dialectical perspective (1971). The process of Kesok's inquiry 
may be depicted in his own words. 
The path leads from the initial perspective of a dialectics 
of nature as levels of matter in motion, to a concrete for-
mulation of dialectics as a phenomenology of subject-objec-
tivity capable of formalization to the development of a 
theory of consciousness in terms of a self-world dialectics 
of inter-subjectivity, to a re-formulation of Hegel's 
encyclopedia according to a dialectical-phenomenology of 
self-world interaction, within which, lastly, the dialec-
_tics of nature as a level-structure of matter in motion 
finally appears as a necessary component (1971:87). 
The implications which are inherent in the logic of the dialectics 
may best be brought out through a comparison to the fundamental tenents 
of Logic, Physics, and Psychology as they were developed for Western 
thought in the early formative stages. Before doing this the nature of 
a paradox.and its relationship to a non-linear logic should be explored. 
On the content of McGill and Parry the concept of contradiction implied 
an impasse where one of the opposite positions had to be released. In 
classical logic this is an attempt to remain faithful to Aristotle's 
system. Through the realization of a paradox, which Kosek interprets 
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from the Greek "para-doxes" to mean "to appear beside," contradictions 
are not viewed as an attempt to eliminate one position or the other but 
are regarded as a necessary and fundamental relationship that clarifies 
each component and, as such, must be considered in a field of events. 
In the pre-categorical stage of immediacy an event or element is 
posited. Once reflection and the resulting stage of a categorical 
process occurs, distinctions are counter posited. This relationship of 
a paradox where "two elements appear as one, but the ttni,ty in turn 
appears as mutuality of two" is what Kosak (1971:31) considers to be a 
non-linear relation. 
This is a relation in which no distinc~ion or element can be 
separated from its content of co-distinctions relative to 
which it is defined and relative to whi.ch it functions, 
without thereby introducing a perturbation and distortion, 
which on another level is but a higher order non-linerality, 
this time between system and perturbation-or between object 
and subject, observed and observer. In a non-linear para-
doxical field, all formation is at once transformation-for 
each is what it is only through its relation to what it is 
not~; in non-linear paradoxical awareness there is neither 
observer nor observed as such, but only the dynamic state of 
observing (Kosak, 1970b:31-32), 
To conceive of mediations in a non-linear fashion, one must face 
contradictions as an inevitable occurrence. Kosak describes the 
process of dialectical logic in the forms of paradox, paradox lost, 
and paradox revisited. This is to indicate that contradictions are not 
suppressed but are recognized in higher orders. This is another way to 
express the movement of consciousness from a pre-categorical condition 
of immediacy where distinctions or negations that occur are viewed c.a.s 
co-determinates of the original paradox. The implication is that the 
original state is not externally negated but undergoes a self-negation 




"consciousness or contradiction appearing as self-contradictions and 
hence self-consciousness" (Kosok, 1970b:35). 
The aspects of a dialectical phenomenology recognizing the dynamics 
of a paradox " ••. generates its own ontology in the forms of a cycle 
moving from essence to existence to reality, where all three are in 
parably distinct, but are not categories of being" (Kosok, 1970b:35). 
For each of these sciences, Logic, Physics and Psychology, Kosok views 
the core development of the disciplines through a dialectical perspec-
tive and, in so doing, illustrates how these classical forms are unable 
to account for the fringe areas which, as has been said, calls into 
question the validity of the law of the excluded middle and the law of 
non-contradiction. Essence, as it is used here, is an attempt by each 
discipline to set out in clear terms what it considers the identity of 
its subject of study to be. It is the beginning point from which it 
builds and consequently refers back to, The foundation of these disci-
plines has been developed from Aristotle. Logic as it was developed by 
Aristotle began with a statement of essence as the law of identity 
which is to say that an element A can only be A and not something else. 
It can also be substituted into other situations to represent that 
same element: A+ C = D and A+ F = G where in both cases the A is the 
same. Kosok views this law as a statement of identity. 
Thus 'A is A is a delineation G>f A into self-identity as 
distinguished from other-identity dep~ndency, and as a 
result, the law of identity is a 'conservation of· identity' 
statement, in effect making each element by itself a state 
of unchanging arid static equilibrium with regard to its 
essence of meaning (1970b:37). 
From this initial position of essence an element is defined only 
in relation to itself in an. attempt to establish clear·boundaries of 
7JiJ '; ,, 
independent being. This same basic principle of essence is developed 
in the discipline of ,physics as Newton expanded his law of inertia 
which contends that every element in space will maintain "a censtant 
momentum unless acted upon by an external farce or centact relation" 
(1970:37). In the discipline of psychology, Freud advanced his prin\ 
ciple of essence through the pleasure principle of the Id, which is to 
say, that the Id will attempt to maintain its position ef pleasure or 
to restore itself back to a given static condition. This is the case 
for each basic element in the respective disciplines as expressed in 
symbolic form, the atom or the Id, as they are regarded as being 
separate and distinct elements. The principle of indeterminancy is 
absent. The initial conditions for static, equilibrium-seeking en-
tities, is to seek to maintain or to return to an independent state. 
The attempt to maintain clear determinate boundary values between 
elements in all cases leads to a host of difficulties as was pointed 
out in the recognition of the fringe areas. In the area of logic, 
Goedels undecidibility theorems enters and challenges the very core of 
Aristotle's system and linear logic. (Goedels' Theorem is defined by 
Kosok as a "relation such as 'A implying and being implied by not A', 
which is expressive of such a boundary coupling between 'A' and 'not A' 
can be validly constructed, but must of necessity lead either to in-
consistency if accepted into the system, or incompleteness if rejected" 
[1970b:39]). The question becomes how are we to account for the fringe 
areas. Kosok offers his alternative by "redefining 'A' and 'not A' in 
terms of a singular boundary value between them, will the coupling 
between 'A' and 'not A' express a paradoxically complete and consistent 
relation" (1970b:39). This is to say that the trans-category trans-
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action which does not return to itself as essence but achieves a higher 
unification which can be illustrated as A'. Kosek refers to this as 
the principle of Non-Identity which can be expanded into a matrix form 
(1970a). 
The next stage which these disciplines turn their attention to is 
the axioms of existence. "Existence is the domain of·pure matter in 
space and time ••• " (Kosok, 1970:36) which Kesok regards as an attempt 
to account for the process of change or mediation. Aristetle pre-
viously stated the essence to be a law of identity; and for existence, 
he extended the first law into the second which, as Kosok ne_tes ~ was 
the law of contradiction which simply implied that something cannot be 
both A and not A, "Thus, negation enters as the morality of mediation, 
for the negation of A is regarded as an operator which refers to all 
that which is other than A" (1970b:38). Far Newten and the discipline 
of physic, mediation occurred through a movement of force, which is to 
say that changes occurred when forces interacted, 
Kosok interprets Freud's concept of essence as represented by the 
Id. For Freud the Id centinually was on guard ta maintain a state ef 
equilibrium which was s,eparate and distinct from other Id's. Kosek 
refers to the Id as "an a-moral collection of individual atoms, each, 
as it were, constituting itself as a microcosm or monad individually 
defined and independent of the needs of other such monads" (1970b:37)\. 
In all three disciplines the process of mediation is encountered 
through negation, force and the Ego which for each-discipline views the 
mediation process occurring between two distinct elements·which were 
separately conceived. 
How these three disciplines attempt to account for reality, which 
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Kosok considered to be "the domain of the mind-matter co-relation which 
manifests itself most visibly in the study of the psyche, i.e., what is 
simultaneously material and mental" (1970b:36), will be the next con-
cern. In dialectic logic this is referred to as the point ef synthesis; 
and Aristotle's respense was the law of the excluded middle. 
Therefore, the law of the excluded middle simply states that 
'A' and 'not A', are a complete division of space, for no 
third term exists between A and not A, all negation being 
neutral (1970b:38-39). 
This is an attempt in classical logic or linear logic to account for a 
system being both consistent and complete. This is the case· if the 
fringe area is overlooked along with Goedels' Theorems. This is what 
Kosok refers to as obtaining a "well formed system identity for A and 
not A, or A and B (calling not A, B), together form a singular identity, 
A plus B, or A' that has no under-or-over lappings" (1970b:39). 
Newton developed his response to a synthesis in much the same 
manner~ In reviewing his system when an·element in space and time that 
is at rest or in a state of equili~rium meets another element or force, 
a change occurs which continues until another state of equilibrium is 
achieved. A synthesis in this 'account, as it is for the others, in-
volves a bringing together ef several parts.into a larger whole or unit; 
and then this unit is considered as a unit distinct from other units. 
Through' this process of development or emergence, the Newtonian outlook 
perceives a host of parts that are not interrelated to each other but, 
can now be regarded as a system. This system is then regarded in its 
initial state; inertia, where parts triay be out of equilibrium but when 
censidered as an entity, is in a state of equilibrium. Just as Goedels' 
Theorems played havoc with Aristotle's logic, the principle ef indeter-
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minancy plays havec with Newtonian physics. Kasok sees this principle 
as another expression of baundary vagueness " ••• which declares the 
impossibility of clearly defining the boundary of any one object to 
begin with let alone the nature of internal beundaries" (1970b:40). In 
physics, developments along a non-linear perspective are presently 
being developed as is evident in the ongeing research ef wave-particle 
studies and the theory of relativity. This developme~t for Kosok is 
still inadequate as it stands today for they both refer back to a 
constant point of-reference in standard linear logic. Fer quantum 
mechanics, the esi;ential element or essence becomes-the proton and for 
relativity it becomes the speed of light. 
Once freed of such limitation, present day ·relativity can be 
derived from electl;'o-magnetism, and, present day quantum 
mechanics then appear as a necessary co-relative asp~ct to 
the dynamics.of the electromagnetic field. Thisleives · 
room for the development of relativity and qua;nt'tlill inecllan-
ics in term~ of particles or energies not d·epe*dent: upon 
the speed of electto-m~gn.etic light, e~g., for sub~elec-
tronic or cu~photeni~ interactions (19701:>:41). 
Freud's a·ttempt to accsun,t for aspects of reality was sµggested, 
as Kosok points out; in the sublimination proce~s of the Supet-Ego. 
Through this relationship, then, for every ego action thei-e is an 
anti-Ego reaction.from which the Super-Ego strtictµre is created with 
the Id. Through this resulting constru~tion there is a movement toward 
equilibrium which is simultaneously a movement back to the three prin-
ciples which view the entities as being;distinct ~E).d separate. 
Th.e basic. problem for all th;ree disciplines as they· were developed 
by Aristotle; Newton and Freud lies in their attempt to construct ex-
planations in a logical ftamework which views relationships from a 
boundary maintenance system which experiences change thr~ugh opposing 
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forces and which attempts to return to a state of equilibrium at 
another level. This is an attempt to return to a state of equilibrium 
at another' level. This is an attempt in linear logi.c ta ignore contra-
dictions and build complete, closed-ended systems. To view relation-
ships in a dynamic, ongoing process of becoming a non-linear logic 
offers many viable possibilities. The principle of non-identity, as 
developed by Kosak and the realization of what it means to be self-
conscious in the sense that Hegel described in his Phenomenology, would 
not view reality as a system of opposing forces which ultimately meet 
and where an impasse is reached resulting in one to be eliminated or 
sublimated in order to make a consistent system. Aufgehoben is a pro-
cess for Geist, praxis and dialectical logic which transcends and 
recognizes the independence and interdependence of co-determining 
elements in a Gestalt or a non~linear process of becoming. 
A Dia.lectical Sociolegy: Act as a Dialectical 
Concept of Praxis 
The relationship a dialectical perspective ~ay have for sociology 
can be illustrated through the concept of act as it serves.as a vehicle 
for the transformation between the individual and the external environ-
ment consisting of other humans and the natural environment. Praxis 
is the mode of activity which transforms oneself and the view of the 
world. To place the dialectical perspective more firmly in the realm 
of sociology, it can be generally asserted tha.t sociology, as it is 
used here, is a study of the relationships which people share with 
each other. This study must go beyond the given appearances, as Kosok 
points out, as it seeks to understand the structure which gives rise 
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to human relationships. 
Sociology, as expressed in a mainstream perspective which finds its 
heritage in Comte's vision of an industrial social order and an empir-
ical positivistic methodology, attempts to account for its essence, 
existence and reality in a linear logic. The idea of the state, as 
developed by Plato, is a conservative conception that holds the essence 
of the state to be a reified concept which its members attempt to 
achieve. The laws of identity also have the relationship in mainstream 
sociology where individuals are viewed as role players whose function is 
to perform this assigned role for the good of a stable order. 
The concept of existence or the modes of interactions which occur 
between independent elements are represented by concepts of the Hob-
besian struggle of all against all. For the functional sociologists 
this has been represented by the principle of insatiable wants bounded 
by the principle of scarcity. Human beings are viewed as being driven 
by the pleasure principle, similar to the Id conceptualization by Freud. 
The modes of interaction between such an encounter are a contradiction 
or struggle for power. The means used to control such a struggle are 
through ascribed roles, norms, stated and accepted goals, common sym-
bols and pure force. 
The reality principle for such a perspective is viewed through the 
struggle of non-compatible entities which are seen in an either/or 
perspective. In such a view elements exist either within a larger 
entity which then attempts to maintain its state of equilibrium or they 
become external to the system. A linear perspective of social reality 
is shared by members of the conservative and liberal forces of the 
mainstream perspective. The left .has repeatedly voiced the opinion that 
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one is either part of the solution or part of the problem. 
Ratner illustrated that a one-sided perspective, regardless of its 
base, does little to add to a fruitful analysis of social reality. This 
is also the case for sociology. When the functionalists are replaced 
by the individual con-games of Goffman, the struggle of exclusive 
elements continue. 
A dialectic perspective for sociology can find a fruitful base in 
the writings of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. This dialectical base views 
the relationships of elements or society and individuals not as ·sep-
arate entities acting in a process of contradiction but rather sharing 
points of interrelationship in a paradoxical field of events. Con-
sciousness in such a perspective is regarded as an active process. 
through which one transforms self and the world. The individual, as 
posited by Descartes, Kant and Fichte, is not regarded as a separate 
entity but rather as an element that is both dependent and independent 
of others. Existence is not viewed as a struggle but as a mediation 
between the particular and the universal 'Which does not cancel one or 
the other but rather gives way to an aufgehoben. Reality in such a 
perspective is a process of transformation based.upon the dialectical 
principles of Non-Identity. 
Summary: Act as a Dialectical 
Concept of Praxis 
In closing, the relationships which act has in the dialectical 
process shall be considered. An act is a vehicle for transformation 
between the individual and the external world which may be composed of 
objects, humans and spiritual matters. It is a mode of activity 
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through which one becomes aware of self and of the world. An act does 
not occur in a one-way mechanistic model; not does it occur as an act 
of a single individual apart from the world~ From a dialectical per-
spective, an act is viewed as an active process of mediation which 
occurs in a paradoxical field of relations. From this encounter, the 
act of observation is an act of participation involving a field of 
relations where both elements of subjective and objective aspects come 
into an interaction where both affect each other. 
When an act is viewed in a dialectical process, a particular 
element of either the actor or the agency cannot be viewed apart from 
the other. To say that one only works here, i.e., to merely punch the 
time clock and not be effected by the mode of activity that is per-
formed or the structural composition of the agency for which one may 
be working within, is a shortcoming that is not accepted within a 
dialectical perspective of the act. On the other hand, to use the 
ethos of some agencies, e.g., give us a boy and we will make a man out 
of him, is to assume that ane enters a relationship devaid ef any past. 
experiences. When an act is viewed in a dialectical perspective, it is 
not presented as an either/or alternative of choosing the act or the 
agency, When such alternatives are offered, the underlying relation-
ships which exist are glossed over and the means fer a transformation 
are easily forgotten. From a dialectical perspective the modes of 
relationships and transformation are brought out as interacting 
elements which effect each other and, in turn, places the emphasis not 
on a given state of being but on a precess of mediation of becoming. 
This perspective recognizes that the activity to be performed has a 
subjective asp'ect from which an act is directed and an objective aspect 
. '7·8 
from which objects of creation appear. The relationship this has for 
a dialectical process of act and agency is well stated by the Frankfurt 
Institute for Social Research • 
••• the institutions themselves are merely the epiphenemena ef 
the living laber ef human beings. Socielegy becemes a cri-
tique of society as soon as it d·oes not merely describe and 
weigh institutiens and processes of society, but cenfrents 
. them with what underlies these, with the life ef these upen 
whom these ins•ti tu tions have been imposed, and these ef whom 
the.se institutions themselves are-to such a great extent 
composed (1972:23). 
Fo:r this ,study the variables ef act and agency·are also viewed in 
a dialectical perspective, which is to say, that both cempenents enter 
into a process of mediation. This is· to suggest that agencies or 
organizational structures even as they may become institutions do not, 
however, 'take on a life of their own. Institutions are not considered 
to exist, apart from the individuals who compose them. From the process 
of mediations, then, a compenent of change or transfermation is ever 
present •. The institutions or the indiyiduals are not to be vie~ed apart 
from each other but are viewed as existing in a field of relationships. 
The following chapter will present the relationships between the three 
variables of consciousness, act and agency from a dialectical per-
spective. An attempt will also be made to account for the emergence of 




CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL: CONSCIOUSNESS, 
ACT AND AGENCY 
Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to present the construction of 
the model. In its broadest format this chapter will consist of four 
major divisions: (1) a definition of the variables, (2) a consideration 
of how the variables interact with each other, (3) a listing of the 
assumpt:;ions of the model, and (4) a presentation of the modes of con-
sciousness which emerge from the interaction of these variables. 
The ectoskeleton of the model, which may be found in The Phenomen-
ology of Mind and~ Philosophy of Mind, will be the first considera-
tion. In an attempt to further develop the process of consciousness, 
attention will then be directed to the internal aspects of how one 
I 
I • becomes conscious, which will be primarily draWl'). from the Marxian 
concept of praxis. After the three variables have been defined, the 
internal mechanism of the model will be considered from the aspect of 
a dialectical-phenomenological field of interrelationships. At this 
point the assumptions of the model will be stated. In ~ts full form 
the model has within it eight types of consciousness which will be 
briefly considered. The primary concern of this model is to inquire 
into what effects various working conditions have on the for~ation of 
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one's consciousness. The working process has been constructed in the 
form of three variables of consciousness, act and agency. The inclusion 
of variable of ·consciousness is to suggest from the outstart that one 
does not enter into a situation denuded of one's being. The working 
process is further structured into the form of mediations which occur 
between the persons expressing themselves through tasks or work ex-
periences and the interaction these tasks have with the organizational 
structure. In its broadest form the working process will have these 
three variables related in interaction. This model is an attempt to 
designate those conditions which would lead to the formation of a 
greater existential mode of consciousness. 
The Variables of the Model 
Consciousness 
In considering the first variable, the analogy to be made is that 
Hegel, in The Phenomenology (1967) and Philosophy of Mind (1971), 
essentially posed three levels of consciousness which were sensual 
consciousness, self-consciousness and universal self-consciousness. 
For purposes of this model only the first two levels of consciousness 
will be developed. Consciousness from a dialectical process is a 
reflective act in which the individual mediates the in-itself and for-
itself. As the resulting mediation process occurs, the interpretation 
and understanding gained from this process will depend upon what level 
of consciousness is being considered. The first task should be to make 
clear the distinguishing features and characteristics of these two 
levels of consciousness. 
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At the first level of consciousness, sensual consciousness can be 
characterized by the general concept of immediacy as it has been con-
sistently identified by Hegel. Immediacy is that characteristic which 
refers to the event or element as occurring~· It refers to those 
.points of consciousness as eccurring in distinction to the.self. This 
concept of immediacy is also that state of consciousness which appears 
at the beginning of each level of consciousness. In a dialectical 
motion of consciousness, this unity is quickly dispersed as it becomes 
conscious of other objects or recurr~ng objects of experience. The 
forms of mediations within this level of consciousness perceive events 
occurring in the present particular form. Attempts to generalize or to 
draw inferences to a much larger pattern are infrequent. Within this 
movement of immediacy, the particular uniqueness of that object is now 
structured and referred to as its. With the lack of ability or concern 
to infer to larger occurrences, all that can be said is that other 
elements exist independently of each other. Relationships of self to 
self, to others, to the world and to elements occurring with these 
contexts simply occur. This form of contradiction is·regarded as only 
normal and is frequently expressed as: There'will· always be conflicts. 
It can be said of this state that events or elements occur and are 
mediated within·the given conditions. These given ,cpnditions occur 
within a social-cultura1-his.torical field thaf serves to act as the. 
unifying .thread of the experienced world.· To go beyond the realm of 
the given is not seriously considered. Experiencing is an ongoing 
event with little articulatien to looking for the pattern,s or Gestalt. 
The world is viewed as exis.ting in a given situatiott and the self is 
viewed as existing in its own given conditions. Whil~ this level of 
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consciousness is one of experimental encounters, the second level of 
consciousness may be thought of as existing in the form of ideality. 
The second level of consciousness, self-consciousness, begins with 
a Gestalt of abstract, pure ideality in which objects in the immediate 
state are not considered. This brief unification can be maintained as 
long as one remains in the forms of abstract concepts which are void of 
I 
concrete experiences or analysis. Hegel's conception of self-conscious-
ness involves this concept of pure ideality. 
Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness; the latter 
is a consequence of the former, all consciousness of an other 
object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. 
The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine, 
and thus in it I am aware of me. The formula of self-con-
sciousness is I= I: abstract freedom, pure Ideality; and 
thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is its own object, there 
is strictly speaking no 'reality': for as it is its own 
object, there is strictly speaking no object, because there 
is no distinction between it and the object (1971:165) 
In this process of giving content to these abstract forms a contra-
diction occurs which can be described as a fitting process or matching 
process in which the contents do not seem to coincide with the form. 
The resulting struggle or contradiction is primarily experienced as 
competing elements of desire among objects or as a struggle for self-
recognition. As this movement of conscious attempts to satisfy one's 
desire, one becomes engaged in a negative act which can only tempor-
arily appease this insatiable appetite. 
Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the grat-
ification of desire, are conditioned by the object, for the 
certainty exists through cancelling this other; in order that 
this cancelling may be effected, there must be this other. 
Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation 
to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it 
rather produces it again, as well as the desire (Hegel, 
1967:225). 
While the contradiction of desires culminates in a destructive act 
of consumption which negates that particular desire, the struggle for 
recognition is based upon the premise that the other cannot be abso-
lutely obliterated. Hegel refers to this process as lordship and 
bondage or the master-slave relationship. 
Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, 
and by the fact that it exists for another self-conscious-
ness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 
recognized (Hegel, 1967:229). 
This struggle for recognition is in its initial appearance a struggle 
for life and death. This struggle demands from the other the recog-
nition of superiority and dominance. This form of mediation is again 
an expression of a negative counter-positing element which cannot be 
satisfied. The struggle engaged in at this level begins from the 
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initial assumption that subject and object are two distinct and separate 
elements. At this level of consciousness, one does not see the inter-
relationships among the elements. 
The third level of consciousness is one that is primarily charac-
terized by ability to recognize these interconnecting patterns of 
relationships and still be aware of the uniqueness of the particular 
objects. Another unique characteristic of this tier of consciousness 
is that one also is aware of the motion and the resulting path which 
was engaged in. This process of consciousness could also be described 
as a meta-consciousness, that is, being aware of what factors have been 
most predominant in forming one's consciousness and having the ability 
to freely communicate that process. 
The form of mediation which occurs at the level of universal self-
consciousness is one where the notion or subjectivity coincides with 
objectivity, When this process occurs in interpersonal relations, one 
becomes aware of one's self in another and, consequently sees aspects 
of the other which are independent of one's self. 
Universal self-consciousness is the affirlllc!,tive awareness 
of self in another self; each self as a free individuality 
has his own 'absolute' independence,.yet.in virtue af the 
negation o~ its inunediacy or appetite without distinguish-
ing itself from that other. Each is thus universal self-
consciousness and objective; each has real universality 
in the ,shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself 
recogn{zed in the other freeman, and is aware·of this in 
so far as it recognizes the other and knows him to be 
free (Hegel, 1971:176). 
For Hegel this form of consciousness was to be experienced from 
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within an environment where the universal would ensure the free expres-
sion of the particulars. This formiof Spirit would truly express the 
nature of experiences. 
This last form into which Spirit passes, Nature, in ::J.ts 
living. innnediate process of development. 'Nature-Spirit 
divest~d of self (externalized) is, in its actual ·exist-
ence, noth:l.ngbut this eternal process of abandoning it 
(Nature's):own independent subsistence, and the movement 
which reinstates Subject (Hegel, 1967:807). 
Absolute truth,'as described by Hegel, is obtained in the universal 
selfi...consciousness, which is the precess of obtaining total knowledge. 
"The terminus is at that point where knowledge is' no lQnger compelled ta 
go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the notian corres~ 
ponds to the object and the object to the notion" (Hegel, 1967:137-138). 
. ' 
As is the case in each,beginning tier of consciousness, this wholeness 
at firi;t seems to be'a primary quality. An4 as is the case for other 
i 
forms of consciousness, if there is believed to'be ne further action 
inside the notion or outside in the object, then in fact it would 
repres~nt a state of $tability where change is absent. When this 
wholeness is placed in the realm of the immediate, however, this once· 
held unity splinters ,off into particular uniqu~ qualities. Through 
this process reification is challenged and is forced ta account for new 
85 
occurrences. If this stability is reified, then a primary character-
istic of consciousness would be interpreted through a static non-life 
particular form that no longer interacts in a dialectical fashion of an 
active ongoing consciousness. 
The concept of consciousness, as it has been developed thus far, 
implies that it is an active process engaged in by the person who 
attempts to pull together some form of a pattern from this field of 
interacting elements. Throughout the history of philosophy there has 
been much debate concerning whether or not one can ever know the thing 
in-itself. Marx, Sartre, Nietzsche, Kosak, Ratner and Kosik have 
considered this question. Although there are several points of major 
disagreement among these men, they could be said to agree on the fol-
lowing: (1) at some point, there is a noticeable distinction between 
the in-itself and for-itself, (2) once these distinctions are noticed 
there ensures an active process and (3) the variable that is negotia-
ting this mediation process is the self. From this basis, consciousness 
will be defined as an active ongoing process of mediation where the 
self is primarily responsible for the mediation process between the in-
itself and for-itself. In the modei all variables will be dichotomized 
into a low and a high form. A low mode of consciousness would indicat~ 
that this m~diation process is not being actively engaged by the self. 
This mode of consciousness is analogous to Hegel's sensual conscious-
ness. The high form of consciousness indicates that the self h~s 
accepted the responsibility for this mediation process and is actively 




Marx viewed the formation of consciousness to be primarily 
influenced by the various modes of expression one utilized to gain 
knowledge. The primary mode of expression that was fundamental to 
Marx's critique was the working process. As has already been mentioned; 
work was a vital and necessary mode of expression through which one 
encountered self, others, and the environment. Through this encounter 
one comes to understand one's own power of transformation and the 
resulting influences on self and on other elements. At times this 
basic form of expression, which Marx described as work, has been inter-
preted to mean that Marx was a proponent of a mechanical materialism 
where an external environment impressed itself upon the subject. 
Although the tendency may be there to make this assumption, a closer 
look at the first thesis of Feuerbach should reveal that this is not 
the case. 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism-that 
of Feuerbach included-is that the thing, reality, sensuous-
ness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of 
contemplation but not as human sensuous activity, practice, 
not subjectivity. Hence it happened that the active side, 
in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by 
idealism-but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism 
does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach 
wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thqught 
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as 
objective activty. Hence in Das Wesen des Christentums, he 
regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely 
human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only 
in its dirty-judicial manifestation. Hence he does not 
grasp the significance of 'revolutionary' of practical, 
activity (Tucker, 1972:107). 
Human activity as a mode of objectification was for Marx an 
expression of one's own subjectivity. The objective and subjective 
co-determination were developed through one's purposeful directed 
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activity. Kosak interprets the first thesis of Feuerbach to be a vital 
aspect of Marx's dialectical-phenomenology which fully recognizes the 
intersubjectivity of the subjective and objective components and their 
resulting circular dialectic relation. This relationship of the 
phenomenological field event is what is referred to as a non-linear 
field of relations. 
Subjectivity is a field~ presence, i.e., an immediate non-
localized gestalt, 'opening' or 'awareness' whose content 
is constituted by events of mediation or determination-by 
'objects' .of awareness, such that the field or 'c0nscious-
ness-in-itself' and the events within a field, content, or 
gestalt of presence (and never abstract or detached 'things-
in-themselves') (Kosak, 1971:49). 
Marx attributed the development of alienation to those structural 
aspects of the working process which acted to separate the subjective 
and objective elements into separate and distinct features. This is 
achieved, in part, when the laborer sells his services for a wage and 
the wage is reified to represent the product of the social conditions 
of the working process. The implication this has for social relations 
is that people come to regard their acts of creation through a fetish-
ized concept of price or money. 
Kosak (1970a) has further analyzed this mode of expression to be 
essential in man's construction of reality. His essential thesis is 
that people, through their relationships with things, come to realize 
their own selfs. Essential to this process is that one comes to under-
stand and direct one's own praxis which is an active process of thought 
and action. Kosak is explicit that knowledge is not gained through 
contemplation but through a praxis. 
The dialectic of the activity and passivisity in human know-
ledge manifests itself first of all in the fact that man, in 
order to know things in themselves, might first of all.trans-
form. them in things for himself (Kosak, 1970a:129). 
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Modes of expression, which man uses to express himself, act as 
projections or bridges from himself to others. It is not enough that 
some kind of activity exists, but for one to realize a praxis, activity 
must be initiated, directed and controlled by the person. The second 
variable of this model is referred to as act which may be defined as 
the degree to which a task has been self-initiated, directed and eval-
uated by the individual person. This·variable also will be dichotomized 
into a low and a high aspect. A low act is that activity or task in 
which the individual person is able to express the origin, development 
and evaluation of the task. A high act is that activity or task which 
has been previously originated and has with it a predetermined course 
of activity to be implemented ·and that has pre-existing external 
standards to which it is to be evaluated. 
Agency 
The third variable for this model is agency. In its broadest 
context agency may be representative of the external organization which 
one continually encounters. An agency is that form of external organ-
ization which attempts to pattern a course of ongoing activity. A 
high agency is a tightly knitted hierarchial structure which formulates 
tasks and sets in motion directives to ensure that the task is carried 
through. A low agency is characterized by a flexible structure which 
i.s not organized in a tightly knitted hierarchial structure and which 
seeks to accommodate a variety of tasks. A high agency is character-
ized by Weber's description of the monocratic form of bureaucracy where 
the structure is hierarchially _constructed, where orders or tasks are 
assigned to specified role players, and where it is the function of the 
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role players to act as objectively as possible in the execution of the 
powers of their office. The intention of such a system is to construct 
a rationally determined course of action in which role players will come 
to execute their functions without much concern with broader issues. 
In this format a dialectical relationship between subject and work is 
not viewed as an act of transformation of self and product, but is 
rather viewed as a task to be completed. The focus shifts from the 
process of doing it to the context of meeting established external 
standards. 
The Mechanism of the Model 
The internal structure or mechanism of the model rests on the 
premise of a dialectical conception of transformation. The foundation 
of a dialectical transformation, as it has been developed by Kosok, can 
be basically said to occur in a non-linear field of relations where the 
principle of non-identity takes into consideration the fringe area 
which is not interpreted as a contradiction but as a relation occurring 
in a paradox. F·rom this positing and counterpositing, elements are seen 
from a relationship which they share with each other. Other aspects of 
a dialectical-phenomenology have been expressed by Kosok as the prin-
ciple of concrete presence which has been alluded to in the discussion 
of Marx's first thesis 'of Feuerbach. Applied to a dialectical-phen-
omenology this principle regards the process of experiences as 
occurring prior to its products. The mode of relationships that occur 
within the non-linear field of relation is expressed as the principle 
of dialectic necessity. "Thus any relation between two elements X and 
Y is productive not only of a direct relation between them (XY) but of 
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a counter relations (the Y within X relating to the X within Y)" (Kosok, 
1971:56). From this basic format a dialectical relationship is one that 
manifests itself from a paradoxical relationship where elements act to 
distinguish one from another so as to clarify and inquire into their 
existing relationship. Careful consideration is taken to recognize that 
the act of separation is a self-imposed process made in the effort to 
help clarify those elements. In a paradox these seemingly inconsistent 
elements share in a basic relationship to each other, illustrated 
through the principle of a dialectic-necessity. The awareness of these 
distinctions are then mediated into a new synthesis which contains both 
aspects of co-determinate elements. In a process of mere contradictions, 
where X and Y enter into a conflict, it is generally assumed that X and 
Y start from a separate point of origin. In a paradoxical relationship 
the point of separateness is recognized as being self-imposed and 
existing alongside of each other. When these co-determinate elements 
are viewed as starting from separate spheres, they are often regarded 
as one attempting to conquer the other; or in the event that an impasse 
is reached, one element must take an inferior position. This is not 
the case in a dialectical-phenomenology. The process of transformation 
recognizes the interacting matrix as developed by Kosok. For our pur-
poses the act of transformation focuses on the mediation between the 
act and agency. 
The model in its full dimensions is an attempt to account for an 
emergent existential consciousness through a dialectical process of act 
and agency. Of the three levels of consciousness we will be concerned 
only with sensual consciousness and self-consciousness. Within each 
level of consciousness there exists four intra modes of orientation 
which are developed to express the form of consciousness that may 
emerge from a dialectical process of act and agency. Considering the 
two levels of consciousness, there will be a total of eight modes of 
consciousness. The three variables are consciousness, act and agency, 
all of which have been dichotomized into a high and a low form. The 
model with its eight cells may be viewed in Figure 1. 
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Level of Consciousness Act Agency Mode of Consciousness 
Sensual 
Low High High 1. monastic 
Low High Low 2. one-dimensional 
Low Low High 3. traditional 
Low Low Low 4. nihilistic 
Self-Consciousness 
High High High 5. missionary 
High High Low 6. individual 
High Low High 7. corporate 
High Low Low 8. existential 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Model: Consciousness, Act and Agency. 
The first mode of consciousness which will be considered is 
characterized by a high act and a high agency. Here the activity to be 
performed has been specified into a task assignment which allows for 
little input or contribution on the part of the participant. A high 
act further denotes that the conception of the task and the standards 
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for evaluatian have been previausly defined. Within the enviranment 
of a high act the person is confronted with what seems to be an already 
accomplished fact. The specification of the task has been previously 
determined; and one is confranted with a series of specifications ta be 
followed. In such a situation one quickly learns that it is not what 
you think of the task but how well you can complete it. The emphasis 
is not on the process af doing or creating or experimenting but on 
following a set of procedures. The emphasis is placed on the final 
product. This could be illustrated by classraoms in which children 
rush through the exercises to get the "right" answer. The procedural 
p~ocess is regarded as a minor aspect of the activity. Work books 
are quickly filled .in with the right answers with little regard to how 
the process was initiated or how it could be expanded upon. The trans-
formation process of creating and experimenting with one's awn unique-
ness is, in this case, not encouraged. If such is to be encouraged, 
there is a time set aside for creative acts which, in most instances, 
is relegated to outside the classroom. When one is locked into such a 
structure, one learns how to give the expected results. The task to be 
completed has been already defined and the criteria as to its evaluation 
have been stated. Prisoners, students, patients and employees in a 
high act quickly learn how to respond to the "vernacular of expecta-
tions". If a successful student is one who is evaluated as a docile, 
cooperating, polite student, then if the student wants to succeed 
within that particular environment, he will manifest those expectations. 
Within a high act ane learns how to become a passive object. The sub-
~ectivity of exploring, initiating, directing and evaluating one's 
task is not related to the person for his own deliberation but is 
93 
compared to pre-existing criteria. 
A high agency denotes a tightly-knitted hierarchial structure which 
has previously determined that task to be carried out and has set in 
motion the means to ensure its end product. In such an agency, indiv-
iduals are viewed as role players who are expected to perform the task 
assigned. Within such an organization the criteria is usually p:laced 
on how well the end product is achieved., The means or modes of 
expression that are used take on a secondary importance. From this 
process the tendency is to view the resulting social relationships in 
their end product and thus reify an aspect of that tatal process into 
an object. The ongoing social relations are sitp.ply net discussed or 
evaluated. Attempts to point out the advantages of such a system 
present .their arguments along the following lines. Work is conceived 
' 
as a necessary endeavor to gain the means·of securing a living. The 
living standard changes periadically as do the needs. Throug~ the pro-
cess of work one acquires the means to participate in the style of life 
that one chooses. Work, in this instance, is not viewed as a tatal 
process in:...itself. Through approaching one's work as a role player one 
is expected to perform a certain task which does not have to be or is 
ofteri thought not to be a fulfilling expression in itself. The state-
ment is often made that freedom·is the ability.to euy the.lu~ries of 
life to which one is accustomed. The means to acquire this life are 
through acquiring more dallars. 
When dollars are reified as the function af work, it is·nat hard 
ta understand why some confuse money and wealth. Money is an abstrac-
tion to facilitate the exchange of the various modes·of wealth. Wealth 
is the plentitude of natural and social materials. Watts uses the 
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analogy of laborers coming to their job in the morning and before they 
can start work, the foreman says, sorry boys-no w0rk today or in the 
near future; we ran out of inches. The men are standing there ready to 
go to work with their tools in their hands and the raw materials at 
their feet, and they are told "there are no inches". When inches o.r 
money take on a reified form it redirects the focus from the wealth of 
the community and its social relations to a sterile abstraction. 
Other agencies may choose to use a different abstract symbol and 
when they are structured in a tightly-knitted hierarchial fashion, the 
tendency is greater to reify some particular aspect over the total 
process. We can see this process of reification occurring at the level 
of churches who send missionaries who destroy the social fabric of 
cultures and social groups in the process of instituting their reified 
form of a god. Other forms of reification which occur in high agencies 
may be viewed in the military services. The Vietnam War provides an 
example. One officer expressed.his task assignment in this way: "We 
have to destroy the village to save it". Mei Lai, Ben Su, free-fire 
zones and concentration camps are other forms of reification where the 
end product is elevated into a position of dominance to which other 
activities are compared. 
A high agency is more prone to achieve this process of reification 
for several reasons. When the person is regarded as a role player, he 
is evaluated on the performance of that particular task. The person is 
not to associate himself with the total process but only with the task 
assigned. Perhaps this can be illustrated in the case of soldiers who 
plot the bombing raids over Southeast Asia but disavow any responsi-
bility of supporting the war because they did not personally drop the 
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bombs. A high agency attempts to present its case as being the most 
efficient ~eans of carrying out the assigned task. In this case, 
technical superio'rity is used as a defense of its organizational 
composition. The position of objectivity is often used to describe a 
high agency. This is interpreted to mean that the agency is actually 
neutral towards.its function and is. merely executing its task. Although 
personal respons~bility for particular tasks can be passed over, overall 
responsibility is harder ta locate. These are a few of the reasons why 
a high agency has a higher teindency to reify a particular aspect of the 
total process. 
Before going directly into the first mode of consciousness, the 
concepts of a low act and a low agency will be reviewed. A low act is 
structured in a flexibl, manner so that one can originate, develop and 
evaluate one's own wark. This can be easily illustrated in some of the 
"free schools" that have been initiated within the last decade. In 
most instances, these free schools act outside the auspices of the 
public school system and are.usually considered to represent an· anti-
thesis to the dominant culture. In these schools children are 
encouraged to develop and explore areas that have meaning to them. The 
curriculum is derived from the experiences and interests of the chil-
dren, and the mode of evaluation is primarily determined by the 
standards of the participating students. The majer thrust of such an 
activity is to have the student become the author of his own actions·, 
and in so doing, it is hoped they will accept the responsibility for 
their acts. Relationships are sought out and the students are 
encouraged to direct their own learning experiences and seek out their 
own relationships. The thrust is not to make them dependent on an 
external source but to provide them with the opportunity to become 
self-directive. 
A low agency attempts to supplement the basic activities that are 
encouraged in the low act. The organizational structure is not hier-
archial nor are decisions made at the top and passed down to be 
implemented. A low ageiicy attempts to involve members of·the insti-
tution or group in the decision-making process. The emphasis is on 
interaction with the directive to gain an open form of communication. 
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Participants are not departmentalized into specialities. A low act and 
low agency has a lower tendency to foster reification. This is pri-
marily the -case due to the structure of the situation where one has to 
assert some form of order on the field of, events so as to give it some 
meaning. In a situation that is characterized by an openness of 
structures, the self will have to account for new experiences. The 
emphasis is toward an ongoing field of events rather than a performed 
sequence of linear events as is often the case in a high act and a 
high agency. 
Modes of Consciousness 
In order to briefly review the characteristics of a low conscious-
ness and yet not repeat what has already been said, Buber's discussion 
of the I-IT relationship (1970) will be reviewed. Buber also speaks of 
the process of alienation in the form of experience where the I comes 
to know other objects in their it relationship and, in so doing, 
separates the object from the I. To only construct reality in this 
fashion would be to see it in a reified separate form. The time 
sequence for this relationship is static. Buber considers this time 
. ·i· 
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sequence to be of the past where there are dead things or objects to be 
manipulated. "The I of the basic word I-IT, the I that is not bodily 
confronted by a you but surrounded by a multitude of 'contents', has 
only a part and no present" (1970:63). 
Monastic 
Begirining at the level of sensual consciousness, the first mode of 
consciousness which emerges from a situation of a high act and a high 
agency will be considered. This situation is characterized by a low 
consciousness, which is to say, the person is not actively engaged in 
the mediation process. He would rather let this deliberation process 
take its own course. This is the case for all modes of sensual con-
sciousness. Within this particular situation of a high act and a high 
agency there is little room for deliberation between the act and the 
agency. The task has been previously specified and the agency has set 
in motion directives to insure that the task will be carried out. The 
criteria and the form of ev'alua tion has also been previously established. · 
For one who stays within this situation the initiative of new actions 
would have to be minimal. The type of consciousness which emerges from 
such a situation may be referred toas a monastic type. Monastic is 
used in reference to the formal orders which have been formualated by 
a tightly-knitted bureaucratic type social organization and where the 
daily tasks are well specified. The social hierarchy stands in a rigid 
pecking order. The acts are well defined and sometimes a specified 
time schedule is used for organizing the day around thought, word and 
leisure activities. The monastic type may be found in religious set-
tings or in the business world. The type of person that emerges from 
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such a situation may envision conflicts or struggles, but they are not 
actually related to one's own ongoing activities. Deliberations over 
these matters are not one's concern for low consciousness can always 
refer back to the daily task or agency for guidance or assurance. 
One-Dimensi.enal 
A situation of a high act and a low agency generates a conscious-
ness characterized as one-dimensional. Characterized by a low 
consciousness, participants within this setting find themselves con-
fronted with a well-designed task that has been previously defined for 
them. The type of agency is structured in a low profile which is 
adaptable to the varied tasks that may be performed. This situation can 
be most easily depicted by the analogy of various "open educational" 
modes which are currently being operationalized. The agency is flexible 
and is not built upon a rigidly defined bureaucratic structure. 
Decisions are not passed down in a hierarchial order but are encouraged 
to be formulated on the "team level" by those teachers who are closer 
to their subjects. The agency generally attempts to create a broad 
enough atmosphere for individual "input" within those agreed upon 
boundaries. The type of consciousness at this level does net actively 
engag~ in mediations teward a synthesis of conflicts. The implication 
this has toward the agency and act is that the general atmosphere in 
which they work is regarded as adequate. 
On the level of the act where the task has been previously spec-
ified as to the creation, direction and mode of evaluation there is 
little room left for deliberation on the part of the participants. 
Within the open education model the student is within a system that 
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seeks to meet the many differen~unique and valuable interests of the 
students. These tasks have, however, been already specified. Real-
izing that students are a diverse group, the educational agency attempts 
to diversify the structure to meet student needs. The objective in 
such a situation is to bring the students into a well-integrated system 
o~ uniformity. Within other settings this illusion of freedom of being 
able to choose a predefined alternative has been in operation for a 
number of years. Marcuse (1966) has gescribed this type of consciousr 
ness as one-diniensional. The form of mediation which occurs between 
the act and agency is primarily a one-way directive ef learning the 
,importance of a predetermined course of action. The level of conscio~s-
ness is low, the agency is low and the act is high. Organization, 
direction and evaluation have be.en previously determined and are 
constantly impressed upon the participants. One-dimensiorial refers to 
the lack of envisi,oning ahyt:hing different. The power ef negation to 
deny those pre-existing alternatives as not an a.ct of fre·edom is not 
envisioned by the participants. The process of negative thinking or 
analysis is lacking. Marcuse envisions the technelogica.1 alternatives 
which should act to offer people a multiple of choic;:es to enlarge their 
own freedom as the very means of timiting their freedom. These alter-
natives act not to serve man but become a situation where man serves 
the.alternatives. Marcuse q.escribe'S this as·a transference of power 
from the person to the technical and bureaucratic structures of 
society. This form of ~edia.tion does not· involve nor does it encourage 
an active involvement on the part of the participant. 
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Traditional 
The third mode of consciousness that emerges from the sensual 
level of consciousness within an environment of a low act and a high 
agency may be characterized as traditional consciousness. Once again 
it is important to note that the level of consciousness is low which 
does not see conflicts or struggles to be germane to self or the 
situation. The act is low which indicates that one has the opportunity 
to envision, create and express one's self in his ongoing tasks. The 
agency is high which indicates that there is a tightly-knitted hier-
archial structure which formulates tasks to be completed. Within this 
situation the participants, via their low consciousness, generally leave 
the deciding factors for resolving mediation with the social forms of 
established organizations. In the past this social system has been 
described as a homogenous society where their tasks were well understood 
and were filled by the members of the group or society. The partici-
pants in such a situation feel that their environment is conducive to 
their needs and interests and can refer back to the type of activity 
they are engaged in as an example of their sense of fulfillment. A 
struggle of mediation on the surface does not seem to exist. Norms are 
important in establishing a sense of boundary for the community. 
Critical analysis or negative thinking is not prevalent in this situa-
tion for to envision anything that wou~d be beyond the acceptable 
standards of the community would be considered as an infringement upon 
their traditional society. Laws, customs and modes of interaction are 
accepted on the premise that they have been in existence for a consid-
erable amount of time. The major criteron for new patterns would be to 
explain them as a source of continuing on with the traditions of the 
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past. The homogenous society of the past where there was a common 
interest or agreement on social standards of expectation is seldom the 
case in larger industralized centers today. Specifications, diversi-
fication of interest and the social glue that now is trying to act as 
the cohesive force holding members together has been developed as the 
technological imperative. Jacques Ellul (1964) has described this form 
of consciousness as the continuing development of techniques. 
He has been shaped by his work, used by it, mechanized, and 
assimilated. Imparted psychological investigations reveal 
that the workers have been deprived of initiative and re-
sponsibility; they are 'adapted' to the degree that they 
have become inert, unable to take risks in any area (1964: 
396). 
Within this situation the profile of low consciousness is encour-
aged from tightly-knitted bureaucratic structures which attempt to 
provide participants with the form of social expression and encourages 
them to fill in their own contents. 
Nihilistic 
The fourth mode of consciousness to emerge from the level of 
sensual consciousness from within a situation of a low act and a low 
agency is the nihilistic· mode of consciousness. All three variables 
are low. It is paramount to discover how this type attempts to create 
some organizational pattern for its acts. The mode of consciousness is 
low which is to say this type is not actively engaged in the mediation 
process. The task to be performed is left relatively open for one to 
imitate and carry through; and the agency is not setting in motion 
directives to have tasks carried through. The form of mediation seems 
to dissipate-for this type of consciousness. Within such a situation 
of this type a sense of being overwhelmed is experienced. Attempts to 
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anchor to some pattern or source of directien is missing. While 
mediation is experienced, a sense of nothingness is experienced. A 
sense of separation from self and organization are the primary charac-
teristics. The focal question becomes who or what is the organizing 
force for this type. Perhaps if there were a high agency present to 
set in motion a pattern which one could easily fill, it would act as 
the organizing force; but this is not the case. If one had a well-
organized pattern of behavior to keep going through the motions, it 
might give one a sense of activity; but this is also lacking. The 
process of the individual's own reflection also is inefficient. Hence, 
the person gradually comes to see nothing worthwhile. If this was 
followed to its end, the end would be suicide. Many times, however, 
diversions are entertained so as to avoid this consideration. Detours 
for this mode of consciousness may be experienced in excessive use of 
alchohol, drugs, inactivity, or sleeping; whatever the form, the major 
characteristic is one of withdrawal. This may occur from what one 
believes to be one endless encounter of contradictions where nothing 
really seems to hold together. This type is unable to reflect on 
consciousness, agency or act. There is simply a void for which there 
is a loss to know what or how to do something. At this point, it may 
be referred to as the negation of the negation without any motion from 
this impasse being realized. The act as a confirmation of one's self 
and others is unable to hold or suggest a meaning :to seemingly unre-
lated environments. Camus has described this as a confrontation with 
the absurd. 
A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; 
we don't hear him, but we see his unintelligible dumb show: 
we wonder why he is alive. This uneasiness before the non-
humanity of man himself, this incalculable fall before the 
,/· 
image of what we are, this 'nausea' as a conte~porary writer 
calls it-this too is the absurd (Barnes, 1962:166). 
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An encounter with nothingness, the absurd, or experiencing nausea 
is for this level of consciousness a state of disorientation. At a 
higher level of consciol,lsness, this form of expression may lead to an 
existential mode of consciousness. 
The next stage or level of consciousness reptesents a high mode of 
consciousness. At this level of consciousness, there are four interior 
modes of consciousness. Four types of agency~act situations exist 
where the person enters with high consciousness. 
The second tier of consciousness~ or self-consciousness is pri-
marily characterized by an active engagement by the person iri the 
ongoing forms of mediations. The form of mediation which occurs at 
this level is one of a struggle of competing desires or a struggle for 
self-recognition where others are viewed in opposition to seif. At 
this level of consciousness, one component attempts to dominate the 
others. The art of reflection illuminates the flbw of opposition as 
independent components separate and apart from one anot~er. In such an 
environment the four modes of intra-consciousness will give way to 
modes of consciousness which may be referred to as the missionary zeal, 
the individual type, the mass man, and the existential. 
Buber has described the i'it world" as one of experience. "Stan.;.. 
ding under the basic word of separation which keeps apart the I and IT, 
he has divided his life with his fellow man into two neatly defined 
districts: institutions and feeling~. It-district and I-district11 
(1970:92). In such a situation, characterized by a separate end, the 
person is unable to gain from the aspects of both·and thus lives at 
the expense of the other. The level of self-corisciousriess experiences 
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the ego in the sense of emotions and feelings.. What was lacking in the 
realm of sensual consciousness was the realization of the organizing 
force being the ego. In the realm of self-consciousness the over-
powering force becomes the I independent from the other I's and objects. 
"The I of the basic word I-IT appears as an ego and becomes consc_ious 
of itself as a subject (of experience and use)" (Buber, 1970:111). In 
realizing this experience the "egos appear by setting themselves apart 
from other egos" (1970:111). Buber described this process as the 
"purpose of setting oneself apart is to experience and 'use, and the 
purpose of that is 'living' which means dying one human life long" 
(1970: 111-112). 
Missionary 
The situation of a high act and a high agency within the level of 
self-consciousness is one primarily characterized by consensus. This 
type of consciousness is actively engaged in the process of mediation 
where the act has been highly formulated and the agency acts to ensure 
that these tasks will be carried through. This form of consciousness 
usually interprets self as being called into some form of active duty. 
The form of mediation on an internal level between the three variables 
is interpreted to be in agreement. The struggle of this form of 
consciousness is viewed not as an internal 'conflict but as a conflict 
between self as represented by the act and agency and those who are not 
a part of that same system. When this form of consciousness is fully 
realized, we can witness missionaries "saving souls," nation states 
assisting "underdeveloped countries," and perhaps in its blinding 
immediate form as conqueror, nation states making the world safe for 
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their own particular form of cansciousness. 
The form of mediation 'that occurs in this situation is one af a 
struggle between one's self and all others. This farm of cansciousness 
becomes more aggressive for within this situation comes a sense of 
confidence that has been instilled through a high agency and a high act 
which seems to :reinforce this sense ef purpase. With each continuing 
success the participants are encouraged to try harder. As failures or 
difficulties are encountered, this type of consciousness can always 
relate back to the act or agency or personal consciousness to r~gain 
momentum to mount another attempt in fulfilling one mission. From this 
type of situation consciousness instills within its participants.a 
sense of purpose which should be achieved. The Jesuits worked from 
such a framework during the Inquisition. Some have manifested this 
farm .ef consciousness in the fighting of wars. The resulting action is 
directed in an outward movement in an attempt to make others in the 
same image as they are or at least to control them in such a manner so 
that they would not be a potential challenge to this reified ·form of 
consciousness. Through a censtant reinforcement of a unilateral farm 
of envirenment which exists apart from others, this form of conscious-
ness thrives in a sterile, uniform const~nt situation as one attempts 
to make others in the image of one's self.. 
Individual 
The mode of consciousness emerging from a situation characterized 
by a high act, high conscieusness, and a low agency is the individual 
type. The mode of consciousness is high which indicates that one is 
actively engaged in the mediation process. The act has been previously . 
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specified for the participant; but yet the agency is la0sely constructed 
to accommodate a variety of tasks and ongoing activities. Through the 
act of working for another, the participant comes to realize his powers 
of transformation and begins to see himself as the arbiter of his 
reality, The resulting mode of consciousness attempts to understand or 
see through a seemingly contradictory situation where one's act has 
been specified but yet there seems to be no controlling agency which 
directs it. The participant attempts to understand the relationships 
accounting for this but is unable to go beyond the immediate social-
cultural environment. Confronted with such a situation, the individ-
ualist motif is played out. [his mode of consciousness was most 
prevalent in the laissez-faire stage of capitalism where the participant 
viewed himself in a fierce competitive struggle. The motif was well 
expressed by the Robber Barons and by Cornelius Vanderbilt who was 
determined to buy social prestige and power. At times this motif 
appears in the advertising media with the Marlboro commercials and the 
thinking man's filter. 
Under similar circumstances a low mode of consciousness responded 
in the motif of the one-dimensional man. The tyranny of technology 
and pre-existing work patterns were not questioned. However, as a 
high mode of consciousness confronted a similar situation, the aware-
ness of this tyranny came closer to being understood. Even though it 
understands, this type of consciousness fails to see alternatives and 
thus responds in a take-what-you-can attitude. The contradictions are 
realized but alternatives are not forthcoming. In this attempt to use 
the system, success is often measured in the forms of materialism and 
possession of objects. The pleasures that can be acquired from the 
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system are a sign of one's own ingenuity. This form of relationship 
lends itself very well to a continuance of the very same patterns where 
one can work in the system but yet not be part of it. 
Corporate 
The individualist mode of consciousness is functional for various 
stages of economic conditions. This may have been a successful mode of 
consciousness for laissez-faire capitalism but is not in keeping with 
the directives of monopoly capitalism. At the stage of monopoly 
capitalism a closer integration. is called for and the competing indi-
vidual is encouraged to yield to the mode of consciousness of the mass 
man or the company man. This mode of consciousness emerges from a 
situation of a low act and a high agency. The form of consciousness 
is again high and the resulting forms of mediation are to be able to 
reflect one's consciousness in the working process. The act or tasks 
are not predefined but are receptive to the participants' initiatives 
and interactions. On the larger circumference of this situation is 
the agency which is structured in bureaucratic form where tasks are 
specified and directives are set in motion to ensure the completion of 
the task. The participants are able to investigate and create various 
modes of expression in the working situation. At this point a decision 
is called for. The participant will act within the limits of the 
prescribed situation or will interpret the situation as limiting his 
potential and will thus leave. In a situation where the level of 
consciousness was low the situation presented itself as a pleasant 
community of similar interests. With the interaction of a high con-
sciousness, however, the forms of mediation are engaged in as a struggle 
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where it comes to be interpreted as the group or companies against other 
groups or companies. The underlying force of the struggle is character-
ized through this level of consciousness. It is not directed inward, 
in the case of the individual mode of consciousness but is manifested 
in an outward movement. In the case of the missionary mode of conscious-
ness, the ability to continually interpret new situations into a pre-
defined pattern was much easier. For the individualistic and mass 
modes of consciousness, however, it is more difficult to interpret 
experiences in a static form. The primary explanation in both cases 
is the separation of act from agency; and, in particular, the mass mode 
of consciousness has to guard continually against new interpretations 
that may be experienced through the low act. The mass man attempts to 
reify once-and-for-all a.pattern of mediation, but the low act serves 
to keep this reification process from taking over completely. 
Existential 
The last mode of consciousness to be considered is in part a 
response to the other modes of consciousness, particularly to the 
company or mass man. The.mode of consciousness which is at the high 
level of consciousness and within a situation of a low act and a low 
agency must, therefore, serve as the arbiter of one's world and 
reality construction. Possessing a high mode of consciousness infers 
that one actively seeks to engage in the mediation process. The 
environment is such. that one can express oneself in the work situation 
through the initiation, development and evaluation 0f one's modes of 
expression. There is no bureaucratically structured agency at hand to 
overlook and orchestrate action towards its end. From this environment 
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the mediation process is intense. In the case of a low consciousness 
within a similar situation the struggle or conflicts which were exper-
ienced were not related to self as in fact the whole situation was 
characterized by a direction of nothingness. The difference between 
the nihilistic and· the emergent form of existential consciousness in 
this situ~tion is that one has encountered the state. of despair and has 
realized it. Kierkegaard (1970) was extremely perceptive of the many 
forms of despair, but the most essential distinction he made was be-
tween despair for those who failed to realize it and despair for those 
w~o realized it. 
In order to will in despair to be oneself there must be con-
sciousness of the infinite self. This infinite self, however, 
is really only the abstract form, the abstract possibility of 
the self, and it is this self the man despairingly wills to 
be, detaching the self from every relation to the power which 
posited it, or detaching it from the conception that there 
is such a power in existence. By the aid of this infinite 
form the self despairingly wills to dispose of itself or to 
· create itself, to make itself the self it wills to be, 
distinguishing in the concrete self what it will and what 
it will not accept (1970:201). 
The despair which is experienced unknowingly is the type exper-
ienced by the nihilistic mode of consciousness. Despair which is 
experienced by a self-consciousness leads to the desire to create 
oneself; and to do so one actively seeks situations which will foster 
this activity. 
The only major philosophical problem of any significance for Camus 
was to decide if one should choose to commit suicide. If the choice of 
suicide was taken, then the mode of consciousness would be that of a 
nihilistic type. For those who decide not to commit suicide but yet 
have little assurance of the future and what it might bring, this type 
of consciousness actively seeks to experience self. An existential 
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mode of consciousness is encouraged to develop in a situation of a low 
act, and a low agency for it is here that one can come to terms with 
one's self through the process of organizing and creating one's own 
structures. Existentialism is the attempt to gain self-mastery over 
one's self on one's own terms. Being still at the stage of self-
consciousness, struggles and conflicts are interpreted as a fight for 
recognition. This recognition is interpreted in part as a struggle 
against the encroaching consciousness of the masses with their continual 
efforts to make life "easier". The existentialist reacts strongly 
against this movement and believes that it is necessary to remain 
aloft from this encroaching conformity. The importance of existence 
preceding essence is a fundamental tenant.of existentialism as this 
mode of consciousness searches to express ane's self in one's work and 
social relationships. This expression is not enceuraged at the level 
of sensual consciousness or within a situation characterized by either 
a high act or a high agency. 
aummary 
!" 
The eight modes of consciousness discussed above are intended 
only as ideal types that may serve as a conceptualization of thought.· 
This is not to say that there are only eight types of consciousness. 
Within this model there are various conditions which serve to foster 
stability, change, revolt and independent action. Cells one and five 
which are characterized by a high act and a high agency would foster 
conditions for stability. Within this situation the development and 
enactment of the task has been previously defined. and at the organi-
zational level there is an overseeing, tightly-knitted hierarchial 
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structure which attempts to enforce the enactment of tasks. There is 
little room for experimentation and the mediation process is tightly 
constructed. In such a setting the participant is fitted into the 
existing ongoing structure. The format of this environment attempts to 
model itself after the assembly line model of interchangeable parts. 
It is a mechanistic model with emphasis on stability. Parts may be 
taken out or eliminated without threatening the viability of the 
structure. Within this model equilibrium and controlled change in the 
mode of a gradual character are encouraged. Constructing limits and 
predefined standards are essential to this system. As this.model 
attempts to stabilize itself, it may very well attempt to build another 
Maginot Line to protect itself from any external danger. However, as 
is the case of a Maginot Line, it is always a simple matter to go 
around it. And once this happens, the ability to adapt or to quickly 
react has vanished as quickly as the line has lost its power to defend. 
Cells two, three, six and seven carry within them the potential 
for change. Although the level of sensual consciousness does not 
attempt to relate these struggles to a personal sense or to a larger 
periphery, there remains the ongoing opposition between act and agency. 
This ongoing struggle is more noticeable in cells six and eight as the 
form of high consciousness attempts to mediate this struggle. The 
potential for change lies in the disparity the participants may exper-
ience in their working conditions. In the case of a low act and a 
high agency the participant is able to experiment or explore one's 
potential within the performance of one's work. Once this exploration 
is engaged in, it is a simple matter to continue to explore until the 
participant will arrive at the boundary lines of the institutional 
112 
agencies. At this point one will evaluate the situation. For those 
situations characterized by a high act and a low agency the participant 
quickly learns that he is working for another and in the process comes 
to realize his own powers of transformation. Realizing the powers of 
transforma~ion the particip~nt will have to evaluate the situation to 
determine if the protection provided by the agencies at large are 
sufficient enough for him to continue to work for another or if one 
should work for one's self. Within both situations one element helps 
to clarify the other. This is not the case for cells one and five where 
they act to define one another in common terms which does not focus 
on their differences but on their similarities. The disparities between 
act and agency he.Ip to draw out the differences which in turn brings 
into sharper focus·where the participants must personally decide what 
their relationship is to be with their working process. If nothing 
else, the recognition of these differences stands ready to be analyzed. 
The relationship between the situation of a low act and a low 
agency at the level of sensual consciousness emerges in a nihilistic 
mode while for a high consciousness it emerges as an existentialist 
mode of consciousness. The nihilist mode acts in the form of a revolt. 
There seems to be nothing worthwhile to create or to attempt. This mode 
is perhaps the most transitional of all eight cells. If this revolt 
is carried through to its end, it may end in suicide or, as in most 
cases, end in a refusal to comply. Irt the attempt to refuse to comply, 
there may develop a sense of awareness or analysis through the act of 
negation, Another way to mediate this.situation is to generally drift 
from one situation to another. When this situation is confronted by a 
high consciousness, the resulting form of consciousnei,;s becomes 
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existential. Through the continual attempts to make some form of order 
or relationship from the low act and low agency, the participants come 
to realize their own powers of creation. By being able to evaluate 
their own creations the tendency to become aware of the dialectical 
relationships of change between the subjective and objective spheres 
begin to draw attention away from the independence ef relationships to 
their interdependence. From this awareness the potential to move from 
the level of self-consciousness to a universal self-consciousness comes 
through the experiencing and awareness of conflicts and struggles •. 
When continual attempts are made to disassociate the participant from 
the larger whole, as in the case of presenting man as a series of role 
players, the ability to relate and infer to a larger condition is 
generally·impeded. Those who experience conflicts at some point ma.y 
have to assert themselves regarding their relationship to the situation. 
The movement from sensual consciousness to self-consciousness is 
fostered through the awareness of conflict. And the movement from 
self-consciousness to a universal self-consciousness is promoted through 
the realization that conflicts must be mediated by self. And through 
mediation the interdependence of relationships is realized. At the 
level of universal self-consciousness there is a recognition of 
dependence and interdependence which can exist in a paradoxical rela-
tionship without being subjected to a struggle for domination. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE TESTING MODEL AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
WITHIN THE ENVIRONMENT OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
Introduction 
This chapter will outline the procedure used in constructing a 
test of the general model. In the first section, the assumptions, 
proposition and definition of the variables will be offered. The 
remaining part of the chapter will focus on how the research design was 
implemented.· A profile of the char~cteristics of the respondents 
involved in this inquiry will be presented in the sample section. In 
~he following sec_tion the variables operationalization of the agency 
and act will be outlined. The PIL will then be briefly .discussed in 
regard to its basic assurdptions. In the follovting secticm the theor-
etical cQnception and. item analysis of the constructed questionnaire 
will be discussed. The ch~pter will c.lose with· a section concerning 
the socialization and student. body profile scales. 
The Te_s ting· Model 
The model in its entirety tnay be tested in a host.of situations 
' . 
aljl.d coµditions. As a test of the model in this study only a certain 
aspect.was considered. Th~ major thrust of this •test was to examine 
the extent to which a low· act and a low agency contributes to the, 
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development of an existential mode of consciousness. The test of the 
model was enacted within the arena of higher education. 
Assumptiorts. 
The model rests on the follawing assumptions. 
1. A higher unity than self is a unity of self with the universal 
and the particular within a field of paradoxical relations. 
2. The act of mediation is a personal process for which there are 
no ultimate assurances. 
3. Wisdom or science is the realization of the differences and 
unity that exists between the states of the immediate and the deter-
minate. 
4. Higher states of consciousness or growth occur when there is 
an awareness and active involvement in the me.diation process. 
S. The educational experience is a meaningful fonil. of self-
expression. 
Propositions 
There are ·four maj'or propositions which this inquiry will focus 
toward. 
1. Those students engaged in a low act will on the average have a 
' ' I 
higher existential consciousness ~han those in a high a.ct·. 
·2. Those students engaged in a low agency will on the· average 
ha.ye a higher existent.ial consciousness than those engaged in a high 
ag.ertcy. 
3. The order of existential consciousness from the least to the 
most will be in the following order: high act and high agency; high 
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act and low agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency. 
4. Upper division students will on the average have a higher mode 
of existential consciousness than those lower division students. The 
order in which they appear is from the lowest to the highest mode of 
existential consciousness; high act and high agency; high act and low 
agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency. 
Definition of Variables 
Low Act: That activity or task which the individual person is 
able to express the origin, development and evaluation of the task. 
High Act: That activity or task which has been previously orig-
inated and has with it a predetermined course of activity to be 
implemented and that has pre-existing external standards to which it is 
to be evaluated. 
Low Agency: Characterized by a flexible structure which is not 
organized in a tightly-knitted hierarchial structure and which seeks to 
accommodate a variety of tasks. 
High Act: Tightly-knitted hierarchial structure which formulates 
tasks and sets in motion directives to ensure that the task is carried 
through. 
The Sample 
To test the model two educational institutions were chosen to 
represent the variables of a high and a low agency. The high agency, 
which shall be referred to as High U, was selected on the basis of its 
adherence to a formularized pattern of uniformity. I have had personal 
experience within High U and noticed its concern with implementing its 
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regulations. A short description of this agency may help in placing 
this variable in perspective. It is a large state university with 
approximately 18,000 students, located in the southwest region of the 
country. The greatest percentage of the students reside within a two-
\ 
hour drive of the campus which provides an easy escape value on weekends. 
The campus is notably active in crusades for Christ of one form or 
another. The campus is not preoccupied with crusades to end the war, 
impeachment movements against Nixon, nor other social or radical move-
ments of our era. If one were to ask where's the action, one would 
probably be referred to "the strip" which is a three-block long area 
populated with several 3.2 beer parlors. During the fall and winter 
months the center of attention is focused on the football, basketabll 
and wrestling teams. The spring months usually provide a beautiful 
climate to begin the phasing-out process which occurs during the second 
week of May. 
To represent the low agency, a well-known, small, private liberal 
arts college was chosen. This institution shall be referred to as Low 
C. It has a national reputation for experimentation. During the 
Spring quarter of 1973 it drew additional national attention because of 
the student strike which almost closed down the school. This was not 
the first student strike, but it was the longest one and the most 
damaging one. The main campus is located within the eastern central 
section of the country. It draws approximately half of its total 
student population of 2,200 from the same region while the other half 
is drawn from the remaining part of the country which adds to a diverse 
stµdent enrollment. 
The students are considered to think of themselves as intellec-
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tuals who are self-directive in their own pursuits. The campus is 
active in the political movements of the time. Impeachment posters are 
quite noticeable; there is a gay liberation office and a women's radical 
caucus center which are both housed in the student union. The campus is 
not active in competitive sports. The activities of the campus are not 
restricted to the classroom but may be thought of as a meeting place 
where students relate their personal work-study experiences and perhaps 
their year of study which they conducted abroad. 
The characteristics of the respondents to the questionnaire in 
regard to sex, size hometown, religious preference, political orien-
tation, ethnic composition, age and prior socialization may be viewed 
in Table I. 
Of the respondents of High U it may be said that they are orien-
tated toward mainstream social structures. Approximately eight @ut of 
. . . 
ten belong to either the Protestant or Catholic faith; and approximately 
nine out of ten belong to 1either the Republican or Democratic parties. 
The sample was heavily biased toward the female sex and approximately 
I 
forty percent of the respandents are from a hometown. of less than 
25,000. The ethnic composition is composed of approximately eighty-five 
percent Anglos. 
. . 
At Low Ca general statement in regard to the respondents to the 
questionnaire may be said to be orientated away frtm.t~e established 
' \ ' . . . ' 
mainstream social structures.! Less than five percent preferred the 
Protestant faith while a firth preferred the Jewish faith and a quarter 
preferred an informal orientation. Half of the sample checked the 
"Other" category for religious erientation. A fifth of the satnple pre-
ferred the Democratic party while approximately forty.percent preferred 
TABLE I 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
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Characteristic Categories High U Low C 
Sex Female 80.5* 45.8 
Male 19.5 54.2 
Size of Farm 13.4 .o 
Hometown 100-1,000 4.7 8.3 
1,001-10,000 16.5 4.2 
10,001-25,000 9.5 12.5 
25,001-100,000 22.0 33.3 
101,000-300,000 6.3 16.7 
301,000-1,000,000 22.1 12.5 
In excess of 1,000,000 5.5 12.5 
Religious Protestant 69.5 4.2 






Informal 7.0 25.0 
Other 8.6 50.0 
Political American Party .79 .o 
Orientation Republican 35.1 .o 
Democratic 56.3 20.8 
Communist 4.2 
Socialist .8 12.5 
Progressive Labor Party 
New American Movement 4.2 
I prefer not to associate 
with political parties 4.7 41. 7 
Other 2.3 16.7 
Ethnic Anglo 86.7 70.8 
Composition Black 1.6 4.2 




Other 5.5 8.3 
Age 21.10** 21.30 
Socialization 22.59** 24.33 
*Numbers are percentages. 
**Numbers are means. 
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not to associate or participate with political parties. Approximately 
twenty percent were associated with political parties other than 
Democratic or Republican. The composition between the sexes is well 
matched and approximately seventy percent were Anglos who came from a 
hometown in excess of 25,000. The mean age for both groups of students 
was similar. 
The variable of act was to be represented by the various majors 
within the corresponding high and low agencies. Act was dichotomized 
into a high and a low component. The main criteria that was used to 
designate a low act was the degree of flexibility a student had in 
originating, developing and evaluating one's own plan of study. At 
High Uthe low act was chosen to be sociology and at Low Cit was 
communications. A high act represented a more tightly controlled plan 
of study. In High U this was well represented ~y Family Relations and 
Child Development (FRCD). In this major there were virtually no 
electives to be chosen and the plan of study had been developed in full. 
In the case of Low Ca high act was not a common characteristic of the 
school. However, in relation to the low act, it could be said that 
history had. more requirements and stated objectives to be followed than 
did communications. History did not correspond to FRCD in its tightly 
controlled structure but for the campus of Low Cit did incorporate 
more structure. 
The sample selection involved representing the variables of agency 
and act. To do this, two educational institutions or agencies were 
chosen. Within these institutions a high and a low act were chosen and 
within each of these acts a further division between upper and lower 
classmen was made. In all, there was a total of eight cells. These 
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cells and their corresponding numbers may be viewed in Figure 2. This 
figure may be useful in indicating the number of responses received and 
the labels which were used throughout the study. 
Data Collection 
High Agency 
The principle mode of activity utilized in gathering data was 
composed of participation and observation, interviews, study of the 
written regulations, reports and documents, and the administration of 
a questionnaire. 
I have repeatedly drawn from my own experiences in the designation 
of High U as the high agency. At the High U, I interviewed Deans of 
Schools, the head of the high act, students from both acts and the 
editor of the student newspaper. During my four years at High U, I 
served as a representative to the Graduate Student Council for a year 
and as the representative of the graduate students to the corresponding 
departmental meetings. I also utilized an informal means of inter-
viewing other students and faculty members. The documents used in this 
study were the minutes from the Graduate Student .. Council, Faculty 
Council, the catalog of requirements, and the student newspaper. 
In the process of administering the questionnaire at High U, 
varying procedures were utilized. The first course of action was to 
record on 3 x 5 cards all persons representing low acts. On this card 
I also recorded telephone numbers, if listed; and, for those not listed, 
I checked the telephone directory. I then asked a select group of 
professors who were most likely to have those designated students in 
their classes to hand out the questionnaire, have the students complete 
High Act Low Act 
High Agency Low Agency High Agency Low Agency 
Under Upper Under Upper Under Upper Under Upper 
Classmen Classmen Classmen Classmen Classmen Classmen Cl.assmen Classmen 
21 36 34 37 4 1.0 4 6 
Figure 2. Representation of the Variables of Agency and Act and Their Corresponding Cell Size. 
124 
them and return them to the professors. I then started calling these 
students on tlie phone to introduce myself and the nature of the research 
project. If the students previously received a questionnaire, I asked 
them to fill it out and hand it back to their professor. For those who 
had not received a questionnaire, I asked them if they would cooperate 
and told them they could pick one up by going to their counselor'~ door 
where they would find an envelope coi;itaining the questionnaire. After 
they had completed the questionnaire, they could return it to the office. 
While I was making these calls, I would randomly choose every eighth 
student and ask him if he would consent to having an interview which 
would take approximately forty-five minutes. As soon as I filled up my 
interview schedule for one day, I stopped asking for any additional 
interviews. 
A different procedure was followed in administering the question-
naire to students in a high act at High U. During the course of the 
interview with the Head of the department of the high act the professor 
advised me of the program I should study which would definitely give 
me a more valid representation of that major. From the descriptio~ 
given, I concurred. I was impressed with the means of organization 
which surrounded the office. After des~ribing the means of adminis-
tering the questionnaire I used for the low act, the head of the 
department responded with her plan. I thought it would be best to 
agree for !,was seeking assistance and had every intention of working 
; 
at her convenience. My general impr'ession was that I should leave this 
matter of handling the questionnaire to the discretion of the profe~sors 
because they had assured me that their students were responsive. I 
interpreted this to mean that I would receive a good return. I was also' 
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advised that generally speaking, freshmen did not declare the_ir major 
until their sophomore year. Hence, for the low act category; the 
sample contains sophomores and seniors rather than first year and 
senior year students. 
I then listed all sophomore and senior students who had declared 
their major to be high act. I contacted the professor and asked them 
to hand out the questionnaires. I followed the same procedure as in 
the low act in arranging for the interviews. In view of what seemed to 
be quite an efficient organization, I did not oversee their activity 
but left feeling assured that when I returned in ten days the question-
naires would be filled out. 
Upon returning I found the return rate to be low. I then pro-
ceeded to mail a questionnaire to every sophomore and senior of a high 
act. The return rate from this mailing was not impressive. Of the 120 
questionnaires mailed out, 34 were returned. Of these 34, seven had 
previously completed the questionnaire, thus realizing a net return of 
27. In an attempt to make one more effort to gain responses, particu-
larly from the sophomore level, I inquired at the FRCD office as to 
the possibility of approaching the classes that were in session. I was 
informed that due to the summer term there were very few sophomore 
students who were enrolled. In view of this the search for additional 
responses was ended. 
Low Agency 
Arriving at Low C, I announced my presence at the office of the 
Dean which is actually the Office of the President and was advised to 
speak with the Assistant Dean. He advised me to draw up a letter of 
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introduction stating my purpose and he would sign it. After writing 
the letter, I searched for an available typewriter and enteretl the 
Information Office which was the first office I found. I approached a 
young woman and asked if I could use her typewriter. As it turned out, 
she typed the letter and introduced us to the Information Director. 
After giving us a valuable overview of the school, the young woman 
introduced us to the Editor of the alumni paper. These contacts became 
essential to the process of gathering the data .. They served as a 
"home base" and a constant supply of information and friendship. 
Visitors to the campus are generally watched as to how well they 
react to the immersion process. Our process began immediately. Within 
an hour I was interviewing a faculty member and my assistant was 
gathering course requirement sheets, catalogs, documents, faculty 
meeting notes, books and anything that might help us. Through the 
course of our week's stay, we interviewed professors from the low ~nd 
high acts, the Deans and Assistant Deans, students, the coordinator of 
the work-study program, "drop-outs", alumni and community people. We 
were especially privileged to gain an hour's interview with a former 
president of Low C. This meeting was greatly facilitated by our orig-
inal contacts in the Information Office. 
Once the high and low acts were designated I inquired at various 
offices for a list of the students who were currently on campus and who 
were majoring in communications and history. The quarter was in its 
fourth week and the Registrar's Office was in the process of completing 
the list. In view of this we went to the classes of the respective 
majors and handed out the questionnaires. To gain a broader impression 
of the school we conveniently stationed ourselves in the cafeteria 
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during the morning and lunch feeding times. We found the students most 
cooperative in discussing their plans of study. Through our discussions 
it became rather evident that at this institution social drill or uni-
form regimentation would be resisted at every attempt. The implication 
this had in administering the questionnaire was quite important. The 
students were not going to complete a questionnaire without knowing the 
author's purpose or intention of the study. 
Interviews lasted between one and four hours. Both students and 
Deans freely offered their time and devoted their full at~ention to our 
inquiries. This was quite evident as I spent the entire morning talk-
ing with an Assistant Dean. Midway through our interview the Assistant 
Dean advised me that I really needed to see the Dean to gain a fuller 
understanding of the situation. At that particular time the Dean was 
teaching a class, but I was assured that he would be most happy to 
talk with me. I returned after lunch ta interview the Dean. This 
interview lasted for over two hours. The techniques that were used at 
High U to gather data and administer the questionnaire did not work 
well at Low C. 
The next day, which was Friday, I received a list of the majors. 
Questionnaires, along with letters of introduction, were sent to the 
designated students through the campus mail and they were informed they 
could deposit the completed questionnaires in a box at the end of the 
mailroom. The return rate was extremely low. Of these questionnaires 
mailed out and distributed to classes and through the cafeteria, which 
numbered approximately 100, only 18 were returned. After returning to 
High U, a second attempt was made to gain more questionnaires. I mailed 
75 questionnaires to the Information Office and asked the Assistant 
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Editor for her assistance. Through our discussion we,organized another 
plan. She personally handed out all questionnaires to students major-
ing in the low and high act. By this time I had made provisions to 
include the division of students into lower and upperclassmen which 
was an extension of the original intention of sophomores and seniors. 
Questionnaires that were left over were personally handed out to people 
whom she thought might respond to them. Ads were placed in the student 
paper, Baha, and the school radio station gave it an extra plug. 
Purpose in Life as a Measure of 
Existential Consciousness 
To measure the variable of consciousness two scales were admin-
istered in the questionnaire. One was the Purpose in Life (PIL) and 
the other was the Existential Consciousness Questionnaire.(ECQ). The 
PIL was. used in this study for essentially two reasons: (1) it was the 
only measure of a ptirparted existential consciousness that I was aware 
of and (2) it's construction and reliability are well known which could 
lend it.self as one meaisure of 9- variant of existential cGinsciousness. 
Crumbaugh and Maholick designed the PIL "to measure the degree to 
which the subject had 'fotind meaningful goals around which to integrate 
his life" (1963: 47). The theoretical founda.tion from wh.ich they 
' 
developed this scale relied on Frankl's conception of existentialism. 
Fundamental to Frankl's conception of existentialism is that man is 
free to make choices and his freedom carries with it a responsibility 
to a higher entity •. This is expressed by Frankl as "there is no such 
thing as responsibility to oneself, we can only be responsible to an 
entity higher than ourselves" (1955:25-26). Frankl's mode of existen-
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tialism is within the motif of a religious orientation. This is clearly 
brought out in his interpretation of suffering and the importance he 
placed on the major thesis of the will to meaning. 
Frankl shares a basic concern with other existentialists which may 
be viewed in the following: (1) there is a mediation process through 
which the individual must become engaged in to determine one's own 
reality, (2) man must ultimately decide for himself, and (3) there is 
a confrontation with the "existential vacuum". For Frankl, Crumbaugh 
and Maholick this is expressed in the ability of man to find a will to 
meaning. For them this will to meaning has heavy overtones of a 
spiritual realization through which one can become committed to a goal 
or process. For Crumbaugh (1963) the two most important influences 
which alter life patterns in any significant way are love and religion. 
Through this realization, Crumbaugh stresses the importance of ~ing 
able to find "positive values which can attract full devotion and serve 
as a nucleus for reorienting one's entire life" (1965:405). The over-
tones of a religious commitment become even more apparent as he affirms 
the need to find a cause one can "passionately believe in" (1965:406). 
The'PIL is intended to measure the.will to meaning. The will to 
meaning "represents a striving· •to find purpose in one I s own existence 
to find a cause or sense of mission that is uniquely one's own and that 
gives direction to life and makes it understandable" (Crumbaugh and 
Maholick, 1963:43). 
The PIL suggests that the mode of existential consciousness moves 
through three stages. The first stage is characterized by the given 
social.situation within which one is located. This, in effect, is the 
dominant reference point for the person's action and considerations .. 
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The second stage is a process through which one begins to question the 
given social situation. If one continues to question or search for new 
meanings and is unable to find any, the resulting condition will be 
noogenic neurosis. This has been expressed as a confrontation with the 
existential vacuum or existential frustration which ''is created by a 
vacuum of perceived meaning in personal existence, and manifested by the 
symptom of boredom" (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964:200). The impasse 
through this vacuum is found in the ability to create values which act 
to foster responsibility via freedom. and, as was previously noticed, 
this responsibility must be to a higher entity than self. At this 
point of recognizing the higher entity, the second stage has been 
completed which is essentially a confrontation with the spiritual as~ 
pects of·man. At this point of finding a will to meaning, one is able 
to direct one's life. The third stage is a point of transition fro~ 
the spiritual realms back to the given state. It is characterized by a 
renewed sense of purpose. The PIL is a measurement of this stage of 
consciousness. This variant of existentialism is somewhat different 
from the conception of existential consciousness which was developed 
for this research. 
The mode of existential consciousness, as it is constructed in 
this questionnaire and the meaning it represents fer this model, can be 
thought of as a tenuous position through which one is constantly con~ 
fronted with a mediation process through which one must continually 
give meaning to self, others and the environment. There are no moral 
commandments upon which one can rest nor are there beliefs or passions 
to which one can attach a sense of final commitment. It is tenuous in 
the respect that once you think you have it, a finality of judgement 
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that will meet all conditions, then you can be assured you do not have 
it. It is as though one was to attempt to catch or to contain running 
water. To confine a stream of running water into a container is to 
negate the very existence of the running water. 
For Frankl, Crumbaugh and Maholick the existential vacuum was a 
state of boredom to be overcome through the will to meaning which 
involved a connnitment to a higher entity. The mode of existential 
consciousness does not recognize a higher external entity. This variant 
of existentialism is expressed by Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus. Facing 
the existential vacuum in this per&pective is interpreted as confronting 
the existential condition which has been described as nihilism by 
Nietzsche, the struggle to be the for-itself by Sartre, and a con-
frontation with the absurd for Camus. The stages of development 
suggested by this interpretation of existentialism are similar to the 
stages of development as they are found in The Phenomenology of Mind. 
The first stage of sensual consciousness one is thought to be a pro-
cess of adaption, play, imitation, and inquiry. As a result one 
acquires a repertoire,with self, ethers, along the path of a mediation 
that attempts to go beyond the appearances of the given state of 
affairs. When this inquiry proceeds to inquire without finding any 
meaning, it results in a state of noogenic neurosis for Crumbaugh and 
Maholick. A somewhat similar state is suggested in this model but is 
referred to as a state of nihilism. Up to this point there are some 
similarities between the PIL and the ECQ. A major point of distinction 
occurs in the means utilized to gain self-mastery. For Crumbaugh, 
Maholick and Frankl the means lie in the will to meaning which ulti-
mately suggests a belief in a higher entity to which one can find some 
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assurance. The interpretation suggested by this model is that through 
the confrontation with the absurd one come, to realize one's freedom 
and responsibility. The concern is not to.negate the absurdity of 
I 
indifference by a leap of faith but to confront the situation with the 
realization that there are no final absolute assurances which can ease 
the existential condition. The second. stage. of the path of conscious-
ness as suggested by this model involves a struggle through which the 
individual encounters himself and his relationship to others and to the 
environment. The third stage involves the process of re-entry into the 
given state of appearances and the world of cultural meanings and 
symbols. For religious existentialists this process is guided by a 
foundation of religious belief. For the mode of existentialism in this 
model, re-entry is of a different nature. The essential question of 
re-entry is itself a question that must be mediated, which is to say 
that one must decide for oneself if it is a desirable course of action. 
For some re-entry is not a viable path as they choose to act. on the 
periphery of the mainstream of society. For others it may be only a 
partial encounter. Re-entry for an existential mode of consciousness 
does not imply a process of assimilation or accumulation but a process 
of mediation which implies continual change and transformation. 
An item analysis of each of the scales used in the questionnaire 
was analyzed through a computer program (TESTSTAT) which yielded means, 
sigmas, and point-biserial correlations between items composing the 
scales. The results of this program on the PIL may be viewed in 
Table II. This program also presented the total scale means, sigmas, 
and an alpha coefficient of internal consistency. Of particular 














I am usually 
Life to me seems 
In life I have 
My personal existence is 
Every day is 
If I could choose, I 
would 
After retiring, I would 
In achieving life's goals 
I have 
My life is 
If I should die today, 
I would feel that my life 
has been 
In thinking of my life I 
A& I view the world in 
relation to my life, the 
world 
TABLE II 
PIL SCALE BY ITEMS 
Scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely bored 
always exciting 




constantly new and 
different 
prefer never to have 
been born 
do some of the 
exciting things I 
have always wanted to 
made no progress 
whatever 
empty, filled only 
with despair 
very worthwhile 






very clear goals and 
aims 
very purposeful and 
meaningful 
very purposeful and 
meaningful 
like nine more lives 
just like this one 
loaf completely the 
rest of i;ny life 
progressed to complete 
fulfillment 
running over with exciting 
good things 
completely worthless 
always s~e a reason for 
my being here 
fits meaningfully with 
my life' 
R Value 























Concerning man's freedom 
to make his own choices 
I believe man is 
With regard to death, I am 
With regard to suicide, 
I have 
I regard my ability to 
find a meaning, purpose, 
or mission in life as 
My life is 
Facing my daily tasks is 
I have discovered 
TABLE II (Continued) 
very irresponsible 
person 




thought of it· 
seriously as a way 
out 
very great 
in my hands and I 
am in control of it 
a source of pleasure 
and satisfaction 
no mission or pur-




very responsible person 
completely bound by 
limitations of heredity 
a.nd environment 
unprepared and frightened 
never given it a second 
thought 
practically none 
out of my hands and 
controlled by external factors 
a painful and boring experience 
clear-cut goals and a 












Another way of looking at coefficient alpha will serve to 
further its importance. It will be remembered that the 
reliability coefficient of any test is the estimated aver-
age correlation of .that test with all possible tests with 
the same number of items which are obtainable from sampling 
a domain. Thus coefficient alpha is the expected correla-
tion of one test with another of the same length when the 
two tests purport to measure the same thing. Coefficient 
alpha can also be derived as the expected correlation 
between an actual test and a hypothetical alternative form, 
one that may never be constructed (Nunnally; 1967:197). 
The PIL is comprised of 20 items which are scored on a one to 
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seven basis. The highest possible score would be 140. The mean score 
for this sample was 103.65 and the sigma was 14.05. All items are 
numbered as they appeared on the questionnaire. The items all corre-
lated beyond the necessary .16 level to be statistically significant 
at the .05 level. The alpha value of .88 indicates that a very high 
degree of internal con~istency is present ampng the items comprising 
the scale. 
Developing a Measure of Existential 
Consciousness 
From the beginning of, the construction of this questionnaire a 
primary goal which the writer attempted to achieve was to write the 
questions in a novel form so as to gain the interest af the respondents 
and at the same time to try to make an enjoyl:!,ble experience for them. 
With this in mind, the usual one line short statements were used from 
which one could choose a response on a one to seven scale. In addition 
to the short stem statements, a statement of a situation was given 
with a few alternative choices listed below them. The paragraph form 
was used in an attempt to express somewhat complicated ideas and to 
attempt to draw the respondent into a closer relationship to the 
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questions. 
The format which will be followed in this section will center on 
three topics of discussion. The first one is to complete the theoret-
ical foundation of the concept of existential consciousness as it is 
used in this model. This will include a brief analysis of Sartre's 
ontological position and how it challenged Hegel's conception of a 
universal self-consciousness. This distinction which Sartre has .pointed 
out serves as a basis of the meaning attributed to this model of 
existential consciousness. The human condition, as Nietzsche and Sartre 
viewed it, expressed a continuing struggle. This concept of struggle 
in the human condition will be explained through the mediation of the 
in-itself and for-itself. The second topic of discuss-ion will attempt . 
to implement or operationalize a foundation of existential concepts 
which were primarily taken from Nietzsche and Sartre. The operational-
ization of these concepts will involve the actual construction of the 
questions. The third topic to be discussed is an item analysis of the 
original questionnaire and indicates those items that were selected to 
represent the final draft of the questionnaire. 
Sartre's Conception of the Human Condition 
Sartre is primarily concerned with rejecting Hegel's basic assump-
tion that being in-itself and being for-itself are integral aspects of 
each other and thus can be brought together in a unity. Although the 
path of Geist, as described in the Phenomenology, encountered moments 
I 
of separation in the movement through;the unhappy consciousness, they 
were reconciled in the development of the self-consciousness. These 
assumptions are more clearly developed in Hegel's Logic as he begins to 
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build his case from the very beginning of the work. Essential elements 
from which this development rests on are the concepts of Dasein and 
Ideality. Bernstein has noted this development with great clarity 
(1971:26-40). 
For Hegel to suggest that aufghoben can be achieved between the 
in-itself and for-itself he must show that these elements are in some 
way related. He attempts this by developing a relationship between 
Pure Being as simply indeterminate and through its opposite component 
Nothingness. From this encounter a relationship develops which is 
referred to as Becoming, and this is the first major category of the 
Logic and is commonly referred to as Dasein. 
In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the 
Nothing which is one with Being, are only vanishing 
factors; they are and they are not. Thus by inherent 
contradiction Becoming collapses into the unity in which 
the two elements are absorbed. This result is accordingly 
Being Determinate (Being there and so) (Dasein) (Bernstein, 
1971:128). 
Becoming is founded on the basis of a process that starts from an 
indeterminate being which is related to its opposite, nothingness. The 
importance of this assumption is that the emergent form of Becoming has 
within it the aspect of the negation. The implication as it is 
developed is the unfolding of this negation from an internal process. 
The relationship of being in-itself is then compared to its 
opposite of being for-itself, as we saw in the development of Dasein 
which carried within it elements of its opposites, the resulting 
relationship between being in-itself and being for-itself will also 
carry within it elements of each other. This is developed by Hegel in 
his Logic and is referred to as Ideality. 
Being for-itself (Fursichsein} may be described as ideality, 
just as being there and then (Dasein) was described as real-
i ty. It i1;1 said that besides reality there is also an 
ideality •. Thus the two categories are made equal and 
parallel. Properly speaking ideality is not.somewhat out-
side of and'beside reality; the notion of ideality just 
lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, 
when reality'is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, 
it is at once seen to.be ideality (Bernstein, 1971:129). 
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Through this development "the introduction of ideality holds forth 
the promise that the deepest divisions in being or the deepest divi-
sions in consciousness will be successfully mediated, reconciled, auf-
gehoben" (Bernstein, 1971:130). This is at the very core of Hegel's 
premises concerning how the unity can occur. For Sartre this is an 
untenable position which must be critized. Sartre's basic assumption 
is that this gap cannot be overcome, which gives substance to the human 
condition. Sartre is very much indebted to many of Hegel's ,ideas and 
expositions but is adamant in rejecting this assumption. For Sartre 
the human condition is characterized by freedom in which the person 
· continually attempts to be that which one is not. If the human con-
dition was supposed to have as essence preceding existence, it would 
for him limit the concept of freedom. 
Sartre's development of the being in-itself rests upon the form-
ulations of the concept of Being in-itself; Being is in-itself and 
Being is what it· is. This is to say Being simply is. Sartre considers 
the in-itself as being "full of itself, and no more plentitude can be 
imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container" (1971: 
120-121). 
The for-itself is in relation to the in-itself but it can never 
achieve the in-itself. "The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself 
as in-itself in order to bound itself as consciousness" (1971:130). 
The for-itself is that negative act which separates itself and 
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distinguishes itself apart from the in-itself; and in so doing, con-
sciousness is conceived as a lack of being or that which it is not. 
The_implications this has for the freedom of individual praxis is simply 
put as: "I am the self which I will be, in the made of not being it" 
(1971:68). As this is related to the future, it brings out a connnon 
concern which many existentialists share. 
It is through my horror that I am carried toward the 
future, and the horror nihilat~s itself in that it consti-
tutes the future as possible.· Anguish is precisely my 
consciousness of being my future, in the mode of not-
being (1971:68). 
Living within this condition of attempting to mediate the in-itself 
and for-itself places the individual in the center of freedom and 
responsibility for personal acts. Praxis in Being and Nothingness is 
an individual act of becoming. Bad faith is described as attempting to 
deny personal freedom and responsibility. In an a1=tempt to-illustrate 
and clarify these concepts of in-itself and for-itsel~ we can observe 
how Sartre develops patterns of bad faith. To deny ene's freedom is in 
a sense denying the for-itself in an attempt to be an in-itself. When 
people portray themselves and came to regard themselves only as those 
portrayals, they are attempting to be an in-itself. Some may say they 
have achieved this; but for Sartre they would be acting in bad faith. 
As in the case of the writer in a cafe who tries so hard in his move-
men ts 
••• a little too .Precise, a step a little to quick, trying 
to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some 
kind of automation while carrying his tray with the 
~ecklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a 
perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which 
he perpetually re-established by a light movement of the 
arm and hand (1971:101). 
However hard one may try, one is not reducible to an in-itself. 
140 
The existential condition as evaluated by Sartre is an attempt to 
base a praxis upon the foundation of personal freedom with responsi-. 
bility for such acts resting on the person. For Sartre essence does 
not precede existence~ there are no assurances and man can only exer-
cise his freedom in the act of choosing. Nietzsche's concern with 
freedom revolved around the necessity that one must experience self in 
order to experience freedom. The development of the Existential 
Consciousness Questionnaire has been drawn primarily from the works of 
Sartre and Nietzsche. 
The Construction of the Questionnaire 
The focus of this section is to develop a common core of agreement 
among several key ~xistentialist writers. These conditions will 
revolve-around the concepts of the human conditions which center on 
existence, responsibility, choice, negation, freedom, anguish, the 
absurd, involvement, estrangement, rules and nothingness. Through 
focusing on a conceptual approach, it is believed that various essen-
tial themes may be chosen from particular writers, primarily Sartre and 
Nietzsche, which also have.applicability to other existential writers. 
This method of presentation has been deliberately chosen for 
several reasons. If one was to °focus on one writer, e.g., Sartre as 
the repr~sentative of the existential perspective, than other varia-
tions of existentialism can be considered in relation to how well they 
coincide with Sartre's perspective. This method has not been·chosen 
fer the meaning of existentialism is not limited te any one particular 
writer. Although this model of existentialism relies primarily upon. 
the concepts developed by Nietzsche and Sartre, it does, hewever,. · 
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incorporate other concepts. 
Another reason for this type of presentation is the realization 
that it is not essential to evoke a school of consensus among existen-
tialists but to let them develop their own particular aspects. To look 
for complete agreement among a field of writers who have repeatedly 
stated their concern that each person must inquire for themselves and 
act on that ·inquiry as they interpret it would be from the very outset 
a violation of a common concern among existentialists. In utilizing 
a conceptual approach one can draw out common concerns of various 
writers and yet recognize each one's particular variation. In this 
manner both the general and the particular concepts are left intact 
for further analysis. Realizing this as a common concern of the exis-
tentialists and in an. attempt to represent these writers as validly as 
• 
possible, several other notable approaches.other than a conceptual one 
have been undertaken which are most 1 evident_in two popular accounts. 
One ·such approach has been that employed by Walter Kaufmann in his 
account Existentialism from Dosteovsky to Sartre (1969). Concerning 
these writers Kaufmann states that, 
The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repu-
diation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, 
and especially of systems, and marked dissatisfaction with 
tradicional philosophy as superficial, academic, and re-
mote from life-that is the heart of existentialism (1969: 
12). 
The mode of presentation utilized in this work is to present a selection 
from those existentialist writers who have been of primary importance 
in developing and influencing a movement that focuses on the contrast 
between the unauthentic life and authentic life. To accomp~ish this 
objective Kaufmann has chosen~ selection from Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Rilke, Kafka, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus •. It 
/ 
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should also be noted that Kaufmann has also written on Nietzsche (1968) 
and Hegel (1965) and has translated. several of Nietzsche's works.· 
A similar approach utilized by William Barrett in Irrational Man: 
A Study in Existential Philosophy focuses on the major themes developed 
. by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. In this work addit-
tional attention is directed to· its foundation and emergence from the 
European countries. Barrett points out two trends ·in existential 
thought. He sees the ability to analyze our ongoing events as dimin~ 
ishing due to the ever-increasing encroachment of technology and 
bureaucracy "since it aims at the rational control and ordering of 
social life; and the two-technology and bureaucracy-have come more and 
more to rule our lives" (1962:269). A second tendency of our time is 
the ever-increasing abstractness whe~e people prefer the reflections or 
image on t~ewall (or tube) rather than the real event. Barrett views 
existentialism as a movement that "seeks to bring the whole 1J1an-the 
concrete individual in the whole context of his everyday life, and in 
his total mystery and questionableness-into philosophy" (1962:275). 
There have been numerous books which have sought to offer a 
collection of secondary sources on the various themes found in exis-
tentialism. One such account assembled by the editor, George Alfred 
Schrader, entitled, ExisteAti~l Phiiossphers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-
Ponty. (1967) '· seeks "to acquain.t the reader with the main versions of 
current existentialist philosophy'' (1967 :vii). The first article which 
is written by Schrader focu~es on the ·many common themes of existen-
tialism and clearly states what he con~iders to be the focal point of 
this movement. 
Existential philosophy from Kierkegaard to the present has 
been especially concerned to analyze ~he peculiar conditions 
and structures of human existence. It is this concern 
rather than any general metaphysical or epistemological 
interest in the substance-essence issue that lies at the 
center of their reflection (1967:11). 
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In an attempt to develop a common center through the employment of 
a conceptual approach which most existentialists could feel comfortable 
with, let us first begin by turning our attention to Sartre. In a 
brief, but analytical essay, Sartre has taken the opportunity "to 
defend existentialism against some charges which have been brought 
against it'.' (1970:31). In the process of answering three particular 
charges, ·Sartre has this to say, 
You see that it cannot be taken for a philosophy of quiet-
ism, since it defines man in terms of action, nor for a 
pessimistic description of man-there is no doctrine more 
optimistic, since man's destiny is within himself; nor for 
an attempt to discourage man from acting, since it.tells 
him that the only hope is in his acting and that action is 
the only thing that enables a man to live. Consequently, 
we are dealing here with an ethics of action and· involve-
ment (1970:50), 
A fundamental tenant of existentialism as Sartre interprets it and 
one which would act as a condition for other existentialists is the 
premise that existence precedes essence. From this premise two major 
corollaries follow which serve to further develop the foundation of 
existentialism. What Sartre calls the first principle of existential-
ism is that "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself" (1970: 
36), Further implied in this statement is that man is not confined to 
a set essence or composition that guides man along a predetermined path. 
This is not to deny the obvious importance of one's £activity but it 
is of major importance to realize man's ability to transcend himself. 
A second corollary of this premise is that "man.is responsible for what 
he is. Thus, existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of 
what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on 
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him" (1970:36) • 
. A number of questions .were written to relate to this major premise 
and two accompanying corollaries. This set shall be referred to as 
"acceptance of responsibility" and consists of the following questions. 
To indicate an existentialist response a line will be drawn under 
the available alternatives. For those questions that w.ill be inverted 
in their scoring an asterik (*) will be used to the front of the 
question. 
1-7 I am solely responsible for my own acts. 
The human condition is primarily characterized by: 
a. A fixed (stable) human nature. 
b. A universal force. 
c. Heredity and gene structure 
1-7 d. The ability to say NO. 
1-7 *I believe there is little one can do in forming one's 
own reality, for.we are all part of a greater force 
(beyond our control) which sets in motion our actions. 
1-7 Things will be as man decides for them to be. 
From this awareness that man is responsible for his own acts, the 
underlying foundation of existentialism begins to appear that man is 
'not confined to a fixed human nature in terms of making decisions. 
Sartre clearly states that "man is condemned to be free" which asserts 
that man being created by others, not of his own decisions, enters the 
world and once there through his existence comes into contact with· 
oneself, others and various situations which call for an ever-demanding 
process of decision making. Sartre's point is that man continally 
chooses and even in the event of not choosing, has still made a 
decision. For this concept of choice the following questions were 
constructed. 
1-7 .Whatever the situation, choice is always possible. 
1-7 It is impossible for mankind not to make choices. 
The realization of choice is not by itself enough to indicate an 
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existential consciousness. What is needed is the further realization 
and analysis of the meaning of freedom. Freedom to choose between 
existing alternatives is not the concept of freedom used in this model. 
Freedom involves the ability of the person to go beyond the given alter-
natives, which is to say, one is free to create alternatives for oneself. 
Freedom within the given is si~ilar to one slave declaring he has a 
kinder master than the other and hence is free. An existential concept 
of freedom declares that one .possess the power of negation and in the 
process of recognizing things or states in their process of being in-
itself, also has the responsibility and necessity of making that being 
in-itself a being for-itself. Thr~ugh this process of negation and 
formulation, freedom involves a personally self-constructed act that is 
neither confined to existing conditions or absolute values or standards. 
This is further based upon the assumption that man has the power to 
negate himself. Freedom in ~xistential literature is not judged on the 
basis of how successful an act beco~es in a utilitarian or pragmatic 
sense; nor is freedom confined to the ability to achieve a goal. Sartre 
clearly sees man's freedom to negate. 
Under these co~ditions freedom can be nothing other than 
this nihilation. It is through this that one for-itself 
escapes its being as its essence; it is through this that 
the for-itself.is always something other than what can be 
said of it ••• Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is 
made-to-be at the heart of man ~nd which forces human 
reality to be as to choose oneself, nothing comes to it 
either from the outside or from within which it can 
receive or accept (1971:567-569). 
Freedom involves the negation of the in-itself where the action 
and negation is directed by the person with the focus on the for-itself. 
Although on~ may not illlll1ediately place Krishnamurti with other 
existentialists, his concept of freedom coincides with an existential 
• 
formulation. It is not uncommon for Krishnamurti to discuss many of 
the central concepts of existentialism. An e~ample of his acicular 
form of writing may be viewed in the following discussion of freedom. 
These two things are essential: freedom•and the act of 
learning. One cannot learn about oneself unless one is 
free, free so that one can observe, not according to any 
pattern formula or concept, but actually observe oneself 
as one is. That observatian, that perceptian, that-seeing, 
brings about its own discipline and learning; in that 
there is no canformity, imitation, suppressian or control 
whatsoever-and in that there is great beauty (1971:9), 
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To illustrate this concept of freedom the following subset of questions 
were written. 
1-7 · *Freedom is the ability to engage in forms of actions 
which have been previously conceived. 
Suddenly freedom swooped down upon me and chilled me 
through and through. Nature leapt back, I was ageless, 
and I found myself all alone in the midst of your 
ben-ign little world, like someone who has lost his_ 
shadow. And there was nothing left in the sky, no 
good, no evil, nobody to give me orders. This can 
be said to describe a situation where man: 
a. Cannot accept anybody else's interpretation of 
freedom but his/her own. 
b. The person realized the magnificance of God who 
is greater than he is. 
1-7 *Freedom is the ability to choose between existing 
alternatives. 
Freedom is not merely an abstract concept where a slave declares 
his freedom as merely an inwa.rd state. Existential freedom recognizes 
this as an aspect of freedom and also recognizes the necessity of 
choosing acts that will foster freedom. "One may choose anything if it 
is on the grounds of free involvement" (Sartre, 1970:60). The type of 
undertakings one chooses to be invloved in defines the concept of 
freedom. Sartre· is very much concerned with the type and sum of the 
undertakings one becomes invelved in., "We define man only in the 
relationship to involvement" (1970:56). Realizing the cencept of free-
dom as an expression of the for-itself and with the idea of involvement, 
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the core of action which one becomes involved in is reflective as the 
type of action being committed and the type of person committing the 
action. The following set of questions shall be termed "involvement". 
In response to reading "Is Life Worth Living" the fallow-
ing statement has been made: It concludes in favor of 
voluntary optimism. Life has meaning if we really wish 
to give it one. First of all we must act, threw ourselves 
into some enterprise. Then.if later we reflect of it, the 
die is already cast; we are c~mmitted. I wonder what you 
would think of that monsieur. 
1-7 a.. Life may be meaningful only if one is willing to 
engage in action where everything is at stake and 
without any guarantee either of outcome or of any 
essential rightness. 
b. One must be committed to something with a stated 
goal or purpose sa that one knows what to aim for. 
1-7 *I often feel that what I have been and done does not 
show my true worth. 
If man/wothan can be said to have a 1center it would be 




1-:7 d. Action .j 
A common concern of existentialism as it.is being used in this 
paper involves the estrangement niotif. This concept of estrangement 
does not imply a condition of ali~nation:which is sought to. be sur-
passed; but one where it is so~ght to develop itself. This is based 
upon prior discussion of having no absolute to which we can turn. 
This state hB;s been further described ?Sa condition of nihilism which 
will be analyzed when we discus.s Nietzsche. The conditions of aware-
ness, choice,.freedom and action brings us closer to the startling 
realization that perhaps the universe can go on without our presence. 
I 
The sudden realization of this enco'unte:r,- brings us into t~e absurd, 
and as Camus has' stated, the fundamental problem of philosophy is to 
decide if life is worth living. At this juncture of realizing the 
indifference of the universe, the absurd conditions resulting from this. 
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realization often brings on states of anguish and despair. To hold one 
responsible for their own acts and to consider for a moment Sartre's 
statement of responsibility can quite easily bring on states of anguish. 
"Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyane else. I am 
creating a certain image of man by my own choosing. In choosing myself, 
I choose man" (1970:37). The following subscale of estrangement has 
been written to develop these concepts of indifference, the absurd and 
anguish. 
Before this night heavy with stars and constellations, 
for the first time I opened my heart to the tender 
indifference of the world. Finding it so like myself, 
so fraternal even, I felt that I had been happy and 
that I was still happy. What do you attribute this 
happiness to. 
a. The person has found peace with himself and God. 
1-7 b. Through the realization of indifference one 
realizes their own freedom. 
c. He is not really happy but is in a sad state of 
depression. 
Sisyphus (a mythical figure) is the absurd hero. He 
becomes so as much through his passions as through his 
torment. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, 
and his passion for life got him that unspeakable 
punishment in which all one's being is spent in 
accomplishing nothing. This is the price which must 
be paid for the passions of this earth. 
1-7 a. The very struggle toward the summit is enough to 
fill a man's heart. 
b. For defying the gods this is a just punishment. 
There is only one really serious philosophical prob-
lem: that is suicide. To judge whether life is or 
is not worth the trouble of being lived is to answer 
philosophy's fundamental question. The interpretation 
that I most agree with is: 
1-7 a. Man confronted with his own freedom must accept 
the responsibility of conducting his own life. 
b. There is nothing to become concerned about be-
cause there is a purpose in life. 
Another component which constitutes a basic foundation of exis-
tentialism for this paper concerns the realization that norms, mores, 
structures and traditions are not of a decree beyond man but are the 
embodiments o'f men. Sartre uses the analogy of a game to illustrate 
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this point. We may be involved in various games which entail rules and 
regulations; but what must not be,lost sight of is'that we have con-
sented to play by these rules and that we know they have been invented. 
Of this very point, Hazel Barnes.has noted, "One has to play 'the game', 
but one is never given a book of rules'" (1962: 49). The following 
question was written with this in mind. 
Some have said that life is like a game in which actors 
must play by the rules so that we can anticipate the 
action of others which in turn gives us some semblance 
of order: 
a. These rules (norms-mores-customs-legitimizations) 
have been institutionalized and are necessary so 
as to.avoid anarchy. 
1-7 b. These rules have been invented and each person 
must decide for themselves if they are to follow 
them regardless of the consequences. 
Camus' basic philosophical question is central to the above 
discussion which sometimes is formulated in: Does one choose to live 
in good,.faith or bad faith? Stated in this form the question becomes: 
Once man has faced the realization of the absurd what are the possible 
alternatives? Camus has answered this question through his writings 
and most directly in The Rebel (1951) as a statement that when one says 
~~' one has defined the limits of which one will go. The concern 
to live one's life for oneself in search of freedom without deceiving 
oneself is the essential conditions of good faith. Bad faith, so to 
speak, permits one to soften the awareness of one's own freedom. 
To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a 
displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. 
Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of false-
hood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in 
bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth 
(1970:150). 
Hazel Barnes (1962) in her study of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus 
clearly states in the first paragraph of her book the accompanying 
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reorientation that is called for when the human condition is based upon 
a psychology of freedom. She refers to this as the "Literature of 
Possibility." 
For almost a century now, prevailing psychologies and the 
literature written under their influence have agreed that 
men cherish the illusion of freedom while being in fact 
determine by heredity, by environment and by early child-
hood experiences. Humanistic existentialism challenges 
this doctrine and claims that exactly the reverse is true: 
every man is free, but most men, fearing the consequences 
and the responsibility of freedom, refuse to acknowledge 
its presence in themselves and would deny it to others 
(1962:3). 
Humanistic existentialism as it is developed in this paper is 
concerned with various concepts which places one in the very center of 
one's own action. It calls for the acceptance of responsibility for 
oneself and others and can be said to have the following characteristics. 
Freedom is perhaps the most central concept which, as we have noted, 
involves the realization that one is engaged in the process of being 
what one is not, which is to say, man possesses ~he ability to negate 
oneself while being engaged in the process of the for-itself. Through 
this process various states are encountered which have been most 
frequently described in existential literature as anguish, despair, 
forlornness, dread and nausea which are encountered as one goes through 
a process of negation. In existential literature this movement from 
the given condition may be described as the following through to a 
state of nothingness. It is as though at variaus times in one's life 
a stripping process is called for in which those values, modes.of 
behavior, mental constructi;ons and structural patterns which one has 
organized his life around is called in for an inspectien. Other people 
have referred to this process as decharging the, concepts. In forms of 
mediation various exercises call for a strippitlg away of those 
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asseciations which one most commenly thinks of oneself. At the center 
of this process cemes the realization that one is responsible for their 
own acts. This realization may be too alarming or disturbing and thus 
this responsibility is cast off .to some external source ether than 
oneself. 
Another possibility exists and that is ene accepts the respon-
sibility for one'sactiens and werks toward the engagement of freedom 
for oneself and others. Cheesing net to live in bad faith and facing 
the constantly changing relations with others calls for a pattern or 
existence based upon commitment and passion. Hazel Barnes notes a 
common concern of existentialist writers in their "challenge to conven-
tional moral codes, a sense of urgency in matters of conscious, an 
interest -in the private introspection of the individual" (1962:155). 
To express a few of the concepts which have been discussed in 
Nietzsche's writings, three subsets of questions concerning the death 
of God, re-evaluation and the will te power were composed. 
The death of God has caused much concern. At the heart of the 
question, as Nietzsche described it, would be the recognition that we 
have killed God ourselves and stand alone as the interpretor of our 
acts. This is at the foundation of nihilism, that man no longer 
supported with his various crutches must accept the responsibility for 
his acts. These acts are neither totally goad nor bad but are both. 
Fer this idea the following question was written. 
1-7 *Without a god, everything would be possible, and in 
realizing this'it is necessary to have a god or a 
form of external authority to keep some semblance of 
order. 
Upon further inquiry the realization of the death of God and a 
cenfrontation with nihilism brings one to the point of asking if there 
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are no absolutes to which we can turn or to which we can invoke so as 
to relieve us from making our own decisions, then what are we left to 
do? Nietzsche clearly presented his views on this matter with a call 
for a re-evaluation of morals with each person mediating these concerns. 
This can be illustrated in the following two questions. 
1-7 Morality is a way of turning one's back on the will 
of existence~ 
1-7 There are no moral phenomena; only moral interpre-
tations of phenomena. 
From a re:-evalua tio.n of morals, one comes in direct contact with 
those competing wills, desires, loyalties and various concerns that are 
in multiple forms within each one of us. A central concern of Nietzsche 
was his development of the will to power. He believed that as one 
becomes engaged in this struggle to give an order to these competing 
wills, one will learn self-mastery. With self-mastery one can learn to 
live in a state beyond the level of sensual consciousness and beyond the 
level of self-consciousness. The will to power is a vital process of 
an existential consciousness which holds within it the transitional 
seeds to other levels of consciousness. For this concept the following 
two questions were written. 
1-7 For one to develop their own self-mastery, it is 
necessary to reject all those structures and norms 
regardless of their origin which impedes one's self 
integration. 
1-7 *I find that what others consider to be true has a 
strong influence on my own construction of truth. 
Pre-Test of the Questionnaire 
The major concern in the pre-testing situation was to determine 
if the respondents could understand the questions and attempt to judge 
how they reacted to it. The Existential Consciousness Questionnaire 
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was administered to three sections of an Introductory English course, 
numbering approximately 25 students per class. The predominant compo-
sition of these classes were freshmen who were between the ages of 17 
and 19. The questionnaire was administered by the instructor and the 
writer of the questionnaire sat in the back of the room and observed 
how they responded to it. It took approximately 20 minu~es for the 
class to complete the questionnaire. It was noted that the students 
seemed to devote their full attention to the questions. Every quest~on 
was read and some were re-read. After the students completed the 
questionnaire the instructor introduced the writer, and in two of the 
sections, a 20~minute discussion ensued. The general impression from 
this pre-testing situation was the questions ceuld be understood by 
almost all ef the students. There was some difficulty with the term 
"eunuch" and through the discussions it was evident that few were aware 
of the existentialist perspective per~· 
Another pre-testing situation occurred in a very informal setting. 
The questionnaire was administered to three senior students who were 
willing to cooperate. Each persen read the questionnaire with a great 
deal of deliberation. In the discussion that follewed the subjects 
noted that they had never taken a questionnaire like this before and 
said they found it to be particularly interesting. Other comments were 
that they liked the paragraph statements which required some serious 
consideration. 
From these pre-testing situations it was generally believed that 
if an attempt was ta be made to write a novel and inte.resting question-
naire which would·attract both the interest of existentially-oriented 
people and underclassmen in general, the questionnaire, as it stood, 
would be appropriate. The questionnaires were administered and the 
following section will present the results. 
Item Analysis of the Questionnaire 
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From the construction of the questionnaire it is evident that the 
paragraph statements were followed by at least two alternative state-
ments. The first intention was to have the respondents choose only one 
of the statements and respond to it on a one to seven basis. After 
further deliberation it was felt that additional information could be 
gained if the respondents were able to r~spond to all the alternatives. 
The underlying assumption in making this decision was that a recon-
struction back to the original intention would be more feasible than 
attempting to speculate what the result might have been if the respon-
dents had the opportunity to respond to all alternatives. In the final 
analysis of this scale, the single-choice alternative was selected. 
This was achieved by the writer choosing only the existential response 
and only scaling the paragraph on this basis. In scoring the questio~s 
a seven was used to indicate the most existential response. The 
highest possible score for the final scale of 15 items was 105. 
A computer program (TESTSTAT) was used in an item analysis of the 
Existential Consciousness Questionnaire. The total scale means, sigmas 
and alpha coefficient of internal consistency are presented in Table 
III. The original R will be given for all items and only the R will 
be given for those which were included in the final scale. For both 
scales the mean, sigma and alpha coefficient will be stated. All 
items will be presented with the number as they appeared in the orig-
inal questionnaire. The items which were retained in the final R scale 
TABLE III 





Whatever the situation, choice 
is always possible. 
I am solely responsible for my own 
acts. 
I find that what others consider to 
be true has a strong influence on 
my own construction of truth. 
39. I believe there is little one can 
do in forming one's own reality for 
we are all part of a greater force 
(beyond our control) which sets in 
motion our actions. 
49. It'is necessary to reject all those 
·structures-and norms which hinder 
one's self expression. 
50. Freedom is · the ability to engage in 
forms of actions which have been pre.-
viously conceived. 
53. The realization of one's own freedom· 
most often is accompanied by anguish. 
54. Things will be as man decides-for 
them to be. 
55. It is impossible for mankind not to 
make choices. 
56. I often feel that what I have peen 
and den~ doesn't show my true,worth. 
59. Freedom is the ability to cheose 
between existing alternatives. 
62. Without a God, everything would be 
possible and in realizing this it 
is necessary to have a God or a 
form .of external authority to keep 
some semblance of order. 
70. Morality is a way of turning one's 
back on the will of existence. 
71. There are no moral phenomena, only 
moral interpretations of phenomena. 
40.-A. These rules (norms-mores-customs-
legitimizations) have been insti-
tutionalized and are necessary so as 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
These rules have been invented and 
each person must 4ecide for them-
selves if they are .to follow them 
regardless·of the censequences. 
Life may be meaningful only if one 
is willing to engage in action where 
everything is at stake and without 
any guarantee either'of outcame or 
of·any essential rightness. 
One must be committed to something 
with a stated goal or purpose so 
that one knows what to aim for. 
For one to develop their own self-
mastery, it is necessary to reject 
all those structures and norms 
regardless of their origins which 
impede one's self integration. 
A fixed (stable) human nature. 
A universal force. 
Heredity and gene structure. 
The ability to say NO. 
Cannot accept anybody else's 
interpretation of freedom but his/ 
her own. 
The person realized the magnificance 
of a God who is greater than he is. 
The very struggle toward the sunnnit 
is enough to fill a man's heart. 
For defying the gods this is a just 
punishment. 
Man confronted with his own·freedom 
must accept the responsibility of 
conducting his own life. 
There is nothing to become concerned 
about be.cause there is a purpose in 
life. 
Without a God, everything would be 
possible and in realizing this it 
is necessary to. have a God or a 
form of external authority to keep 
some semblance of order. 
The person has found peace with 
himself and God. 
Through the realization of indif-
ference one realizes their own 
freedom. 
He is not really happy but is in 







































Original Scale · 











met the criteria of .16 or greater to be statistically significant at 
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the .05 level. The lowest correlation value did not go below .35. The 
final alpha value of .69 suggests a high degree of internal consistency 
for items comprising the scale. The mean value for the scale was 65.0 
and the reported sigma was 10.85. 
Remaining Scales 
Socialization 
To gain some perspective on the degree to which the respondents 
experienced a few of the primary social institutions, a socilization 
scale was devised. The scale consists of six items of which two refer 
to the educational process, one to the home environment, one to 
religious affiliation, a question concerning the learning appropriate 
behaviors, manners, customs and tradition and the sixth concerning 
association with other people. These questions correspond to questions 
16 through 21 on the questionnaire. The respondents were asked to rate 
the degree of fle:Xibility they had within these.six situations. A one 
I 
response was to ind.iicate a situation of tight ce~trel • and a seven to 
represent a wide open situation. In Table IV the means of the respon-
dents f:rom the two agencies are presented. A computer program (TEST-
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STAT) analyzed the scale item construction of the socialization scale. 
The maximum score for the six items was 42, the reported mean score was 
22.80 and the 'sigma was 5.25. The alpha value of .64 indicates that 
there is a high degree of internal consistency among the items. The 
individual items all correlated beyond the .16 level which is to say 
they were statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The lowest 
level for the individual items was .50 with half. of the items ranging 
in the mid .6 level. The means do not represent a wide divergence 
(High U = 22.56, Low C = 24.33) which seems to indicate that the 
students from the two institutions experienced a similar degree of 




16. Education: K-8. 
17. Education: 9-12. 
18. Home environment. 
19, Religious affiliation. 
20. Learning appropriate behaviors: 
manners, customs, traditions. 


















Student Body Profile 
Table V presents the data for the student body profile. The pur-
pose of this scale was to assess the students' view of their other 
fellow students. The primary concern was to determine if they viewed 
their classmates as willing to direct their own source of action or 
education. In one way this may serve as an indication of the students 
perception of the degree to which other students enacted an existential 
mode of consciousness. The original scale consisted of 10 items. 
Through a later examination, question number 29 was omitted from the 
scale because it was not clearly stated and did not add to the concep-
tual overview for which the scale had been devi$ed. On the remaining 
eight items a computer program (TESTSTAT) analyzed the item construction 
and correlation of the individual items. The original R values and the 
final R values will be given for the questions. Through this analysis 
one item, number 26, was omitted from the scale. The question numbers 
of the items are those that appeared on the questionnaire~ The respon-
dents were asked to respond on a one to seven scale. The maximum score 
of 56 would indicate that these students were most willing to direct 
their own course of action which is another way to say they had a high 
mode of existential consciousness. Items which were reversed in 
scoring are indicated with an asterik (*). The mean score of the final 
scale was 30.80 and t~e sigma was 7.08. The,eight items were statis-
tically significant beyond the .05 level. The alpha value of • 73 
indicates a high degree of internal consistency among the items com-
prising the scale. The mean score reported fer High U was 29.34 and 
for Low Cit was 38.58. This indicates that the respondents from Low 
C perceived their fellow students to be more willing to direct their 
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own educational experiences than did those students at High U. 
TABLE V 
STUDENT BODY PROFILE 
Original Final 
Items R R 
Value Value 
(N = 152) (N = 152) 
* 22. General disinterest or apathy .42 .46 
23. Willingness to confront social 
* 
issues. .63 .66 
24* Willingness to follow rules. .58 .58 
25. Preference for an assigned text 
* 
in their classes. .46 .44 
26, Have stated objective in their 
* 
courses. .24 
27. Following guidelines formulated 
by others. .66 ,65 
28. Support total control for making 
one's own decisions. .60 .63 
30. Each student, by himself/herself, 
creating their own educational 
experience. .66 ,69 
31. Participate in radical overthrow 
of undesirable institutions. .60 .61 
Original Scale Final Scale 
Mean 22.80 Mean 30.80 
Sigma 5,25 Sigma 7.08 
. Alpha .64 Alpha ,73 
CHAPTER VII 
CONSIDERATION OF THE VARIABLES AND PROPOSITIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter is basically divided into three sections. It is the 
purpose of the first section to state the criteria that was used in 
designating various majors and educational institutions to represent 
the variables of act and agency. The second section will begin with a 
brief statement of the limitations of the study and then proceed to 
present the data concerning the propositions. The third section will 
present the responses to a single item on the questionnaire which asked 
the student to pick one of the following which best typified their 
feeling as a result of being within their perspective institutions: a 
eunuch, an imitator or an explorer. 
A Consideration of the Variables of 
Act and Agency 
Criteria for Low Act 
The two college majors that were operationalized for this study to 
represent a low act were sociology in one university and communications 
in the other. When sociology is considered in relation to the other 
majors which are offered within High U, it appears to be a good repre-
sentation. There is a relative degree of freedom in choosing electives 
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and there is a relatively wide range of courses to choose from within 
the discipline itself. The format of the courses for the most part is 
fairly structured which is evident by a series of standard texts which 
are used in the teaching of the courses. The introduction of new 
courses must be approved by the Board of Regents and in general student-
initiate<;[ courses within the department are not a common event. The 
most often used type of evaluation is through written exams which are 
made up by the instructor. In some cases these exams are of a take-
home type. Quoting from the High U's catalog the discipline and 
relevance it has for the individual student is viewed in the following 
manner. 
A bachelor's degree in sociology is not a professional degree 
as it is in education or engineering. Sociology is a basic 
academic discipline. However, employment opportunities are 
many for those who, in consultation with their advisors, 
develop a special sequence of courses. For example, there 
is a growing demand for undergraduate sociology majors in 
public and private agencies dealing in human relations 
(i.e., correctional agencies, social welfare agencies, urban 
planning agencies, community relations agencies). For those 
with earned graduate degrees, professional career opportun-
ities include such fields as teaching; business and industry, 
community relations and development, urban affairs, correc-
tions, health, civil service, and a large number of private 
and public agencies. 
At the undergraduate level, the department offers four 
learning areas: soFiology, anthropology, human resources 
and urban studies •. Academic 'training at the MS and PhD level 
is based upon six fields of concentration: anthropology, 
social problems and deviance, methods-statistics, social 
organization, social psychology and theory. 
All sociology majors may have their programs tailored to 
their individual needs by the department advisors. 
In comparison to other majors within High U, sociology seems to be 
a fair representation of a low act. In regard to the broader concep-
tual framework of a low act, sociology is not a good example. 
The criteria for choosing communications at Low C illustrates 
quite well the meaning of a low act. There are no stated requirements 
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of how many hours or what sequence one should follow in the program. 
This major is considered an interdisplinary major which has come into 
being through the demand and inter1=sts of the students. The mode of 
evaluation most often used is through projects. These projects may 
range from composing a connnunity based film or setting up lights for a 
rock concert. The standard set of criterion that is most often seen in 
the mass media is not taken as an example of what to do but serves as an 
example of control and manipulation by large corporate interests. 
A glimpse into the structure of this discipline may be gained 
through a consideration of who decides the structure of the program 
(self-determined) and who makes the decisions within the program 
(student governed). The following two descriptions are taken from the 
communications catalog. 
Self:....Determined: · The stud.ent is r¢sponsible fqr designing, 
carryingout and evaluating his or her program; The flex-
ibility in combining various experiences'and course work in 
other 9i$Ciplin~s allows the stude:p.t to Build a culrriculum 
appropriate ta his or 'her personal, career or graduate 
school needs. Students have developed majors in everything 
from Dance-Video to Pre-Med Communications, from Urban 
Cotnniunieations to General Systems Theory. 
Student Governed: The growing body of communications 
studies center represents a radical departure from tradit-
ional departmental structures in that stlidents take a 
m~.jority decision making status in matters.of academic, 
budgetary and administrative policy making. In addition. 
students advise faculty on inatters of' cu:t,riculum, and 
CSC makes wages available to students for student init-
iated courses. 
The variable of a low act was well represented by communications 
for it offered the students the ability to initiate, e;x:pl0re and eval-
uate their own a~ts. 
Criteria for Low Agency 
The cri~eria for the category low agency was well represented by 
the institution Low C. It is characterized by an active ongoing con-
cern among its members which included people on the janitorial staff, 
students, officers of the institution, professors and administrators. 
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A point of focal concern among members of the community of Low C 
centered around the future of the school. The future, as it was defined, 
relied upon how well the community would be able to meet three of its 
most threatening challenges. In reviewing these challenges various 
features of a high agency become apparent. These features will be 
discussed before pointing out the major elements of why Low C is a good 
representation of the criteria for a low agency. 
These challenges are all interrelated and are not presented in the 
order of their importance. One challenge is to decide what the rela-
tionship of the main campus will be to its network colleges. The 
rapid growth which the network experienced within the last five years 
has now leveled off, The major question seems to be if the main campus 
can afford to offer continual support to its members. A major cri-
terion of this challenge is to stabilize its growth and not have the 
members continue to drain the resources from the main campus. The 
mode of debate on this question is quite open. During faculty meetings, 
various members have asked that the President resign because of his 
apparent inability to lead the community. This call for resignation is 
a response by the members of the faculty who feel that the President is 
a primary supporter of the network system. The student newspaper on 
its front page has on various occasions demanded that the President 
resign. The President is, however, still acting through his office, 
for only the Board of Trustees can replace him. 
A second challenge that is in the process of being decided is what 
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to do regarding the commitment the President and a few board members 
have made to the model of pluralism. Pluralism was a directive~o bring 
in minority students or New Direction Students. These students, for all 
practical purposes, can be thought of as third world people who live in 
the ghettos of the United States. Although the great majority are non-
white, tpere are a few white students who are considered in this class. 
A primary requisite for this classification is a low financial status. 
The pluralism model attempted io bring the many segments of the society 
into the environment of a rich liberal arts college. This movement has 
generally been recognized as a failure from almost all concerned. One 
of the most damaging strikes in the schools history occurred in regard 
to this matter. The school is still attempting to recover. Low C 
increased its debt as a direct result of the strike from the damage 
sustained and more seriously from a loss of student enrollment. The 
projected student enrollment for the fall quarter of 1974 is estimated 
to be one third lower than it was a year ago. The challenge Low C 
faces in its failure to meet the pluralism model of education is but a 
reflection of the society's failure to meet its diversity commitments. 
The outcome of this challenge may be the most. challenging issue for all 
of us. The various outcomes and alternative courses of action which 
resulted in this struggle has been focused on a strike and the resulting 
firing and explusion of faculty and students which were all reinstated 
at a later time. It should be noted that 25% of the faculty, however, 
was cut in response to the financial strain the college was experiencing. 
Although it cannot be said that the Institute for the Solution of Social 
Problems was cancelled due to its involvement in the strike, a general 
statement may be that its involvements in the strike did not enhance its 
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acceptance among other members of the community who did not support the 
strike. The challenge of pluralism was met by competing components 
which attempted to redefine the power structure. 
A third challenge which involves the immediate security of the 
college is to develop a course of action that will bolster its dwind-
ling enrollments. The basic ongoing finances of the school are approx-
imately 90% dependent upon student tuition. In an attempt to meet this 
challenge the tuition was lowered in hopes of attracting more students. 
All students are requested to live on campus in an effort to meet the 
mortgage payments of the dorm. Other measures being taken are to re-
define management policies. 
The power structure of Low C is in a vertical arrangement, with the 
Board of Trustees at the top, followed by the President who is to direct 
and provide leadership for the community. Although th:i.s ·arrangement 
exists, office holders are not able to act solely from the authority of 
their office. The decisions of the various components of the school are 
subject to review and debate among other members. In comparison to 
High U, students have a great deal of•power and are involved in the 
decision-making procedures which concern their immediate interests. A 
major difference between Low C and High U is that the students of Low C 
believe that if the matter under conslderation affects the school in 
any way, it is therefore subject to their own immediate interests and 
thus they should be involved in the decision-making process. This can 
be illustrated in reference to a recent action of the faculty when they 
voted to abolish the Institute for the Solution of Social Problems. 
The students were enraged that the faculty would take such action. 
The challenges confronting Low C cannot be resolved by authori-
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tarian decision-making given the low agency profile. When various 
components are represented in the decision-making process, there may 
occur a series of conflicts which ultimately lead to force and violence. 
Diffusion of power sometimes leads to an active process of struggle. 
The resulting measures being introduced at Low Care pointing to a 
tightening up of its structure. Concern for survival is the first 
prablem they are facing. At this time there is still evidence that its 
various components recognize the need to gain an existing erder and for 
the most part are willing to support measures to ensure their survival. 
Weber has commented that a sure means of control can be exerted 
through the payment of wages. When the faculty size was reduced in an 
effort to economize, a group of professors suggested that members of 
the faculty could elect to receive two-thirds of their wages and a 
corresponding reduction of teaching duties. This measure was preposed 
to allow the released faculty members an opportunity to stay within 
the community and draw a living wage. This was not a new precedent for 
Low C. During the depression of 1929-1940 the President of Low C 
paid the members of the faculty according to need and not accerding ta 
rank. It was not uncommon for the President to be taking home a lower 
wage than junior faculty members. Weber's means of discipline through 
rank, salary, tenure, and status does not f.ind a streng base at Low C. 
In regard to its flexibility, Low C attempts to meet the many 
varied tasks which are developed within its community. Students can 
initiate courses. There is an adult degree program which seeks to meet 
the needs of those older people who for various reasens would like to 
complete a degree but are unable to attend a campus site. The network 
college program which is att·~mpting to diversify itself and provide 
168 
various oppressed members of the society with experience, knowledge and 
the credentials of a college education. 
A distinct aspect of Low C is its work-study or co-op program. 
This involves a working experience for the students in such areas that 
will make their education a more meaningful experience. This program 
was introduced and developed in the early 1920's by the·President of the 
college. When the students were asked why they chose Low C,. the co-op 
plan was mentioned frequently. In report Number Four which appeared in 
March of 1973 from the Office of Educational Evaluation and Research, 
the co-op program was viewed as an integral aspect of their education. 
In response to the question, What features of Low C most appeal to you 
now? by far the largest number (76%) named the co-op plan as highly 
appealing. The co-op plan helps to meet the indiv3.dual needs and inter-
ests of the members of Low C. From a publication reporting these co-op 
experiences the following exerpts are taken to illustrate another aspect 
of a low agency as it attempts to meet the many different tasks or acts 
within its structure. 
1. One development at the Low C campus is an increasing 
number of situations in whi.ch students work and study 
simultaneously. For example, a psychology major may 
spend six months at the Menninger Foundatio.n in Topeka 
(Kansas), working half....itime, taking part in seminars-
frequentlygraduate level-the other half, and getting 
the equiv~lent of dne quarter's stqdy and one quarter's 
work credits in the s:Lx month pericid. 
2. One stude11t has parlayed the academic poss:il!>ilities of 
co-op into wh<1,t will be the College's firstillllllunolegy 
degree. St~~ent X has done rese~rch work thr$ugh co-op 
at Stanford University~sMedical 1Micro-Biology La:borq1-
tory, at an ad~a:cent V.A. hespital anq~ on the strength 
of those experiences., in an immunology program affeted 
by the University er New Mexico's Medical Sdhool that 
· is 't,sually reserved for graduate or medical students. 
·· Research effo1;ts certified by Stc'.:1-nford as the equiv-
alent of' ac tuai course work f.ermed the ~ore of his 
degree plan, which was filled out with science credits 
earned at the Low C campus •. 
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Although the ten-member delegation ta China was net per~ a ca-ap 
program, it is listed here to cite the flexibility and willingness on 
the part af the Low C to support such learning experiences. This 
account was written up in the alumni paper of Low C which appeared in 
May, 1974. 
The group prepared for its 25 days in the People's Republic 
first by course work and Chinese language study done at the 
Low C campus, and then, beginning in January, in Hang Kang, 
where they spent six weeks in the study of medern China with 
the aid of China schalars, resident in Hang Kong.and in 
intensive language study. 
The language study was under the direction af Professar Y, 
assistant professor of Chinese at the Low C campus. Dele-
gation members emphasized that the prefessor was a former 
resident of the Peaple's Republic, was instrumental both 
in helping organize the China trip and readying the group 
for its visit. 
Low C is flexible in its structure; it is neither tightly bureau-
cratically organized nor mainly emphasizing efficiency; and it is 
responsive to the many varied tasks within its structure. 
Criteria for High Act 
The two variables which were selected to represent a high act are 
history and Family Relatians and Child Development (FRCD), History was 
chosen to represent a high act·at Low C. This is net a particularly 
good example of a high act. This is the case because within Low C 
there is a major emphasis on student involvement and decision making. 
When other majors were considered in the area of liberal arts, history 
seemed to represent a high act more than the other majors. The charac-
ter of the discipline itself permeates a great deal of its structure. 
History has often served as the foundation within a liberal arts 
perspective. It calls for a rigorous program of disciplined reading 
and analysis. To achieve such ends, a department would normally provide 
some structure to involve the students in such a task. This is the 
• 
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case at Low C. Its program on campus has a reputation for excellence. 
The Hiscary Field syllabus states three requirements of a history major. 
The two questions that should be asked are who decides the structure of 
the program and how are the decisions made. 
Plan of Study: There are three specific expectations of 
all history majors: the History Tutorial wi~h some member 
of the history department/faculty, as soon as possible after 
entry in the department; History Seminar given by the de-
partment staff every Winter Quarter; and Senior Project 
taken during six consecutive months senior year, preferably 
Winter and Spring. During the Summer Quarter of your sen-
ior year, you must file a brief statement notifying the 
department of your choice of advisor and topic for your 
senior project. The History Office gets two copies of 
each student's senior project, one to be graded and re-
turned, the other for the permanent files. 
There are no other department requirements although there 
are qualitative expectations. 
Decision Making: Students are encouraged to contribute 
to the policy making, administration, teaching and devel-
opment of the department, so that the department members 
may respond to one another's changing interests and needs. 
Student involvement includes: 
1. Election by history majors of three student members 
to the Department of Executive Committee. The faculty 
also selects three members, one of whom is the depart-
ment chaipna.n. The members share equally the right 
to determine departm~nt policy. 
2. Department, teaching, and research assistantships are 
available for academic or co-op c'redi t. ' . 
3. Student-initiated courses on topics havini to do with 
historical study, especially in areas not covered by 
the teaching fac~lty. 
History is not a particularly good example of a high act but it can 
be said that it does offer more structure thart comiil.unications. 
At High U, FRCD represents quite well the definition of a high act. 
The plan of study for this major consists of 136 semester hours in 
which there are no electives. The complete plan of study has been. pre"" 
arranged for the student. In many of the lower level courses the exams 
are made on the departmental level. The students often expressed a 
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strong dislike over this measure of control. Many of the exams are 
multiple choice which call for a detailed and specific awareness of the 
possible responses. 
At some time in the latter half of the junior or senior year the 
female students are required to live in the Home Management House. This 
is to prepare the student in the art of learning self-responsibility. 
Meals are planned, materials are bought and duties are assigned in an 
effort to teach students how to live on a fixed budget. Often times 
this requirement calls for a financial strain upon the student who is 
financing two living arrangements. 
The stated objectives of this act may be found in the general 
catalog of High U. 
Courses in family relations and child development assist 
students in developing the attitudes and skills which are 
fundamental to satisfying relationships in the home and 
community. 
The department has three major goals: 
(1) to offer professional preparation in fields·related 
to child development, early childhood education, and 
family relations and human development; 
(2) to improve the student's opportunities for a whole-
some and satisfying family life through an improved 
understanding of concepts of growth and of relation-
ships; 
(3) to make available to all college students, men and 
women, some general education for family living 
viewed as the basic human relationship. 
FRCD acts from the basic assumption that the staff is capable of 
providing a structural format that will lead the student to accept 
responsiblity as a contributing member of the society. 
Criteria for High Agency 
The variable of a high agency is well represented by the institu-
tion of High U. The first impression which may be received upon 
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viewing the campus is its neat and ordered appearance. The lawns are 
manicured and the bicycle paths are marked with white lines and arrows 
pointing to the appropriate flow of traffic. Occasionally one can 
detect worn paths across the grass which were probably made by wonder-
ing students who strayed off the approved paths. Within a few months 
these paths will be blocked off by inserting bushes with sharp thorns 
near the points of entrance and exit and/or the insertion of metal poles 
and a chain fence. 
The level of administration is arranged in a vertical fashion from 
the State Board of Regents to the President of the university and down 
through his staff. In regards to the relationship of administrators to 
the faculty and students it is arranged in a vertical flow of power and 
connnands. The administration formulates· policies which are expected to 
be carried out. "The President is responsible for· the total aspect of 
the Univers,ity. He oversees its policies." This st~tement was repeat-
edly made by several high-ranking officials. To cite an example of 
this vertical flow of power may serve to illustrate one aspect of a 
high agency. The following incident was ~elated to me by a high-
ranking official who held the rank similar to that of a head of a 
departm~nt. After receiving a call from a board member, the President 
called one of his Vice Presidents to investigate the matter in question. 
In tliis particular instance it involved the requesting of funds for a 
school service. The Vice President then called the head of the appro-
priate department who in turn called the students who were involved irt 
I 
the matter. After investigating the matter, appropriate action was 
fr taken to assure the board metttb.er that it would not happen again. This 
course of action was then related back, through channels, to the Vice 
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President. 
To illustrate the point that the President is never far away from 
the power to control aspects of the university, the following statement 
is taken from the student handbook, This matter concerns the student 
newspaper. While it is a stated objective that in a democracy the press 
shall be free from governmental influence, the government of High U is 
never far away. The student handbook states: 
The Board of Directors of High U Student Publications is 
accountable to the President for policies and procedures 
of student publications, for approval of student personnel 
and for approval of budgets of the 'O'Dolly', the 'Bluenut' 
and of such other student publications as the board deems 
advisable. The board consists of four student members, 
three faculty members and the director of the School of 
Journalism and Broadcasting. Two student members are 
journalism majors, and two non-journalism. The term of 
office is two years for student members and three years for 
faculty members. The Director of Journalism and Broadcast-
ing is a voting ex-officio member. 
While this may be a common practice for a high agency, this is not 
the practice at Low C. The editor of the student newspaper, darkroom 
manager, student bulletin director and other chairpersons are appointed 
by the Community Manager. The Community Manager is in turn appointed 
by the Community Council (Corneil). This organization is composed of 11 
members of which six are students, three non-students, the Comm.unity 
Manager and a representative from the Dean of the Community Services 
offices. 
Without belaboring the point, but yet to illustrate how Low C 
represents a low agency and how High U represents a high agency, a 
quick glance at the policy of grades may prove to be interesting. 
High U states in its handbook for faculty members the rather 
extensive overseeing powers of a bureaucratic agency. 
Reports of the final grades of all.students are prepared 
and released each semester by the Registrar's Office. These 
reports are made available ta the student, the student's 
parents, the student's advisor, the student's dean, the 
Dean of Students, the student-counselors in the.dormitories 
the draft boards throughout the country, and the ROTC depart-
ment. 
Six week grade reports for all freshmen and sophomore stu-
dents are made available to the students, the student's 
parents, the student's advisor, the Dean af Students,. 
student-counselors in the dormitories, and the student's 
dean. 
Low Chas provisions for giving letter grades but most often re-
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sorts to written evaluations and provides a space on the same form for 
the students to evaluate the professor. The follewing description is 
taken from their bulletin. 
Grades are not given for courses unless requested. Eval-
uation goes on continuously in a course as teacher and 
student inform each other critically and creatively of what 
they think they are learning, with suggestions for future 
direction. At the end of a course, the instructor reports 
in summary the work required in the course and the l!lumber 
of credits the student has earned (or No Credit if none 
has been earned). In addition, if there are fewer than 20 
students in the course (or in any event' if the student re-
quests an evaluation), the instructor assesses the quality 
of the student's work and how well the student has under-
stood the materials of the course; he includes also the 
studen~'s own estimate of his achievement. The Registrar 
enters the credits earned on the transcript part of the 
student's cumulative record. The student may use copies 
of the detailed evaluations to accompany his transcript 
if he wishes to include them. 
Low C does not send quarterly grade reports to parents. 
Students should share with their parents the reports of 
their educational progress. 
In closing this discussion a final.point of comparison between 
Low C and High U will be made in regard to their philosophies. High U 
primarily views students as a functional component who are expected to 
support the ongoing order or structure. As it is stated in the general 
catalog: 
High U is a conununity whose members include its students, 
faculty, and administrators. The basic purposes of the 
University are the enlargement, dissemination, and appli-
cation of knowledge. One of the most basic necessities for 
the achievement of these purposes is freedom of expression 
and communication. The University always must strive to 
achieve that balance between maximum freedom and necessary 
order which best promotes its basic purposes by providing 
the environment most conducive to the many-faceted activi-
ties of research, teaching, and learning. 
Each right of an individual places a reciprocal duty upon 
others: the duty to permit the individual to exercise his 
rights. The student, in his status as a member of the 
academic community, has both rights and duties. Within 
that community, the student's most essential right is the 
right to learn. The University has a responsibility to 
provide for the student those privileges, opportunities and 
protections which best promote the learning process in all 
its aspects. The student, for his part, has responsibilities 
to other members of the academic ~ommunity; the most impor-
tant of which is to respect those 1 rights of others which 
are equally essential to the purpose and processes of the 
University. 
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Low C regards education as a fulfilling process where students are 
responsible for integrating and creating their own meaningful educat-
ional experiences. The following statements are taken from the Low C 
bulletin. 
The competence that should result from a liberal education, 
Lloyd J. Averill has recently written, will mean increased 
capacity for meaningful and discriminating experiences, 
access to varied avenues into experience, an increasing 
repertoire of thoughtful responses to experience, and 
growth toward a livable wholeness-integrity-of experience. 
Thus life should not be divorced from work, nor the his-
torical and theoretical from the vocational or applied. 
The aim is· human wholeness. 
There are some 2200 Low C educations in progress at 
Jello Creek ••• 
Each individual embodies an adventure of existence, 
Whitehead has written. The art of life is the guidance of 
this adventure. Low C tries to help students, as needed, 
to learn how to run their own lives responsibly and to 
develop significant life purposes-not to do for students 
what they should do for themselves. 
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Consideration of the Propositions 
Limitations of the Study 
Three of the obvious limitations of this study are the question-
naire itself, the interviewing procedures used and the small number of 
.. '),,'"., 
respondents. In regard to the first limitation, the questionnaire was 
generally felt by many to be too long. Perhaps the most trying part of 
the questionnaire was the existential consciousness section. Repeated 
remarks from students at High U indicated ttlat they had some difficulty 
I 
! 
with a few of the questions. Everyone that was interviewed mentioned 
that they had never taken a questionnaire quite like that one. Some 
found it interesting but many tired rather quickly. In the adminis-
tration of the questionnaire at Low Cit became evident that the stu-
dents would not respond to completing the questionnaire. There are 
several apparent reasons. It was quite long and needed approximately 
45 minutes to complete. The student would not respond to a question-
naire without knowing the intention and how the information would be 
used. The students were quite willing to devote their attention and 
offer assistance on a personal level but generally disregarded attempts 
to regiment them into quick responses. The most frequent remark 
concerning the questionnaire was that they were not capable of making 
such generalizations. In regard to the students from High U, the 
concepts of anguish and negative freedom were generally not considered. 
In the process of interviewing the students the following comments 
need to be stated. I was ably assisted by a good fried who gathered 
some valuable information from interviewing students from the commun-
ications department. He taped his interviews and I carefully listened 
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to them, read his accompanying notes and discussed the interview with 
him. I conducted the greatest percentage of the interviews. I feel 
that I brought a bias into this procedure which should be noted. In 
interviewing the students at High U, I feel that I was able to gain a 
good rapport and response from the sociology majars. While inter-
viewing the students from FRCD I feel that I was unable to conduct a 
complete and in-depth interview. I generally found these students to 
be quite willing to cooperate which was probably part of the difficulty. 
The main hinderance in our interaction was that I was unable to draw 
out their personal respo~ses. In the case of interviewing adminis~ 
trators and faculty members~ I generally believe I was able to gather 
an accurate representation. 
Interviewing the students at Low CI found rather easy and enj0y-
able. The students were willing to talk and were not concerned with 
pleasing the interviewer. Generally speaking the students were highly 
iµvolved in their program 0f education and liked the attention afforded 
them during the interview. They were quite happy to relate their 
personal experiences. All the interviews, h0wever, were net this easy. 
In the course of interviewing a young Black woman, I found her quite 
responsive. Later that evening I attempted to probe into various 
matters with a group of Black students. This interview, which lasted 
several hours was quite worthwhile. Throughout the interview there was 
a slight feeling of distruct on their part and mine. If I were a 
Black, I am quite confident the interview would have been more re-
warding. 
In interviewing the faculty and administrators and other members 
of the community, I feel that I was able to gain a good representation 
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of my points .of inquiry. The interviewing procedure was used for a 
number of reasons: (1) to offer a check to asses the extent to which 
the questionnaires were really asking and gaining information they had 
been designed to obtain, (2) to gain experience in the technique of 
interviewing and (3) because I find interviewing quite enjoyable. Over-
all, I think this technique is a valuable aid in assessing one's data. 
It adds a m0de of human interaction from which I have gained a great 
deal. 
A third major limitation is in part directly related to the first 
in that the return rate was extremely low. In evaluating the results 
it should be kept in mind that the questionnaire analysis is primarily 
the result of High U. The low number of respondents fr0m Low C is 
heavily outweighed by the larger number 0f respondents from High U. It 
is difficult at best to infer from such a small return rate. This is 
due in part to the nature of the research design. In designating Low C 
as the low agency there were several drawbacks. The student population 
of approximately 2200 of which not more than half of this population 
attended the main campus at 0ne time immediately reduced the total 
number of students from which a sample could be drawn. Of the students 
that were on the campus, the enrollments in the designated majors were 
small. In history there was approximately 36 and in communications 
there was approxi.mately 15. Declaring majors at this institution was 
not a major concern of the students or of the registrar. In many cases 
one's major was declared at the point one was filing for graduation. 
I talked with many students who had graduated with a history major 
simply because they had accumulated the necessary hours. Although their 
major may be in one field, it was certainly not a positive indication 
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that the student considered that to be his primary interest nor the 
type of activity he would pursue after graduation. Majors were not 
considered as a criteria for putting together an educational experience. 
In most cases a major was a mere formality that allowed one to gain a 
diploma. 
For those students who received the questionnaire, there was little 
guarantee that it would be completed and returned. This was partially 
realized before the research was designed. It was generally believed 
that the excellence and innovative manner of the agency was worth the 
challenge in gaining the data. 
In the case of the return rate from students at High Uthe moderate 
return rate was-due primarily to the lack of experience in distributing 
questionnaires. I believe that if the questionnaires were passed out 
earlier in the semester and if more supervision had been applied, the 
return rate would have been higher. 
Another limitation of the study concerned the representation of 
the various classes of students. In drawi~g the sample there was no 
attempt made to draw a random sample of these categories of students. 
Consideration of the Propositions 
Proposition 1 : Those students engaged in a low act will on the 
average have a higher existential consciousness 
than those engaged in a high act. 
In regard to the measurement as devised in the Existential Con-
sciousness Questionnaire (hereafter this questionnaire will be re-
£erred to as ECQ) the means indicate that there is a high degree of 
existential consciousness for those students who are engaged in a low 
act. The reported means for students in a high act was 63.66 while 
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students in a low act had a reported mean of 66.19. The PIL measure-
ment indicates a lower mean score for those who were engaged in a low 
act. For the PIL the reported mean for those students in a high act 
was 108.14 while it was 99.99 for those in a low act. These two scales 
seem to indicate in this instance an inverse relationship. The ECQ 
does not attempt to measure a commitment to a goal or purpose because 
its basic concept of freedom and responsibility demands an ongoing 
mediation which does not lend itself to a stated policy or purpose. 
In this sense the inverse relationship seems to support the contention 
of the first proposition. 
The mean score of the Student Body Profile (hereafter it will be 
referred to as SBP) which is a scale to indicate how the respondents 
perceived their fellow students in regard to their willingness to direct 
their own activities indicates an inverse relationship to the direction 
of the ECQ. Students who were engaged in a low act generally perceived 
their fellow students as having a lower willingness to direct their own 
activities. To say it another way, students in a high act regarded 
their fellow students as being more willing to direct their own activ-
ities. The mean score for those students in a high act was 32.46 while 
for those in a low act it was 29.35. 
Proposition 2: Those students engaged in a low agency will on the 
average have a higher existential consciousness 
than those engaged in a high agency. 
The mean score on the ECQ lends support for the confirmation of 
this proposition. Those who were engaged in a high agency reported a 
mean of 64.77 while those in a low agency reported a mean of 66.29. A 
word of caution should be said in regard to placing a great deal of 
we£ght on the mean scores. It is obvious that the number of respondents 
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from Low C is small. It can be said, however, that the direction of 
increase toward a higher mode of existential consciousness is higher for 
those who attend Low C. 
TABLE VI 
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT AND EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Act 
Existential High Low 
Consciousness 
ECQ 
Mean 63.66 66.19 
Sigma 11.40 10.35 
N 71 81 
PIL 
Mean 108.14 99.99 
Sigma 13.04 14.02 
N 71 81 
SBP 
Mean 32.46 29.35 
Sigma 6.11 7.61 
N 71 81 
An analysis of the PIL indicates again that the mean score is 
lower for those students involved in a low agency (mean= 94.5) than 
those who attended High U or a high agency (mean = 105. 54). This rela-
tionship supports the same inverse trend that was reported in proposi-
tion one. It may be said again that the inverse relationship is not 
contradictory but rather lends support to the confirmation of the 
proposition. The means and corresponding N of the ECQ and PIL as well 
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as the means for the profile may be found in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
RELATIONSHIP OF AGENCY AND EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Act 
Existential High Low 
Consciousness 
ECQ 
Mean 64.77 66. 29 · 
Sigma 10.61 tZ.42 
N 128 24 
PIL 
Mean 105.54 94.5 
Sigma 13.69 13.03 
N 128 24 
SBP 
Mean 29.34 38.58 
Sigma 6.35 5.81 
N 128 24 
When the Student Body Profile is analyzed in regard to the variable 
of agency it indicates that the mean score is higher for those students 
who are engaged in a low agency. Students engaged in a high agency 
reported a mean of 29.34 while those in a low agency reported a mean of 
38.58. 
Proposition 3 : The order of existential consciousness from the 
least to the.most will be in the following order: 
high act and high agency; high act and low agency; 
low act and high agency; and low act and low 
agency. 
The mean differences of the ECQ certainly do not represent a great 
' 
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deal of difference. Perhaps the only noticeable degree of difference in 
regard to mean scores may be viewed in the scores from the low act and 
low agency and those of the high act and high agency which are 63.56 and 
69.40 respectively. The other categories of a high act and low agency 
and a high agency and a low act reported means of 64.07 and ~5.73. The 
data concerning this proposition may be viewed in Table VIII. From an 
overview·· of the means· it may be said that the general direction of 
increase as stated in the proposition is supported in the data. 
TABLE VIII 
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT AND AGENCY TO EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
High Act Low Act 
Existential High Low High Low 
Consciousness Agency Agency Agency Agency 
ECQ 
Me~n 63.56 64.07 65.73 69.40 
Sigma 11.09 13.04 10.19 11.42 
N 57 14 71 10 
PIL 
Mean 111.18 95.79 101.01 92.70 
Sigma 10.86 14.23 14.10 11.62 
N 57 14 71 10 
SBP 
Mean 30. 77 39.36 28.20 37.50 
Sigma 4.71 6.48 7.24 4.83 
N 57 14 71 10 
When the variables of act and agency are considered together, the 
direction of increase in regard to the .ECQ may·be said to be attributed 
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to the act, which is to say, of the four cells the lower cells are 
represented by students from a high act while the upper two cells are 
represented by students from a low act. This would indicate that the 
direction of increase may be due more to the influence of the act then 
the agency. This indication would serve to strengthen the proposition 
under consideration as well as proposition one. 
The mean scores of the PIL seem to indicate a partial continuance 
of the inverse relationship to the ECQ. In the case of the high act 
and high agency the mean of 111.18 was the highest while the lowest 
reported mean of 92.70 was reported by those students who were engaged 
in a low act and low agency. The second highest PIL score of 101.01 
was reported by those students who were engaged in a low act and high 
agency while the next to lowest of 95.79 was rePQrted for those students 
engaged in a high act and a low agency. These two ~ddle cells did not 
follow an inverse relationship with the ECQ. 
In·regard to the SBP those students who were engaged in a low act 
and a high agency reported the lowest mean score of 28.20. They were 
followed in ascending order by the categories of high act and high 
agency (30.77), low act and low agency (37.50) with the highest mean 
score of 39.56 being reported by those students who were engaged in a 
high act and low agency. 
Proposition 4 : Upper division students will on the average have a 
higher mode of existential consciousness than 
those lower division students. The order in which 
they appear is from the lowest to the highest mode 
of existential consciousness; high act and high 
agency; high act and low agency; low act and high 
agency; and low act and low agency. 
The data that will be discussed in relation to this proposition 
lll2Y be found in Table IX. When means are considered for the ECQ, the 
TABLE IX 
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT, AGENCY AND CLASS RANK TO EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Hi~h Act Low Act 
Existential High Agency Low Agency High Agency Low Agency 
Conscious- Underclass Upperclass Underclass Upper class Underclass Upper class Underclass Upper class 
ness Students Students Students Students Students Students Students Students 
ECQ 
Mean 62.43 64.22 66.25 63.20 66.47 65.05 67.00 71.00 
Sigma 11.49 10.96 19.52 10. 74 9.11 11.18 10.23 12.82 
N 21 36 4 10 34 37 4 6 
PIL 
Mean 110.90 111.33 94.25 96.40 99.03 102.84 96.25 90.33 
Sigma 10.21 11.37 13.25 15.25 13.80 14.31 13.57 10.76 
N 21 36 4 10 34 37 4 6 
SBP 
Mean 31.10 30.58 38.00 39.90 29.82 26.70 40.75 35.33 
Sigma 4.93 4.63 9.80 5.24 6.75 7.44 3.40 4.59 
N 21 36 4 10 34 37 4 6 
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direction of increase is not supported by the mean scores. The first 
cell (high act and high agency, mean= 62.43) and the fourth cell (low 
act and low agency, mean= 71.00) indicate that upperclass students do 
have a higher mean score on the ECQ. However, the. two middle cells 
which are high act and low agency (underclass students reported a mean 
score of 66.25 while upperclass students reported a mean score of 63.20) 
and low act and high agency (underclass students reported a mean score 
of 66.47 while upperclass students reported a mean score of 65.05) do 
not indicate a higher mean score for upperclass students. In both of 
these cells, the mean score of upperclass students was lower. The 
initial mean scores in cells two and three are close enough to allow us 
to consider them as representing a similar base. The amount of decrease 
is less in the case for those students who were engaged in a low act. 
The highest mean score was reported by those students who were engaged 
in a low act and a low,agency. This seems to be cotjsistent with the 
findings throughout the data that for those students who are engaged in 
a low act the score will be higher on the ECQ. 
The mean scores on the PIL for the categories of high act and high 
agency (underclass students= 62.43 and upperclass students= 64.22) 
and high act and low agency (underclass students= 99.03 and upperclass 
students= 102.84) indicate that the upperclass students reported a 
hi$her mean score. It should be noted the amount is minimal. For those 
students engaged in a low act and low agency the underclass students 
repQrted a mean of 96.25 while the upperclass students reported a mean 
of 90.33. If the mean score rep~rted for a high act and high agency 
for the underclass students and upperclass students can be regarded as 
a stable condition, then the trend that had been observed in proposition 
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one and two and partially in three of an inverse relationship between 
ECQ and PIL is again evident. In general the amount of difference be-
tween underclass students and upperclass students for mean scores on the 
ECQ and PIL are minimal. 
The SBP indicated that underclass students in a high act and a 
high agency (31.10), in a low act and high agency (29.82), and in a low 
act and low agency (40.75) all reported a higher mean score than the 
upperclass students for the sa~e categories (30.58, 26.70, 35.33). 
Those students who were engaged in a high act and low agency reported a 
mean score of 38.00 for underclass students while upperclass students 
reported a mean of 39.90. 
Student Characterization of Self 
This chapter will close with the reporting of the responses to 
question number 75 as it appeared in the questionnaire: As a result of 
being in this institution, I can best describe my.state of feeling as: 
(1) a eunuch, (2) an imitator, or (3) an explorer. 
The responses may be found in Table X. It is evident that the 
only group of students who saw themselves as explorers were those who 
were engaged in a low act and a low agency. With the exception of one 
student who regarded himself as an imitator, the remaining 13 students 
of the high act and low agency regarded themselves as explorers. Of 
the total number of 54 students who were engaged in a high act and high 
agency, 17 indicated they felt like imitators while 37 reported they 
viewed themselves as explere~s. Of those 71 students engaged in a low 
act and high agency the following responses were given: seven respon-
ded with eunuch, 26 felt like imitators and 38 felt like e:xplorers. 
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TABLE X 
HOW THE STUDENTS VIEWED THEIR MAJOR 
High Act Low Act 
Categories High Agency Low Agency High Agency Low Agency 
Eunuch 0 0 7 0 
Imitator 17 1 26 0 
Explorer 37 13 38 10 
Total N 54 14 71 10 
CHAPTER VI II 
CONSIDERATION OF THE MAJOR THESIS AND POSSIBLE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE INQUIRY 
Introduction 
This final chapter will focus on two topics. The first section 
will comment briefly on the four possible situations of act and agency 
as they have been discussed in the testing model. The major focus will 
be directed to the category of a low act and a low agency. In this 
section the position will be taken that a low act and a low agency do 
lend itself toward an emergent form of an existential consciousness. 
The second section will consider a possible contribution of the study 
which may be the form of a questionnaire which is able to measure a 
mode of existential consciousness as it was developed in this model. 
Consideration of the Major Thesis 
By way of introduction to the consideration of the major thesis of 
the model, the three categories of a high act and high agency, low act 
and high agency, and a high act and a low agency will be considered in 
view of a few general observations concerning how they relate to the 
general model. 
Students who were engaged in a high act and a high agency exhibited 
a great sense of purpose or direction. The head of the department re-
ferred to this group as "knowing what they wanted". This certainly 
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seemed to be the case. They experienced a great am.aunt af structure to 
gain the credentials to enable them to teach or ta help them in their 
personal lives. Their mean scare of 111.18 on the PIL was the highest 
of all the groups. Their mean score on the .ECQ of 63.56 was the lowest 
of all the groups. In regard to the general model it can be said that 
this cell of a high act and a high agency was expected to offer the 
least amount of transition. The process of mediatien was censidered to 
be the lowest where participants act from a preconceived notion or pur-
pose which involves a sense of direction. Conflict or negative think-
ing is not a major characteristic of this type. I generally found this 
to be the case for this group. Studen,ts seemed to go threugh a pre-
determined cour'se of events without vigorously questioning the existing 
structure or looking for alternatives. It should be noted that in such 
a situation there might ha.ve been more students ch~racterizing them-
selves as eunuchs or.imitators. Two reasons are offered te explain 
this. One is tlhat in such a smooth runntng program~ deuotets or rebels· 
might tend to leave the pr9gram. The other reason which suggests the 
great importance of a pr~Jtis b that these.students may have exper-
ienced si tuatio.ns in which they . could relate and apply their theory into 
practice. The varieus moq.es of obse:rvation, laboratory school settings 
' . . . 
and student teaching programs may have greatly helped ta.support the 
feeling of an explorer. 
In regard to the group of students who were within a situation 
. I 
characterized by a low act and high agency, there are several observa-
tians to be made. The students ,seemed aware of the high structure of 
their environment and expressed their'concern toward w~nting more 
opportunity to experience or work in their fields of i~terest. Yet 
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only 38 students viewed themselves as explorers while 26 viewed them-
selves as imitators and seven saw the.mselves as eunuchs. It was noted 
earlier that when sociology was compared to other majors within High U, · 
it was considered to be a geod representation of a law act. It was 
noted, however, that in regard to the conceptual scheme of a low act, 
it was not a particularly good representatien. Through the interviews, 
observation in the classroom situatio~, a mean score on the PIL of 
101.01, and a mean score of 65.73 on the ECQ, it seemed that these 
students were looking for a creative means to express themselves in 
which approximately 55% of the respondents felt like they were able to 
explore their own acts. Within such a situation of a low act and a 
high agency there was an environment of mediation occurring in which 
the seeds of a transformation were present. I believe there is an 
indication that this group is actively looking for means to become 
more actively involved in their own acts. 
In regard to the category of a high act and low agency, as was 
generally stated before, this is not a particularly goddrepresentation 
of this category. The histery major did not ,offer a gaod represent-
ation of a high act. In this situation the agency exhibited a greater 
amount of influence and direction over the entire.situati~n. This is 
also the case for the situation of a low act and high agency, which is 
to say· that the agency exhibited a ~reater degree af influence. Of all 
the categories considered, the one characteriz.ed by a lew act and low 
agency exhibited.the greatest amount of existential consciousness. 
It is the central thesis of the model that the mode of .existential 
consciousness would be highest for those who engaged in a situation 
characterized by a low act and a low ag7ncy. The theoretical £oundation 
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of this statement states that acts serve as the transmitter or means of 
exploring one's own potential and creative fulfillment. This is to say 
that consciousness is formed through the acts in which one is involved. 
These acts are not regarded as occurring in a vacuum but within an 
environment which operates to facilitate or impede the movements of the 
acts. Ac ts are the means through which one gains consciousness. When 
the act is low, which is to say when it does not impede the initiation, 
development or evaluation of the activity or task to be pursued, one 
must then experience the influence and power of one's own direction. 
When the agency is low, which is to say, when it does not impede the act 
through attempts of control by providing predetermined alternatives or 
measures to enforce directives to predefined ends, the resulting dialec-
tical.process between act a:ad agency will give rise to an existential 
mode of consciousness providing the level of consciousness is high. 
Within the testing model as it was operationalized, the data suggest 
that this may be the case. From my own observations and study of the 
situation, I believe this prq,pos.i tian is supported. 
Students who were engaged in a low act and a low agency showed an 
exuberance in regard to their own form of .involvement in their own 
educational pursuit. This expression of invelvement is well typified 
by a comment made by a second year communication niajor. 
There is like a real clique of common people. There is a 
group that does things and when we are all in courses and 
places it all kind of 1meEJh~s tli>ge ther. So you dcm' t know 
where a course work ends and playing begins because it is 
all in the same area.· Everybody is just into it and doing 
it. Like thei;ttre people who are.always acting, they are 
getting credit for actingand putting plays. We are 
getting credit for our dtal involvement. Everything you 
do is related to communications. 
Another communications underclassman expressed his feelings toward 
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the manner in which the communications program was structured. 
The video department 
is how they work and 
ever much you want. 
atmosphere. You can 
says here is a bunch of toys: There 
yeu are free ta play with them how-
It makes for a really live creative 
really do whatever you want. 
Through this mode of activity I believe one is able to express 
one's sel.f as an artist which is to say one is able ta conceive the 
idea and see it take form and shape under the direction of one's own 
guidance. Art in the sense I am using it here assumes that the creation 
of an element is an act of creativity and as such is not practiced as a 
technique. Students who were involved in this pregram were quite per-
ceptive and I think exhibited the highest mode of existential conscious-
ness. 
One student in particular expressed himself in what I would con-
sider to be an example of a high mode of existential consciousness. His 
radical insights cut through the surface layers ef planned choice.and 
freedom. In describing his relationships to Low C, he cansidered it to 
be a highly structured institution. In his train of thought it would 
be considered a high agency. He made the following statement to 
illustrate his point. 
There are two real important things you must consider: where 
do people live and what type of food do they eat. When they 
are interfered with, they act as a source of manipulation 
and hinderance to freedom. Unless you get those two things 
taken care of, you can't do anything. These are the two 
most important structured aspects of the school; like every-
body is forced to live in the dorms and the food service is 
. a continual problem. We are forced to buy a certain number 
of food tickets-that is pretty fucked-that is pretty bad. 
In view of the living arrangements at Low C, they would be con-
· sidered wide open at High U. There were few regulations existing in 
the dorms at Low C. There is free access to all rooms, at all times, 
and by all people. Couples may live together and groups may petition 
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to live together. This particular student, however, viewed the mere 
fact that he was required to live in a dorm and buy food tickets as 
oppressive. "Yes, the living arrangements keep me from living my life 
the way I want to. These two things are a basic part of my life." 
His awareness of the situation and the ability to notice pre-
defined alternatives as limiting one's freedom is essential to an 
existential mode of consciousness. It is my opinion that he was not 
acting in a state of rebellion to authority or power but analytically 
appraising the essentiql elements of freedom. 
It is really important for somebody to choose their own life 
style in terms of personal growth, finding out what is most 
comfortable for you. Once you establish a firm base on that 
level you could do a lot of other things-in terms of your 
work and relationships with other people. 
The communications program at Low C provided an atmosphere where 
the students could originate their own ideas, put in practice their 
ideas; and in conjunction with their fellow students, a faculty and 
others, they could evaluate their own work. A fourth-year communica-
tions student expressed his major as total access. "Here I can do any-
thing I want, which is like tetal access. It is like the closest thing 
to owning my own system which.is why I like communications." 
' . 
It is my opinion that students who were majoring at Low C in 
communications exhibit~d the highest amount of existential conscious-, 
ne~s ~ban other groups of students.! Through this experience, it is 
suggested that the person can more easily recognize the transforming 
aspects ef the work process. This process involves tecognizing and 
realizing the subjective elements of the self being projected into the 
abject of creation and also realizing the transforming aspects of the 
objective elements of the working process which leads to higher modes 
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of consciousness. "For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness 
of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of 
what is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth" (Hegel, 
1967:141). 
Through this mode of consciousness which is facilitated through 
low acts one realizes the importance of the working process of the act 
of labor. 
Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked 
evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words; labour 
shapes .and fashions the things ••• The consciousness that 
toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the 
direct apprehension of that independent being as its self 
(Hegel, 1967:238). 
Another contributing factor to an existential model of conscious-
ness is the organizational structure of a low agency. Low C provides 
A an environment which is supportive of many diff7rent tasks or acts. 
basic assumption from which Low C acts is that students learn through 
making their own decisions. A dean of the school said: "Education 
must be an active process where the students are involved in making 
their own decisions." Low C continually tried to keep an open environ-.. 
ment where students could plan their own educational ptogram. The 
co-op plan is essential in involving students in an action-orientated 
p~gram. This aspect of the program lends itself in support of a 
praxis. A praxis in the general model and the testing model has been 
suggested as the vehicle of transformation where one directs and ex-
periences one's own acts. When the act and agency are of a low profile, 
they tend to support an open flow of communication between the person 
directing the action and the environment which facilitates a reflexive 
movement back to the person. When a high level of consciousness is 
mediating this process of a low act and a law agency, it will generally 
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give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. 
The testing model did not attempt to evaluate the various levels 
of consciousness among the respondents. In the general m0del, however, 
it was suggested that a high level of consciousness is one that is 
actively engaged in the mediation process. A few comments concerning 
the variable of consciousness should be offered. I am assuming that to 
acquire an existential mode of consciousness one becomes involved in 
the process of ego detachment from self and the given mode of the 
situation. Through this process of detachment, one undergoes a ques-
tioning of the obvious. What seemed to be only natural or to represent 
a common sense construction of reality are analytically scrutinized in 
a meta-analytical fashion. To engage in a radical meta-analysis is in 
effect calling for a questioning that will go to its roots. In the 
process of this questioning one may come to confront reified structures. 
When the environment is supported by a low act, a low agency and a high 
level of consciousness, it is suggested that this type of situation 
will lead to viewing the life process as existing in a field of rela-
tions which are in a paradox. It is further assumed that the detach-
ment process is enhanced when one undergoes experiences which support 
a process of involved mediations. This is to say that if one primarily 
experiences or is educated te think of· experiences in a linear 
contradictory fashion of support or denial of a basic superstructure, 
then one tends not to see oneself as the center of the mediation pro-
cess to either act or agency. In doing so, the me,diation process 
takes on a low profile. When the mediation precess is actively 
centered on the self, then one must determine for oneself the relation-
ship that exists between and among the various elements. Many times 
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this active process of mediation, when it is directed by oneself, is 
brought about through conflicting interpretations. What is needed at 
this point is the freedom to experience these seemingly conflicting 
assertions. An environment of a low act and a low agency supports this 
freedom; and through the mediation process, it is suggested that such 
a situation will give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. 
When the mediation process is viewed as existing in a field of relations 
characterized by a paradox, the dialectical aspect of self and the world 
is accentuated. Through the realization of a dialectical process, one 
realizes the equilibrium state of being and chooses to act in a dialec-
tical process of becoming where one is actively involved in the act of 
transformation. 
The theoretical construction of the model suggests that a low act 
and a low agency will give rise to an existential mode of consci.ousness. 
My observations and the indication gained from the data lends support, 
I think, to the confirmation of the central thesis of the model. This 
inquiry may have two major findings. One may add to the,confirmation 
of the central thesis of the model and the other could be a development 
of a scale which could measure an existential mode of consciousness. 
Existential Consciousness Questionnaire 
The literature in sociology and psychology has a multitude of 
scales that in one way or another attempt to measure anomie, alienation, 
self-concept and, in the case of the PIL, attempts to measure a variant 
of existentialism. Among all these scales there is lacking one which 
attempts to measure an existential mode of consciousness as it was 
developed in this inquiry. A possible contribution of this study might 
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exist in the development of such a measurement. The central aspect of 
this questionnaire focues on one's ability to perceive a concept of 
freedom which is based upon one's ability to negate a given situation. 
This implies that one must be at the center of the ~ediation process 
which will unify and give meaning to the relations that exist between 
the immediate .and the determinate. The components of this questionnaire 
basically focus on the concepts of freedom, choice and the will to power. 
Through an analysis of the means of this questionnaire there seems 
to be little difference between the groups of respondents. The 
direction, however slight, did follow the suggested pattern. That.is, 
students who were engaged in a high act and a high agency exhibited the 
lowest mode of existential consciousness as it was measured by the ECQ 
(mean= 63.56) which was followed by the high act and low agency (mean 
= 64.07), low act and high agency (mean= 65.73), a~d the highest mean 
score of the ECQ was reported by the respondents in a low act and low 
agency (mean = 69. 4 ), • When the nature of the data is considered, in 
.this case consciousness, slight changes as represented by numbers may 
indicate. a rather insignificant amount of difference. What may seem 
rather insignificant in quantitative measures may be significant in 
' 
qualitative measures·. Statistical analysis and quantitative measures 
may not always detect ongoing qualitative changes. This point may be 
illustrated in the case of the shrewd gambler ~ho has loaded the dice. 
He may only use the ~oaded dice one out of ten throws. On the statis-
~ical face value of such an analysis one out of ten would seem to 
indicate mere chance. However, when using the loaded dice, he only 
needs to bet approximately on one out of ten throws to win large amounts 
of' money. Quantitatively, it may be attributed to chance; qualitatively, 
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he is using loaded dice and taking home the money. The point to be 
brought out is that the amount of qualitative difference may be small 
in measuring such a concept. 
Although the difference among the reported mean scores on the ECQ 
and less so for the PIL indicate a small variance, this is not unusual 
when considering other educational studies. One reason has already 
been suggested by way of only detecting small but important changes. 
Another reason which should be noted is the possibility that educational 
institutions for the most part do not cause a considerable amount of 
difference one way or the other. My personal feelings on this are one 
of immediate doubt because I would like to think of my mode of work as 
contributing toward a change which would foster a praxis. My second 
thought on this matter is that the educational process is but an 
extension of the socialization process in which .students for the most 
part pick or are placed in situations which will be supportive of their 
prior socialization. This question has raised some interesting points 
for further consideration. 
When the ECQ·is viewed alongside of the PIL there is some evidence 
to suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the two scales. 
This point will be more thoroughly analyzed, I hope, in other research 
projects. If this tendency continues to appear, I think it will make a 
r 
stronger case for the ECQ in measuring what it purports to measure. If 
this does materialize, then it could be a valuable contribution to the 
field of sociology and psychology and other interested disciplines. 
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